

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

INTERNAL USE ONLY

This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable.

NO. 44

25 SEPTEMBER 1973

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS	1
GENERAL	16
EASTERN EUROPE	25
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	29

CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS

Washington, D. C., Friday, September 7, 1973

Colby Revamps CIA Unit in White House Shakeup

The Office of National Estimates, which CIA Director William E. Colby is abolishing in a White House-ordered shakeup, is to be replaced by a less structured group of intelligence analysts who will individually prepare intelligence estimates under new guidelines.

Despite an effort by the CIA leadership in recent weeks to deny that a radical shakeup of the intelligence evaluation procedure has already been decided upon, the Star-News has learned:

- That Colby decided more than two months ago to abolish the elite 10-man Board of National Estimates which for more than 20 years carried collective responsibility for preparing objective intelligence estimates. The decision was discussed among high-ranking CIA officials late in June and revealed at a subsequent meeting of the high-level U.S. Intelligence Board, but has not been announced to the agency rank and file or to the congressional oversight committees.

- That the board's distinctive and prestigious product, the 50 or more National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) it prepared annually, will now be prepared by individual researchers in a loosely defined group with the new designation: National Intelligence Officials (NIO).

- That NIEs henceforth will be altered to meet long-standing Nixon administration dissatisfaction with the calibrated and scholarly product of the board and its 20-man staff, which together formed the Office of National Estimates. Colby is said to have ordered the NIOs to make their assessments brief, to the point and factual.

To give the new NIE format an added air of precision, Colby has reportedly ordered the abolition of the long-standing verbal scale of certainty which used such hedge words as "apparent," "Possible," "probable" and "almost certain."

INSTEAD, Colby has ordered a numerical scale of certainty from 1 to 10. The FBI has for many years graded informants cited in reports on a T-for-trust-

worthiness scale on which T-10 indicates total confidence and T-1 indicates almost no reliability.

Authoritative sources in the intelligence community have misgivings about these changes, warning that the substitution of individual analysts for the collective product of the old system could rob future NIEs of objectivity.

These same sources scoff at the new numerical grading system, calling it a "cosmetic way to achieve a false sense of precision."

Despite the frequently reported complaint of White House policy makers that NIEs were too verbose and took too long to read, intelligence sources familiar with the estimating process point out that estimates deliberately written at greater length in the Nixon administration because Henry A. Kissinger wanted them that way.

EVIDENTLY distrustful of BNE output from the start, Kissinger passed the word that he wanted NIEs to include a detailed exposition of the evidence and a clear development of the analytical argument as well as the detailed summary of conclusions the NIEs had previously set forth.

The administration distrust of the existing analytical function seems to be the basic motivation behind the abolition of the BNE and its staff, despite the fear voiced by knowledgeable observers that "the independence and objectivity of the national estimates are threatened by the abolition of this office."

In an internal bulletin circulated in the CIA and to some congressmen a few days after the Star-News first reported last month that the ONE would be abolished, the CIA leadership declared that "the goal is to conserve resources and maintain efficiency by combining the production of NIEs with certain other agency and intelligence community functions."

One undeniable effect of the decision is to remove a

body that had a unique and symbolic reputation for objectivity. It is understood some BNE members and ONE staffers will continue to analyze under the new title of National Intelligence Official. Others are to be assigned to a newly created Office of Political Research, reportedly to be headed by Ramsey Forbush, a former member of the BNE.

WHILE THE new structure at CIA clearly reflects White House wishes, the details are understood to be Colby's alone. He is especially credited with the guidelines calling for numerical rather than verbal grading and the decision to remove the estimating function from collective to individual responsibility.

According to one inside source, Colby has shown himself to be as much a stickler for form in his own arrangements as he was in setting his precision guidelines for writing estimates. Until he was finally sworn in as CIA director this week, he continued to operate from small offices in the CIA headquarters and did not move into the director's big suite until the formalities were observed. He also continued to park his car in a remote spot in the vast agency parking lots until Tuesday, when his title became official.

Colby's creation of NIOs in place of the ONE structure is not intended to take

the CIA's analyzing function across the line that divides prediction and assessment from policy making, informed sources stressed.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD that the analyses which are now beginning to come from the NIOs assiduously avoid policy proposals—thereby fulfilling for the moment the CIA leadership's pledge in its recent bulletin that "the objectivity of NIEs will be sustained."

For the longer runs, the relationship of the intelligence community to U.S. foreign policy will not be clear until Kissinger has settled into his new position as secretary of State. At present, he still dominates foreign policy from the White House. In his capacity as head of the 120-man National Security Council staff.

But the stature and role of the revamped CIA in the second Nixon administration will not become firm until Kissinger develops a modus operandi for his new dual role as secretary of State as well as National Security Council director. A key unanswered question is whether he will continue to rely on his own NSC crew or, by depending more on career bureaucrats at State, come to depend more on the product of Colby's newly reorganized system of producing intelligence estimates. — OSWALD JOHNSTON and JEREMIAH O'LEARY.

LONDON TIMES
6 September 1973

The cold warrior in the hot seat of the CIA

Mr William Egan Colby could be mistaken for one of the thousands of middle-aged bureaucrats who drive into Washington from the outer suburbs each morning to shuffle papers in government departments such as Agriculture, Transportation, and Health, Education and Welfare. A superior bureaucrat (Princeton and the Columbia Law School) who has cultivated the anonymity of his kind: glasses, short back and sides, and sack suit.

He is a family man and a devout Catholic, who once was chairman of the Boy Scouts in Springfield, Maryland. He would probably still be chairman except that over the years he served in Stockholm, Rome and twice in Saigon, where in the diplomatic lists he was described as a first secretary.

In fact, he was the station chief of the Central Intelligence Agency in the first two capitals. In Saigon he eventually became director of the pacification programme. On Tuesday, he emerged from his anonymity briefly to go to the White House, where he was sworn in as Director of the CIA.

Mr Colby is very different from two of his predecessors, the late Allen Dulles and Mr Richard Helms. Mr Dulles was outgoing, liked to have reporters into his Georgetown home for a drink, and was a constant party-goer. Mr Helms was also frequently seen on the diplomatic cocktail circuit. No grey anonymity for them, but they had one thing in common with the new director.

They had all been in charge of the agency's Directorate of Operations. It is usually known as the Department of Dirty Tricks because this is the branch responsible for espionage and covert political operations. These are known to have included the attempted invasion of Cuba and the deposing of foreign rulers unfortunate enough to have been regarded in Washington as ideologically unsound.

Mr Colby is a real professional, a lifetime intelligence man who began his career during World War II in the Office of Strategic Services. Then he practised what he afterwards directed. For instance, his official biography states that just before the end of the war he was parachuted into Norway to sabotage the railway system.

The thousands who work at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Vir-

ginia, at least know that one of their own is again in charge, but his welcome has not apparently been unanimous.

One reason is that he was regarded in the past as a cold war warrior, perhaps because of his Catholic background. Another but related reason can be explained by the functions of the agency and its organization.

The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947. Its major functions are to coordinate the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies; to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities; and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security.

Much of this is done by the Directorate of Intelligence which, in spite of its name, is mainly staffed by scholarly types from the better universities. Working mainly with information publicly available they produce the reports on which policy is formulated and presidential decisions taken. They are respected by their opposite numbers in London, and Moscow, in spite of the occasional envious sneer about their size and budget.

In my experience, these analysts tend to be broadminded and liberal. They do not go in for holy wars against the communist Anti-Christ. They believe that reconnaissance satellites and other electronic devices are more efficient in policing the Russian and Chinese nuclear armouries than spies and spooks with questionable foreign backgrounds. They have a distaste for the dirty tricks of the Directorate of Operations.

The dirty tricks are official work of course. General authority has been given, even if the wording is somewhat oblique. *The United States Government Organization Manual* gives it as follows: the agency "performs such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct".

Nevertheless, the collective brains of the agency have long thought that dirty tricks were old hat, and when Mr Schlesinger was director an effort was made to reduce such covert operations. Mr Colby might well reverse this process, or at least so it is felt at Langley.

Another reason why his appointment

is not universally popular is that Mr Colby has been a man with two faces in more ways than one. Pacification in Vietnam looked an ideal job for a Boy Scout in that it was supposed to be a do-gooding organization providing roads and schools after they had been demolished by the B52s, but it also ran the Phoenix programme.

This was devised to disrupt and destroy the infrastructure of the Vietcong, the extraordinary underground organization which provided the guerrillas with food and support. According to Mr Colby's testimony given in 1971

before the House Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, 20,587 Vietcong were killed when he was in charge in Phoenix. It is alleged that many were murdered and others tortured.

The allegations have been denied of course. Mr Robert Komer, who ran Phoenix before Mr Colby, testified that the vast majority were killed in open combat. When asked how many were killed during interrogation, he replied, "I would say relatively few. It must have been way under the 10 per cent figure. The number killed by torture would be very, very little."

Mr Colby, when testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said, "I would not want to testify that nobody was killed wrongly or executed in this kind of a programme. I think it probably happened, unfortunately."

Yet one witness, Mr Barton Osborn, a former intelligence agent, told the House subcommittee that some Vietcong suspects captured by Phoenix operatives were interrogated in helicopters. Lesser fry were pushed out to persuade more important suspects to talk. He also described with horrifying detail the various methods of torture practised on the ground.

The truth will probably never be known. Certainly no Peers Commission has been convened to inquire into charges and oblique admissions indicating that in comparison My Lai was but an unfortunate incident. But the question now is whether Mr Colby is the right man to direct intelligence operations upon which presidential decisions of far reaching consequences will be taken.

Louis Heren

WASHINGTON POST
9 September 1973

Nixon Zeroes In on CIA Unit

Loss of Objectivity Feared in Upheaval

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

In abolishing the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of National Estimates, the Nixon administration executed a bearer of often unwelcome tidings.

That fact is central to the quiet upheaval in the national intelligence bureaucracy that is being carried out under White House prodding by the CIA's new director, William E. Colby.

Because of the heavy coating of official secrecy that surrounds the issues and the personalities it is unlikely that the merits of the intelligence reorganization will ever be thrashed out in public or subjected to full congressional review.

Yet it could, in the opinion of some senior intelligence professionals, profoundly affect the quality and objectivity of the government's judgments on a wide range of strategic questions: Soviet military capacity, disarmament policy, U.S. intervention in "third world" crises, determining whether certain governments will stand or fall.

On matters such as these the Office of National Estimates has over the past 20 years delivered its judgments to four Presidents in formal papers—anonously and with little apparent controversy until the later years of the Vietnam war and the accession of the Nixon administration.

Since 1969, however, a widening breach has opened between the CIA's team of professional evaluators and the White House national security staff commanded by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national security adviser.

On strategic military questions, such as Soviet missile and antiballistic missile technology, there have also been abrasive differences between the CIA analysts and Pentagon representatives on the interagency team that produces the national estimates.

Kissinger is reported by authoritative White House sources to have found the CIA's National Intelligence Estimates "deplorable" in style and content. They were also sharply at divergence from the policies pursued by the Nixon administration.

Item: Early in 1970 the CIA provided the

House with an estimate that expressed grave pessimism over the prospects for long-term survival of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia. Nevertheless the administration steadily increased military aid to Lon Nol and the President "was to pronounce the Cambodian effort as "the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form."

Item: Shortly after the outbreak of Pakistani army hostilities in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in March 1971 the CIA produced a national estimate warning that India would be drawn into the war, that Pakistan would be dismembered and that Soviet influence in the subcontinent would be greatly enhanced. ("The White House later complained that the estimate didn't have enough zing and impact," said one CIA evaluator. "We wondered if they read it.")

Item: In 1969 and 1970 the CIA's strategic analysts were far more conservative than Pentagon evaluators in their reading of Soviet ABM and MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) capability. Current Pentagon assessments of Soviet MIRV development tend to support the more conservative appraisal.

White House sources stress that the dissatisfaction with the intelligence products of the CIA stemmed mainly from their "mushiness," their inconclusive style and the sense that the agency was trying to impose policy on the President through its control of intelligence data and evaluations.

CIA analysts familiar with the national estimating process say it was at Kissinger's insistence that the reports grew longer and more detailed. Kissinger, they said, wanted them to include the arguments and justifications in the formal estimates.

During the turbulent interregnum of James R. Schlesinger's five-month term as CIA director this year the Office of National Estimates became one of the chief targets of a broad house-cleaning review. (The other was the CIA's clandestine Service, otherwise known as the Department of Dirty Tricks.)

Item: Early in 1970 the CIA provided the

cocktail grapevine, announced to several members of the Board of National Estimates: "This looks like a gentlemen's club and I'm no gentleman."

But it was not until after Schlesinger's departure to the Pentagon that Colby reached the decision to phase out the board, even though he has yet to acknowledge that he has abolished the office.

Its demise was most clearly signaled by the departure of John Huizenga, chairman of the Board of National Estimates, who left the agency early in the summer on a basis that was "not voluntary."

Huizenga's departure was described by the CIA's public information office as normal and voluntary retirement at age 60. It was not, according to authoritative CIA sources.

The new national estimates, setup envisions a much smaller staff of analysts from various agencies. In the Washington intelligence community. (The previous estimating body numbered 40 to 45 staff and board members.)

Rather than producing a collective product reflecting the judgment of the combined staff, the new emphasis will be on individual assessments by intelligence specialists.

Some senior intelligence officials are fearful that the new system will dilute the objectivity of the national estimates. Specialists, they argue, will tend to reflect the institutional biases of their own agencies, particularly the military.

Under the previous system differences were thrashed out before the drafting of a formal estimate. Dissenters registered their opposition in foot-

notes, which were passed along to the White House with the main body of the report.

One former member of the national estimates team expressed the underlying concern of those who oppose the change:

"They're selling out to the Pentagon and Defense Intelligence Agency. If the CIA made any contribution to the intelligence community it was that its intelligence analysts had no axes to grind, no military hardware programs and no policies to defend."

It was the CIA's influence over the intelligence interpretation that irritated Kissinger and possibly other White House inhabitants. One administration official described the CIA papers as "homogenized" and complained that the objections of other intelligence agencies were submerged in a fuzzy prose.

Even some CIA loyalists concede that there was some justice to Kissinger's criticism that the 20-year-old Office of National Estimates had become stale and ingrown—in effect a gentleman's club—and needed an infusion of new blood.

"Some of the staff people had been there since the Year One," said a former member of the estimates staff. "But the basic structure was sound and independent. People respected each other's integrity and felt free to disagree. We weren't beholden to special interests."

Colby, in a recent bulletin to CIA employees, assured them that the "independence and objectivity" of the national estimates would be preserved. In the same bulletin, he said that no decision had been reached to abolish the office.

"That was an absurd notion," reflected one senior intelligence official. "Every one concerned knew that the Office of Estimates had already been abolished."

NEW YORK TIMES
20 September 1973

C.I.A. Will Abolish Estimates System, Form a New Board

By DAVID BINDER

By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON, Sept. 19 — The Central Intelligence Agency is planning to abolish the 15-year-old system of turning out what it calls national intelligence estimates, sometimes as many as 50 a year.

The estimates on critical issues facing United States policy-makers drew on contributions from as many as seven intelligence-gathering agencies and sometimes from outside experts. They were drafted by the staff of the 10-member Board of national estimates, consisting of both "generalists" and specialists, and put into final form by the board.

The new Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, himself a career professional, decided that this system of analysis and assessment no longer suits the needs of the White House, his main customer, or the intelligence community.

In place of the board Mr. Colby intends to appoint about 10 problem-oriented specialists to be known as national intelligence officers. He is doing his selecting from about 50 candidates the bulk in the C.I.A. but some in other intelligence agencies and some outside the intelligence profession.

They will be empowered to range throughout the intelligence-gathering agencies and into the academic world to pull together assessments of current issues. They will act as Mr. Colby's staff officers.

Some are to focus on obvious problem areas like the Soviet Union, China, Europe and the Middle East. Others will be assigned to issues like control of strategic arms and economics. At the moment no national intelligence officer will be assigned to Africa; should an African problem become sufficiently critical Mr. Colby would assign an officer to it.

He has emphasized that the estimative process is not being abolished by his reform. Rather, it is being reorganized to enable his officers to draw more fully on intelligence expertise that has developed outside the big C.I.A. compound.

WASHINGTON POST
21 September 1973

CIA Seeking to Eliminate 100 Pages of Upcoming Book

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency is seeking to expunge 100 pages of a 530-page book profiling the agency's operations in the United States and abroad, attorneys for the authors said yesterday.

The book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," was written by former CIA analyst Victor Marchetti and John Marks, a former State Department intelligence officer and U.S. Senate aide. It is to be published by Knopf.

Melvin Wulf, chief American Civil Liberties Union attorney on the case, said he was informed by a CIA official yesterday that the agency—acting under a court injunction—would seek to eliminate nearly a fifth of the manuscript.

Wulf identified the CIA official as John Warner, the agency's general counsel.

A spokesman for the agency acknowledged yesterday that

Warner is negotiating the terms of publication with Wulf, but said that details could not be disclosed. "There definitely are security problems," the CIA spokesman said.

Marchetti insisted yesterday that "there is nothing in this book that would jeopardize the national security of my country. There is nothing in the book that would jeopardize the lives of any agents, sink any ships or give away any codes."

Among the subjects with which the book deals are the CIA's role in the 1970 Chilean election, the disbursement of CIA funds to a number of world leaders, alleged misuse of the CIA director's contingency funds and internal U.S. operations of the CIA.

This is the first time, according to lawyers in the case, that a government agency has exercised prior restraint over a book under a court order.

The CIA obtained a re-

straining order in U.S. District Court in Alexandria in April, 1972, to prohibit Marchetti from circulating an outline of the book to publishers.

A trial was held in camera, and attorneys for the authors invoked the defense employed in the Pentagon Papers case: that censorship could be justified only if it could be shown that there might be immediate and irrevocable injury to the United States.

The court held with the CIA's argument that it could enforce the oath of secrecy that was a condition to Marchetti's employment by the agency, a decision that was appealed.

The federal appellate court found that the agency had a right to delete classified material from the book after a review prior to submission of the manuscript to its publisher. The Supreme Court declined to take jurisdiction of the matter.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 September 1973

Between Coups, Employees of C.I.A. Learn to Knit, Bowl and Play Softball

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

LANGLEY, Va., Sept. 16—When they are not stealing secrets or considering coups d'état, employees of the Central Intelligence Agency indulge in such innocent pastimes as learning to knit, repair cars, bowl, play softball, collect coins and fly small planes.

These are among the popular endeavors sponsored by the Employee Activities Association of the C.I.A., which also maintains a credit union and an insurance agency for its spies and other employees.

Knitting classes, according to the bulletin board announcement, are held Wednesdays and Fridays at noon. For those with more martial inclinations, there are karate classes and training in rifle and pistol shooting. The C.I.A. softball league features teams calling themselves the Lollipops, the Cardinals and the Charlie Browns.

In the basement there is a rubber-covered track for joggers, a favorite of the former director, Richard Helms. In his day, the track rules prescribed: "Never talk to the director while he is doing his laps and never pass the director while he is doing his laps."

With a degree of pride, agency officials display their art, the work of the C.I.A. Fine Arts Commission, which has hung huge abstracts in corridors wide enough to play soccer. The ends of the corridors have been "color-coordinated" by the commission, with tints ranging from cool to warm and warm to cool.

The fine arts people have arranged for enormous photographic blowups of maps of the C.I.A.'s favorite foreign cities—London, Leningrad, Paris and Rome—pasted up on the elevator shafts.

Courtyard Flowers

They also watch over the agency's exquisite courtyard flower bed and its handsome stands of trees. The grounds outside are called "the campus."

Like factory workers, C.I.A. employees eat early and practice temperance, trying to get to the in-house Rendezvous Cafe before the noon rush. The strongest drink is iced tea and the serve-yourself meals cost \$1.80.

A visitor asking for an explanation of the 40-foot-wide corridors and the 15 glass doors of the entrance

to the 14-year-old building is told that the agency leadership wanted "airiness" instead of a close atmosphere.

Whatever the motivation, the effect has been to cause the agency's employees to walk three and four abreast when they move around the building.

Certain undercover habits persist, as in the C.I.A. car pool. If you want a ride to or from Langley, you fill in a card with all the particulars of office extension number, time and place, but only your first name or nickname and the request: "Call Fred."

C.I.A. people also indulge heavily in jargon, from the boss on down. They talk of "wiring diagrams" when they mean "organizational plans" and "patterned response" instead of "straight answer." But the new boss, and old C.I.A. man named William Colby—his car-pool request would read, "Call William"—has also picked up some current pop phraseology. He was recently heard saying, "I haven't got any hang-ups about . . ."

The C.I.A. also tends to use abbreviations and shorthand. The institution's house symphony orchestra is referred to as "symphony."

NEW YORK TIMES
21 September 1973

C.I.A. Will Seek to Excise Parts of Book by Ex-Aide

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 20 — The Central Intelligence Agency has told the American Civil Liberties Union that it will oppose the publication of about 100 pages of allegedly classified material contained in an account by a former C.I.A. official of the agency's internal workings.

Melvin L. Wulf, legal director for the A.C.L.U. in New York City, said today that he had been notified by the agency that officials there planned to excise "near to a hundred pages" from a 530-page manuscript by his client, Victor L. Marchetti, a former assistant to the C.I.A.'s deputy director.

Mr. Wulf submitted the manuscript to the Intelligence agency for review on Aug. 27, under the terms of a Federal court order handed down a year ago.

That occasion marked "the first time in the history of the United States," according to Mr. Wulf, that an author had been required by judicial order to submit a manuscript to the Government for prior censorship.

Security Peril Denied

Both Mr. Wulf and Mr. Marchetti, who are the only two individuals outside the C.I.A. to have seen the manuscript in its entirety, said that they believed it contained nothing that would jeopardize the national security.

But a knowledgeable Government official described some of the material in an outline for the Marchetti book, tentatively titled "The Cult of Intelligence," as dangerous, and said that, if the agency had allowed its publication, it "would have blown us out of the water in a lot of places—identities, operations."

Mr. Wulf said that he expected to receive from the C.I.A. next week a letter detailing the passages to which the agency objected. He said that he and Mr. Marchetti would then meet with representatives of the Alfred A. Knopf Company, the prospective publisher, to decide on their response.

Mr. Marchetti said in a telephone interview that although he wanted to wait until he knew precisely which passages the agency was focusing on, "my feeling is to fight back as hard as we can to publish."

Mr. Wulf said that he anticipated the possibility of going "back to court [to] try again to raise the generic question of their power to do this." Mr. Marchetti added that if the courts upheld the C.I.A.'s opposition to the material it was possible that he "would go to jail before I would permit them to quash the book."

Employment Agreement

When the C.I.A. discovered last year that Mr. Marchetti

intended to write both the book and a magazine article on intelligence operations, it secured an injunction, based on a draft of the article and an outline for the book that prohibited him from presenting his writings to a publisher without allowing the agency to review the contents.

The Government maintained in its argument for the injunction that the agency was entitled to such prior review under an employment agreement signed by Mr. Marchetti in which he agreed not to disclose classified information obtained by reason of his employment with the agency.

The injunction, which stipulates that fiction, as well as non-fiction materials written by Mr. Marchetti must be submitted for review, was upheld by a Federal appeals court decision in August of last year.

The court also maintained that the issue was not one of Mr. Marchetti's First Amendment rights of free speech, as Mr. Wulf has argued, but rather one involving the terms of the contract that Mr. Marchetti entered into with the agency "by accepting employment with the C.I.A. and by

signing a secrecy agreement."

The Supreme Court later declined to hear an appeal of the appellate decision, which stipulated that Mr. Marchetti could seek judicial review of any disapproval of a manuscript, or portions of one by the C.I.A.

Mr. Marchetti, who spent 14 years with the C.I.A. before retiring in 1969, has previously published one novel, "The Rope Dancer," which concerns the activities of a fictional "national intelligence agency," and an article in the April 3, 1972, issue of The Nation magazine that was critical of some of the agency's activities.

He said today that he was currently working on a second novel that was based on a "purely fictional" insane asylum operated by the agency were wayward or "burned-out" operatives were sent to recover.

Although Mr. Marchetti submitted "The Rope Dancer" to the C.I.A. for review, another former agency employee, E. Howard Hunt Jr., wrote several dozen novels under different pseudonyms, during his service with the agency, many of which dealt with the exploits of fictional intelligence operatives.

A knowledgeable source said yesterday that Hunt, who pleaded guilty in January to charges of bugging the Democratic party's Watergate offices, was never required to submit his works for review because the agency was unaware that they were being published.

WASHINGTON POST
17 September 1973

Moynihan Decision

Ambassador Daniel Moynihan said that a report he has turned down an offer to become a top assistant to Secretary of State-designate Henry Kissinger were "premature."

Quoting authoritative American sources in New Delhi, where he is ambassador, the Associated Press said he had declined the offer because he prefers to stay in India to work for improved relations between New Delhi and Washington.

AP reported that Moynihan cabled and telephoned his wife in New Delhi to tell her "not to start packing." It quoted an embassy source as saying, "He's going to return to New Delhi and continue as ambassador."

In Washington, where he is home for consultations, Moynihan confirmed the message to his wife, but said: "I have to make the decision this week and I haven't made it yet."

THE ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH
5 Sept 1973

Editorials

Proper Use of CIA

William Colby, who was sworn in as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is faced with the difficult job of rebuilding the image of the organization. That image has been tarnished by the agency's association with the people involved in the Watergate and Ellsberg break-ins.

There has always been a faction opposed to the CIA, and the recent controversy has again raised the question of the agency's proper functions in the foreign affairs of this country. What does the CIA contribute? Does our government need intelligence, secret or otherwise?

The answer to the first question is that the agency has two missions: to carry on espionage and counterespionage work overseas and to provide the President with objective estimates of foreign events and situations.

The answer to the second question is "yes." A classic example of the value of intelligence is the Cuban missile crisis. Without a specialist on Soviet crates who could judge what was inside the boxes on the decks of Soviet freighters going to Cuba, experts on Soviet launching sites, previous U-2 flights over the U.S.S.R.

itary-technical data from a top-level agent in Moscow and some leads provided by agents inside Cuba, President Kennedy probably would not have been able to take preventive action before the Soviet missiles became operational.

Harry Rositzke, a former agent for the CIA and the Office of Strategic Services, writing in the Los Angeles Times, makes the valid point that while the CIA cannot claim perfection, the chief difficulty involving intelligence has been the failure of policy-makers to make better use of the information they are given.

Rositzke sees the Vietnam war as a tragic example of that. He points out that, "It was an extensive, detailed CIA study in the mid-'60s that first convinced the Secretary of Defense that the Vietnamese war would be a long one and that it could not be won on the battlefield."

There is a place in the order of things for an intelligence gathering organization such as the CIA. It is up to Colby and the policy-makers to whom he reports to make sure that the intelligence gathered is used prop-

WASHINGTON POST
17 September 1973

Sen. Stennis Seeks to Restrict CIA Domestic Role

By Judy Nicol

Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. John C. Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said yesterday that he hopes to hold hearings aimed at further restricting the Central Intelligence Agency's involvement in domestic affairs.

"The main thing is to limit (CIA) operations, domestic operations," said Stennis on Face the Nation, a CBS interview program.

"I totally disapprove" of domestic political intelligence operations by the CIA, said the Mississippi Democrat who is chairman of the Central Intelligence Subcommittee of his Armed Services Committee.

He said he was told in June, 1972, by Richard M. Helms, then CIA director, that the CIA had no involvement in the Watergate burglary. He said Helms, now ambassador to Iran, "came to my office a very few days thereafter and assured me they did not have anything to do with planning

or anything in connection with that break-in" (of the Democratic National Committee offices in the Watergate office building.)

Helms could not be reached for comment yesterday.

Helms' successor, William E. Colby, has acknowledged that the CIA had erred in preparing a psychiatric profile of Pentagon Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg and in providing cameras, tape recorders and disguises to White House aides E. Howard Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy. Liddy and Hunt were later convicted in the Watergate break-in.

The CIA's charter, the 1947 National Security Act, says "the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal security functions" in the United States.

But the 1947 statute contains a loophole which has served as a charter for special foreign and domestic operations. It says that the agency shall "perform such other functions and duties related to

intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

Stennis, speaking of the Watergate scandals that unfolded as he was convalescing from gunshot wounds received in a January robbery, said, "As an American citizen I'm ashamed of it."

The senator said that he had attended a recent hearing at the U.S. Court of Appeals on President Nixon's refusal to turn over tapes of conversations relating to the Watergate matter.

If the Supreme Court rules that Mr. Nixon should turn over the Watergate tapes and the President refuses, Stennis said, "I think it would be the most grave situation that's arisen maybe in a hundred years."

In an ABC broadcast yesterday, Sen. Howard Hughes (D-Iowa) said that the American people "should not be afraid of the impeachment process."

"To be afraid to use (the impeachment power) would

mean we would be placing in the hands of this President and all future Presidents an implied power that they could do anything they wanted to in defiance of the law and the courts . . . with impunity, with immunity," Hughes said on ABC's Issues and Answer program.

"If the facts indicate that the President is in violation of the law, or if the President is refusing to obey the direct orders of the Supreme Court, then not to use (impeachment) would be a failure of the system entirely," said Hughes.

A third Democratic senator, in remarks prepared for delivery in the Senate today, called for a Commission on the Office of the Presidency to examine the institution.

Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn.) said "the American people seem to have gone beyond simple respect for the office of the Presidency. . . Instead we have begun to create a monarchy out of an office intended to be the bulwark of democracy."

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Sept. 18, 1973

Cubans Aren't Bitter Over Watergate

By Jack Anderson

The four Cubans who were caught inside the Watergate in the crime that has rocked the nation have written some poignant letters from prison.

Although they were recruited to do the dirty work and then were abandoned behind bars, their letters aren't bitter.

"All things considered," wrote Bernard Barker to his daughter, Maria Elena Moffett, "we are all pretty damn lucky people."

Another Watergate prisoner, Frank Sturgis, wrote to his wife Janet: "I've been thinking of you constantly and dream of you always. Keep your chin up baby. Things will somehow work out."

The letters were shown to us by friends of the four. Although Barker and Sturgis were reluctant to let the world read their personal sentiments, they gave us permission to quote from the letters.

Barker, for instance, called upon Watergate ringleader E. Howard Hunt inside the White House and came away with the impression that the Watergate break-in and the earlier Los Angeles burglary were national security assignments. Afterwards, the Cubans wound up in prison while those who plotted the Watergate crimes remained free.

Yet on Father's Day, Barker wrote to his daughter and her husband: "If you are lucky and wise, you will be of those selected few that will know real happiness in life. Your mother and I have it, and you two have it now and should have it more than us because you don't argue the way we do."

Again on Aug. 24, he wrote to his daughter in Spanish: "I have always been proud of you, but now I walk around with a special smile on my lips since now it also includes your husband. . ."

He concluded the letter with this rueful apology: "Well, my love, receive all the love from your problematic progenitor, a relic of a problematic generation that has been unable to give more than what it has and that can only distribute its problems."

Sturgis wrote hopefully to his wife about a visit from Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.), one of the Senate Watergate committee members. "I think he wants to help us somehow. I hope so! He may come back to see us again," wrote Sturgis.

He explained to the Senator, Sturgis told his wife, how "the CIA trains men to infiltrate industries past their security guard and if caught, say nothing because someone will make contact and bail us out and if

anything happens, it is common knowledge that your family will be taken care of."

"No one spoke to us about that, but our chief was Howard (Hunt)—ex-CIA official and White House aide. We thought it was gov. operation and it may still be one."

The Senator "feels that the three of us took orders from Macho (Barker) and thinks Macho is holding back," related Sturgis. "We three do not know if that is so but the Sen. has an idea that he may know something on that order."

Hunt was taken away to testify on Aug. 16. Reported Sturgis to his wife: "Howard has not returned as yet. Everybody thinks he is talking his butt off. If he is, he can only help us and not hurt us."

But Sturgis wound up cheerfully: "We still may win this yet. Keep the faith, honey! I love you always."

Footnote: Perhaps the most fascinating reference was to columnist William Buckley. "I don't know if I told you before," Sturgis wrote to his wife, "but William F. Buckley used to work for CIA and I don't know if he still does. When he found out that Howard (Hunt) was going to work in the White House, he told Howard it was good that he could be so close to the President but Howard told him that

he was there to take orders and not to influence anyone. That was a good answer! I'm not clear whether this is what Howard or Buckley really said!" Reached for comment, Buckley, frankly admitted he was a "deep cover agent" for the CIA from July, 1951 to March, 1952, but said he had not worked for them since. He declined to say what his CIA role was.

Reluctant Regulator—When Charles King Mallory, a young New Orleans lawyer, was named as the Interior Department's power resources chief, Interior's publicity mill ground out a press release praising him for his dedication to "public utility . . . securities regulation (and) antitrust" activities.

The implication was clear that the administration at last had found a consumer advocate to ride herd on the energy moguls. In fact, the new deputy assistant secretary is not a consumer lawyer at all but one who represented Louisiana Power and Light which is charged in consumer suits with antitrust violations and conspiring against consumers.

Although several of Mallory's other clients were also lined up against the consumers, Mallory assured us that his publicity men "had no intention to mislead" in their handout on him.

© 1973, United Feature Syndicate

WASHINGTON POST
18 September 1973

Hunt Asks Plea Shift

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Attorneys for convicted Watergate co-conspirator E. Howard Hunt asked a federal judge yesterday to allow Hunt to withdraw his guilty plea and to dismiss charges against him because, among other reasons, Hunt thought that top White House officials had approved the Watergate burglary.

Hunt's lawyers told Judge John J. Sirica in a long written motion that Hunt helped plan and participated in the burglary because he had been led to believe the mission was approved by the White House "pursuant to the President's power to protect the national security."

Hunt's motion traced the origin of the Watergate break-in back to the formation of the White House "plumbers" unit by President Nixon to investigate leaks of classified information, and the subsequent approval of "Gemstone," a large-scale intelligence and counter-intelligence program. Hunt specifically accused G. Gordon Liddy, who participated in both groups, of leading him to believe the Watergate break-in was a legitimate act.

"Defendant was led by Mr. Liddy to believe that program (Gemstone) was required by the Attorney General, John N. Mitchell, and that it was approved also by Messrs. Liddy, Jeb Stuart Magruder, a former White House aide; John W. Dean III, counsel to the President, and Charles W. Colson, special counsel to the President," the motion stated.

Liddy was convicted in the Watergate break-in and has refused to talk about its origins to any government body. Magruder has pleaded guilty to participating in a cover-up of the scope of the original break-in; Dean and Mitchell face possible indictment by a grand jury investigating that cover-up; and Colson is reportedly under investigation by a second Watergate-related grand jury here.

As another reason for changing his guilty plea, Hunt's lawyers cited alleged government misconduct "in the White House and down through the executive office of the President and the Department of Justice."

"The investigation and prosecution of this case were replete with deliberate obstruction of justice, destruction and withholding of evidence, perjury and subordination of perjury—all by responsible government officials," Hunt's attorneys said.

Hunt had pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy, burglary and wiretapping at the beginning of the Watergate break-in trial last January. His motion yesterday to vacate his plea follows by three days a similar attempt by four Miamians who pleaded guilty in the same trial to change their pleas to innocent.

The four Miamians had claimed that their pleas were entered because they felt they were under pressure to do so from Hunt and

"high officials of the executive branch of government." They had claimed they had participated in the Watergate break-in because they had been told it was a legitimate government intelligence operation.

In explaining Hunt's claim of two "valid defenses" to the charges against him in the break-in, his lawyers, headed by Sidney S. Sachs, said in yesterday's motion:

"The first is that his acts were lawful because they were performed pursuant to the President's power to protect the national security."

"The second, assuming (for the sake of argument) that the acts were not lawful, is that he was justified in believing they were lawful."

Hunt was "coerced into abandoning these defenses," the motion claimed, because the government "unconstitutionally deprived him of evidence to support them."

Testimony to back him up concerning much of that evidence, Hunt claims, has since been unearthed by subsequent grand jury investigations, testimony before the Senate Watergate committee and depositions in civil suits growing out of the Watergate scandal.

Yesterday's motion contained a summary of such evidence in the case to show "that the investigation and prosecution of this case were contaminated by misconduct by many responsible White House and law enforcement officials."

Hunt pointed specifically to the destruction of materials from his White House safe by acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III; failure of the White House to disclose that President Nixon had taped conversations in the White House, and instances of perjury by government officials before the original Watergate grand jury and in the trial.

Hunt's attorneys supported their claims that his announced defenses are va-

lid by relying on the President's constitutional powers to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

"On this authority, the Watergate entry can be strongly defended as a valid exercise of the President's national security power..."

"The Watergate entry, a part of the Gemstone program, was based on a report by (an undisclosed) government agency (transmitted to Hunt by Liddy) that foreign governments were supplying funds to the Democratic Party campaign," the motion stated.

Even if the acts were illegal, Hunt's lawyers claim their client "cannot be convicted for acts committed within the scope of his employment at the direction of high government officials."

(The President's "constitutional powers" were also cited in another case involving Hunt. John D. Ehrlichman, former top domestic adviser to the President, told the Senate Watergate committee in July that the Hunt-directed break-in at the office of the psychiatrist of Pentagon Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg was "within the President's inherent powers as spelled out by federal law."

"I think it is clearly understood that the President has the constitutional power to prevent the betrayal of national security secrets, as I understand he does, and that is well understood by the American public," Ehrlichman told the committee.)

The motion referred often to alleged government misconduct in the case as a reason all charges against Hunt should be dismissed.

"Surely in the history of this country there has been no case in which the government more outrageously has perverted the administration of justice and subverted the Constitution," according to the motion.

To illustrate what the attorneys claimed was "the depth to which the corrup-

tion penetrated the government," the motion named 11 top government officials allegedly involved.

In addition to Colson, Mitchell, Gray, Magruder, Dean and Ehrlichman, the motion listed former White House chief of staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, former Commerce Secretary and Nixon fundraiser Maurice H. Stans, and former White House aides Egil Krogh Jr., David R. Young and Frederick C. LaRue.

Ironically, Hunt's attorneys cited the decision of Federal Judge W. Matthew Byrne in dismissing charges against Ellsberg as a reason the charges against Hunt should be dismissed. The break-in at the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist was one example of "government misconduct" in that case.

"The constitutional principle which protected Dr. Ellsberg applies as well to (Hunt)," his attorneys said.

Meanwhile yesterday afternoon, coconspirators Bernard Barker and Eugenio Martinex appeared before the federal grand jury that is investigating federal violation connected with the Ellsberg break-in and other Watergate-related issues.

Their attorney, Daniel Schultz, said Special Watergate Prosecutor Archibald Cox had informed him the two men faced probable indictment in connection with the break-in and they wanted to appear before that group before it acted.

One source termed their appearance a "merc plea," in hopes the grand jury would not indict them in the case. Schultz would say only that they wanted to tell the grand jury "what Mr. Cox apparently doesn't understand."

The grand jury is expected to return its indictments in about a week, sources said yesterday. An earlier return was expected, but an early draft of the indictment was ordered rewritten by Cox, the sources said.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Friday, September 7, 1973

Colson Talked to Hunt About 'Nailing' Ellsberg

By Martha Angle
Star-News Staff Writer

A day after the Supreme Court gave the go-ahead for publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971, former White House aide Charles W. Colson sounded out E. Howard Hunt Jr. on "nailing" Daniel Ellsberg, according to documents in the hands of Senate investigators.

A transcript of a Colson-Hunt telephone call on July 1, 1971, a day after the high court's ruling, shows that Colson asked whether "we should go down the line to nail the guy (Ellsberg) cold," and Hunt replied affirmatively.

At Colson's recommendation, Hunt was hired as a White House consultant less than a week later and former presidential adviser John D. Ehrlichman asked the CIA to help him. Three months later, Hunt participated in the break-in at the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist in California.

COLSON yesterday admitted he tape recorded his July 1, 1971, conversation with Hunt and sent a transcript of it to former White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman the following day.

"The more I think about Howard Hunt's background, politics, disposition and experience, the more I think it would be worth your time to meet him," Colson said in a cover memo to Haldeman on July 2.

"If you want to get a feel of his attitude, I transcribed a conversation with him yesterday on it. Needless to say, I did not even approach what we had been talking about, but merely sounded out his own ideas," Colson told Haldeman.

Colson yesterday said that what he and Haldeman had been "talking about" was the possibility of hiring Hunt "to come onto the White House Staff to coordinate research on the Pentagon Papers and serve as liaison with the Hill."

COLSON repeated earlier denials that he had any advance knowledge of plans for a break-in at Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, saying he learned of that burglary "sometime after it occurred — I can't pin down the date."

In his July 1 call to Hunt, Colson said, "we were trying to figure out how to recoup last political ground" in regard to the Pentagon Papers case.

In the conversation, Colson asked Hunt his opinion of the government's prosecution of Ellsberg in regard to the theft of the Pentagon Papers and the possibility that a conspiracy was in-

volved — "the bureaucrats conspiring against the President."

HUNT REPLIED that "when I first heard about this I assumed that Mort Halperin was responsible" the transcript shows.

Morton S. Halperin, a former National Security Council consultant now at the Brookings Institution, was one of 17 NSC officials and newsmen subjected to presidentially ordered wiretaps between 1969 and 1971.

The disclosure that Ellsberg, a friend of Halperin had been overheard on Halperin's telephone was "one factor which led to a dismissal this past May of the case against Ellsberg."

In the phone conversation with Hunt, Colson suggested the Pentagon Papers affair "could go one of two ways. Ellsberg could be turned into a martyr of the new left — he probably will be anyway — or it could become another Alger Hiss case, where the guy is exposed, other people were operating with him, and this may be the way to really carry it out. We might be able to put this bastard into a helluva situation and discredit the new left."

Hunt replied that "it would be a marvelous way if we could do it, but of course you've got the (New York) Times, the (Washington) Post and the (Christian Science) Monitor and all sorts of things."

"THEY'VE GOT to print the news, you know, if this thing really turns into a sensational case," Colson said.

"Well you of course, you're in a much better spot to see how the administration stands to gain from it," Hunt said, "and at this point I would be willing to set aside my personal yen for vengeance to make sure that the administration profits from this."

Colson went on to ask Hunt whether "you think that with the right resources employed that this thing could be turned into a major public case against Ellsberg and co-conspirators," the transcript shows.

Hunt responded that he thought this was possible "with the proper re-

sources." Colson said, "I think the resources are there" and asked Hunt whether "your answer would be we should go down the line to nail the guy cold."

"Go down the line to nail the guy cold, yes," Hunt replied.

COLSON went on to suggest there was "profit to us in nailing any sonofabitch who would steal a secret document of the government and publish it or would conspire to steal it."

He told Hunt the case "won't be tried in the court" but "in the newspapers" and added, "so it's going to take some resourceful engineering."

Hunt said, "I want to see the guy hung if it can be done to the advantage of the administration."

"I think it can be done," Colson replied. "I think there are ways to do it and I don't think this guy is operating alone."

Hunt: "Well of course he isn't operating alone. He's got a congeries of people who are supporting him, aiding and abetting him, there's no question about it."

Colson: "But I'm not so sure it doesn't go deeper than that."

Hunt: "Oh really? You're thinking of like (Democratic Chairman Lawrence) O'Brien or."

COLSON: "Oh no, I'm thinking of the enemy."

Hunt: "The real enemy. Well of course, they stand to profit more, the most, no question about it. You've got codes and policy making apparatus stripped bare for public examination, all that sort of thing."

"Supposing we could get a look at these documents from inside the Kremlin or Peking. Former CIA Director Richard Helms could be retired forthwith and you'd cut down 90 percent of our expenditures across the river."

Colson: "I think there is a fertile field here and I just thought I'd try it out on you to see what you thought of it."

AFTER some more conversation, Colson told Hunt that "I'll be back to you" and promised to visit him soon to dine on "fine stone crabs" which Hunt offered

to share.

Colson yesterday said he had tape-recorded the telephone call with Hunt "for the benefit of Bob Haldeman . . . I thought it would give a good measure of the man (Hunt)."

Colson said that on the basis of the transcript, Haldeman told him to put Hunt in touch with Ehrlichman and "if Ehrlichman likes him, go ahead and hire him."

He said Ehrlichman interviewed Hunt on July 7, 1971, the same day Gen. Robert E. Cushman, former deputy director of the CIA, has testified that he received a call from Ehrlichman asking the CIA to help Hunt in his work for the White House.

Later that month — on July 23, 1971 — Hunt visited the CIA and Cushman authorized the agency's technical services division to provide him fake identification, a wig and a voice-altering device, Cushman told the Senate Watergate Committee.

WHILE at the White House, Hunt was part of the "plumbers" unit headed by Egil Krogh. David R. Young and G. Gordon Liddy (who, like Hunt, was later convicted in the Watergate case) were other members of the team.

An Aug. 11, 1971 memo previously introduced in the hearing record showed that Ehrlichman specifically approved a recommendation by Young and Krogh "that a covert operation be undertaken to examine all the medical files still held by Ellsberg's psychoanalyst covering the two-year period in which he was undergoing analysis."

Underneath his approval, Ehrlichman scribbled, "if done under your assurance that it is not traceable."

DURING his Senate testimony seven weeks ago, Ehrlichman denied that the "covert operation" he approved was a break-in, asserting that he learned of the burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office only after it occurred.

But Ehrlichman, Krogh, Young and Liddy this week were indicted by a Los Angeles County grand jury. Hunt had testified before the grand jury in regard to the September, 1971 break-in after receiving immunity from prosecution in that case.

Colson is expected to be questioned about his July 1, 1971, conversation with Hunt — and his memo to Haldeman the following day — when he testifies before the Senate Watergate

WASHINGTON POST
8 September 1973

Soviets Tie Watergate Woes To U.S. Foreign Policy Foes

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Sept. 7.—Soviet political lecturers are telling their audiences that President Nixon's troubles over Watergate were caused by reactionary influences opposed to Mr. Nixon's foreign policy.

A lecturer in Moscow said recently that "election campaigns in the West often—unfortunately—involve many dirty activities," and that this was well understood in the Western countries. "It was not by chance," he added, that "some circles" in the United States decided to make a big issue of last year's dirty activities.

The lecturer quoted Mr. Nixon as saying: "They listened in on people's telephone calls under Eisenhower, they listened in under Johnson, they listened in under Kennedy, so why do they pick on me now?"

The answer, the lecturer suggested, was obvious.

"We always knew that powerful circles would oppose any improvements in America's relations with the Soviet Union," he added.

The implication of this line appears to be that Mr. Nixon personally made detente possi-

ble, and thus earned the direct support of the Soviet Union. Senior Soviet leaders have taken a similar position in conversations with visiting Americans in recent weeks.

Political lecturers are a key element in the official Soviet system of political education. Millions of citizens hear lecturers at their places of work, study or residence. Lecturers are often used to convey information about subjects considered too sensitive for the open press, which is read by foreigners and regarded as official.

The press has handled the Watergate affair with extreme care, never publishing anything that reflected badly on President Nixon, and never really explaining what the crisis was all about.

The lecturer here did not offer any explanation either, but he made it clear that members of his audience should be sympathetic to Mr. Nixon, and not to his critics.

The lecturer also disclosed that polls showed 25 per cent of the American public favoring Mr. Nixon's retirement or removal from office, a fact that at least gives Soviet citizens an idea of the seriousness of the affair.

The lecturer described the President's opponents as a

combination of forces representing "the military-industrial complex"; politicians and commentators who "made a living on the cold war" and hated to see it end; elements of the press, and "Zionist circles." Zionists have now become the world's leading reactionaries in all Soviet propaganda.

"Seventy-five per cent of the means of mass communication [in the U.S.] are under the control, directly or indirectly, of Zionist circles and Jews," the lecturer claimed.

He quoted Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir as saying that Watergate had weakened Mr. Nixon, as if to show that Mrs. Meir approved.

The lecturer also warned that "there are people in the United States who would like

to have a new war tomorrow—people who make arms for the arms race, and earn profits from it."

Even if this line is only propaganda, there is little doubt that the Soviets are baffled by Watergate. From the mighty to the masses, they have expressed bewilderment to Americans here. In a country where respect for authority is axiomatic, many ask how Americans could treat their President so badly.

Committee later this month.

SOURCES said the transcript of that call, and the accompanying memo, were turned over to the committee investigators on July 31 by a former Colson secretary. They have not thus far been introduced into the public hearing record.

"This is the latest in a long and steady stream of leaks by the Senate Watergate Committee," Colson charged yesterday.

"I'm not surprised but I continue to be disappointed in their utter lack of judiciousness in handling material provided them by witnesses.

"Maybe it's time they tidied up their own store," he said.

NEW YORK TIMES

16 September 1973

'BURN BAGS' USED BY MANY AGENCIES

Shredder Also Destroy Tons
of Classified Material

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15 (AP)—Special "burn bags" and shredders regularly consume tons of outdated classified material and other documents considered sensitive in this security-conscious capital.

The classified papers may contain military, technical or security information. Also destroyed are drafts, memorandums, messages, message responses, studies, reports and just about any other stack of paper an official regards as sensitive.

L. Patrick Gray 3d, former acting director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, said he was unaware his office had a "burn basket." He told the Senate Watergate committee that he burned some Watergate-related material last December with the Christmas trash at his home in Stonington, Conn.

At the F.B.I. Headquarters, where all messages are regarded as confidential, all paper trash is collected in special "burn bags" from white-rimmed waste-baskets for burning by security men. The supermarket-size paper bags are marked with red diagonal stripes and the words, "Classified Burn."

900,000 Burn Bags

The General Services Administration says it spent \$31,000 for 900,000 official burn bags last year in the capital. The bags are also used to collect material for shredders.

The Defense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration are among agencies with specific procedures for destroying material.

On occasion, a NASA paper bag and tie can be seen in sub-

urban Arlington stoking reams of papers into an air-jet spurred incinerator used by several Federal agencies.

The Richards Company, which owns the incinerator, has burn contracts with the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Agriculture Department's Foreign Agricultural Service, as well as with NASA.

Corporate Customers

Several banks, the International Business Machines Corporation and the telephone company also use the facility, a company spokesman said.

The Secret Service destroys White House information. However, John Murray, a Secret Service spokesman, says: "So far as how, or what, or when, we won't comment."

Among the material destroyed by the Justice Department are rough drafts of Federal suits, which may be modified before reaching court, and business information used in anti-trust suits.

Because of environmental restrictions on burning, several agency officials say the Government leans toward shredders.

Two New York companies are on the G.S.A.-approved contractors list. They offer shredders at prices ranging from \$200 to \$1,000. The shredders can chew up a ton and a quarter of paper an hour.

REGISTER, Springfield, Ill.
30 August 1973

McCord: Martha can offer new facts

By Chris Detto

Convicted Watergate burglar James McCord said Wednesday he thinks Martha Mitchell "can provide useful information" to the Senate Select Committee on Watergate if she is called to testify.

McCord spoke to about 1,000 Sangamon State University students and the general public packed into the SSU cafeteria Wednesday night after spending most of the afternoon talking informally with students at both the downtown and lake campuses of the university.

The former Air Force, FBI and CIA man said that he first met the wife of the former attorney general in the fall of 1971 and found her "unspoken and with a great deal of integrity. She is an easy person to deal with," he said. McCord was in charge of security for the Mitchells after March, 1972, when Mitchell resigned the attorney general's post to head the Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP), for which McCord was chief of security.

He said Mrs. Mitchell's latest phone call to UPI's Helen Thomas in which she said she had seen a book of political espionage plans prepared by White House Chief of Staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman and President Nixon is "a major development which may lead to more facts concerning the Watergate case."

Martha Mitchell has asked to testify before the Ervin Committee in executive session, and McCord said, "I hope she gets that opportunity. She has something to contribute and I believe her."

McCord repeated his previous feelings that he does not believe Richard Nixon, H. R. Haldeman, John Erlichmann and Martha's husband John, however.

He said that Haldeman, Erlichmann and Mitchell "have lied" before the Watergate Committee and "I am willing to be sued for that statement. In fact, I'm rather

interested in a civil suit on this subject."

He said he believes Nixon was not telling all he knew in his television appearances on the Watergate affair and said that his comment about the June 17, 1972 break-in at Democratic National Headquarters being the plan of "a few overzealous individuals" is "a spacious answer." McCord admitted that the five men arrested inside the Washington hotel, of which he was one, were indeed overzealous, however.

"The best wireman in the country," as he was termed by one of those who testified before the Ervin Committee, repeated his belief that Nixon not only participated in the coverup but also authorized the break-in itself.

"I believe Nixon authorized the operation and he obviously authorized the coverup," he said. "His statements have been to the contrary but I don't believe it."

Part of this opinion is based on information he said he was told by another bug-ging conspirator, G. Gordon Liddy. Liddy, however, is not talking and won't verify what he told McCord. Liddy told him, McCord said, that Mitchell and former White House Counsel John Dean had approved the break-in plans. McCord said he does not feel Mitchell and Dean would approve the plans without the President's consent. "I know how they operate," he said.

He still has hopes, he said, not only that Gordon Liddy will talk, but that the four Cubans arrested inside the hotel — Bernard Barker, Frank Sturgis, Eugenio Martinez and Virsilio Gonzalez — would reappear before Judge John Sirica and admit they pleaded guilty under pressure. "They all pleaded guilty under duress and promises of executive clemency," McCord said. "They told me so themselves during the last weeks of the trial."

He said he does believe

the committee testimony of John Magruder and "the substance of John Dean's testimony" in which he implicated Nixon. "Dean may be wrong on a few dates," he said.

You might be the only college audience to hear me," said the balding burglar in reference to U.S. Judge Sirica's decision on the Presidential tapes Wednesday. Sirica said he was going to reconsider letting McCord and former CREEP staffer John Stuart Magruder stump the country to tell their side of the Watergate business.

McCord said that Special Watergate Prosecutor Archibald Cox "interposed an objection" to his and Magruder's speaking engagements to Sirica.

"I think he felt that our talking may in some way prejudice those persons who may be indicted in the future," he said. He cited the "two million words of testimony that have been heard on national television" during Senate Committee hearings and said "I can't see how my talking in Springfield, Illinois will prejudice a jury in Washington, D.C. Mine is a minute contribution and I can't see how I'll affect their rights," he said.

McCord has already spoken to some 20 civic and church groups and is prepared to speak at about 40 additional colleges and universities after SSU. He said all but one of his scheduled appearances are outside Washington. He also pointed out that the seven senators on the Watergate committee and some of their staff are making speeches.

McCord's \$2,000 fee for the SSU appearance will go toward paying off the \$60 to \$100,000 in legal fees he ex-

pects to accumulate by next spring.

The convicted conspirator praised the CIA, for which he worked for 20 years, and said an attempt to blame the Watergate operation on the CIA was instrumental in his not pleading guilty and eventually sending a March 23, 1973 letter to Sirica which touched off a valid investigation of the events surrounding Watergate.

He said the CIA has "the most tremendous people in government, very high-caliber people," and that the agency "is extremely highly supervised, despite public opinion and the opinion of some Senate subcommittees. It is very closely supervised by the President," he said.

He also has good words for CREEP.

When he was hired as security chief in Sept. 1971, there were about 25 people on the staff, mostly borrowed from the White House, he said. "It grew to 300 to 400 people," he said, "and they were a delightful, pleasant group to work with. Most of them very young, clean-cut and very dedicated."

NEWSWEEK

10 Sept. 1973

A Plumber's Works

Everybody knows E. Howard Hunt Jr., the Watergate "plumber" and ex-CIA agent, but how about Howard Hunt the novelist? The 54-year-old Hunt has written 47 books, mostly spy thrillers published under such pseudonyms as Robert Dietrich, David St. John and Gordon Davis. While Hunt is serving out a 35-year sentence for conspiracy at Danbury prison, many of his books are being republished. He has written nothing during his first five months in jail (and is not even allowed a typewriter), but seventeen of his spy series—featuring steely CIA agent Peter Ward or Commie-crippling accountant Steve Bentley—are being rushed into paperback reissue. In addition, two new Hunt books are coming out this fall; and Hunt has yet another to sell, "Moscow Calling."

The two new books are a revealing package. **THE BERLIN ENDING** (310 pages, Putnam, \$6.95) is a espionage roman à clef Hunt wrote between the Watergate break-in and the death of his wife in an air crash. It follows ex-CIA agent Neal Thorpe's efforts to save the daughter of a treacherous West German foreign minister, one of several seemingly non-Communist world muckamucks secretly in thrall to Moscow. The fictional identity of the blackguard minister was tipped off by Hunt, who sent his editor a news photo of Willy Brandt and Leonid Brezhnev inscribed: "Here's the dirty dog and his master."

Bitter: Hunt's other new book is non-fiction—at least ostensibly—**GIVE US THIS DAY** (235 pages, Arlington, \$7.95). Originally written in 1967 "in a mood of nostalgic bitterness," it narrates his CIA role in the "needless failure" of the Bay of Pigs. Hunt describes how he made a secret trip to Castro's grim new Cuba and returned to recommend to the CIA that Castro be liquidated. He refutes the Kennedy Administration line that the CIA had bungled the job by committing a popular uprising inside Cuba that never happened. No revolt was planned or

expected, insists Hunt. Instead, the CIA was sandbagged at the last minute by the White House's cancellation of air support and forced to shoulder blame that, declares Hunt, should fall on the Pentagon planners who picked the disastrous site.

The book is expectably full of colorful anecdotes. CIA planners wanted to use Cozumel island's airstrip as a refueling base for their limited-range B-26's. But the Mexican Air Force officer in charge demanded a nonnegotiable bribe of four air-conditioned Thunderbird convertibles. Irrked at his "brazen venality," the CIA looked elsewhere, in vain. And two familiar characters also appear as anti-Castroites in Hunt's story: Watergate burglars Bernard Barker and Frank Fiorini, alias Frank Sturgis.

Books by writer Hunt raise intriguing questions about agent Hunt. A penciled phone number Thorpe carelessly leaves in his apartment almost leads to a Soviet triumph. Hunt's White House phone number and initials, found in Barker's address book, linked the Nixon Administration to the scandal and proved Hunt's undoing. In one of Hunt's Peter Ward adventures, he describes an unnoticeable metal plate CIA burglars use to secure a forced door. Hunt's own Watergate operatives used glaringly apparent black tape. And in an early novel, "Bimini Run," the Alan Ladd-like hero is "Frank Sturgis"—surely the ancestor of "Frank Sturgis."

Several characters in "The Berlin Ending" are revealing Hunt surrogates. Certainly danger-addicted, romance-ridden Thorpe, who thinks the CIA has gone soft but who handles women like priceless china dolls, is Hunt's young-buck vision of himself. But whose resigned, aching loneliness is that pictured in ailing, aging, ex-CIA chief Alton Register? He gazes sadly at his dead wife's portrait, eulogizes the "crystalline figures" of spydom's pre-"flotsam" days, murmurs richly: "Peace, what crimes are committed in thy name" and "I'm a dinosaur,

a species almost extinct." And could that Soviet agent's bitter anxiety over becoming a "burned-out husk to be discarded and forgotten" be empathy from the man blocked from promotion in the CIA who joined a Washington PR firm and then signed on at the White House to plug leaks?

One of Hunt's first endeavors there was to study up on the mysteries surrounding Chappaquiddick. Then the operative used to State Department cover assignments donned his red wig to nudge ITT's Dita Beard into recanting her memo. He doctored cables purporting to show President Kennedy's complicity in Ngo Dinh Diem's assassination.

Fate: Now, suffering from ulcers, 23 pounds lighter, a chained and manacled Hunt has left Danbury prison nineteen times to testify (he is due to appear later this month before the Ervin committee). He is likely to go down as the Willy Loman of the spy business, a dedicated hireling hanging in there in a changing world. What money his books bring in, he declares, goes to lawyers. His four children at the big, brick house in Pottomac, Md., called "Witches Island," are parentless, though good friend William F. Buckley Jr. is acting as "a sort of godfather." Hunt recently complained bitterly that the Watergate "leg men" drew long sentences, while the "prime conspirators" are still free. And he even hinted he suspects betrayal by a double agent in his ranks on that fateful June 17 night.

More poignantly, he says that his wife thought the original ending of "Ending"—in which the good guys, our guys, win—was "too pat." On the way to the airport with the faded \$10,000, she told Hunt: "The evildoers of the world are not always punished. Sometimes the s.o.b. gets away with it and the good people don't." Hunt says he was just finishing up the new, more pessimistic close to the novel when his son told him of his wife's fatal plane crash. He subtitled the book: "A Novel of Discovery."

—S. K. OBERBECK

MOSCOW, Idaho

6 August 1973

New Impetus for CIA Review

Senate confirmation of the appointment of William E. Colby to head the Central Intelligence Agency gives new emphasis to familiar questions. Colby has aptly been described as "the epitome of the covert man": his experience has been largely in this aspect of CIA activities, rather than in the agency's routine intelligence-gathering operations. With such a man at the helm, the need for continuing, effective congressional review of the CIA is more urgent than ever.

Colby is said to have played an important role in the planning and execution of what virtually amounted to a CIA-operated secret war in Laos in the 1960s. Now there are hints of

involvement in Cambodia, with the CIA again active. The fear expressed by Sen. Harold E. Hughes of Iowa prior to Colby's confirmation—that as CIA chief "he might acquiesce in another secret war"—is not unfounded.

This and other possibilities for secret operations on a broad scale argue for legislative surveillance of the CIA's funding and activities. Such surveillance, a considerable step beyond the present far from stringent oversight, would be desirable in any case. It becomes all the more desirable now that a man of Colby's bent—a competent professional, but one oriented toward clandestine involvement in other nations' affairs—

HERALD, Cincinnati
1 September 1973

Labor Party Claims CIA Wants Mayor Gibson Out

Jim Rotonda, spokesman for the National Caucus of Labor Committees (NCLC) and U. S. Labor Party candidate for Mayor of Newark today made the following statement on recent developments in Newark:

"Events in Newark prove all of what the NCLC predicted in its pamphlet, 'Papa Doc Baraka: Fascism in Newark,' and all of what U.S. Labor Party candidates have been saying for weeks in their campaigns around the country.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), working through its two Newark fascist operatives, Imamu Baraka (Leroi Jones) and Assemblyman Anthony Imperiale, have moved in the last week to immediately end the administration of Newark Mayor Kenneth Gibson. The move is part of an attempted CIA plan to establish fascist rule in Newark by the time of the scheduled June, 1974 mayoral election.

The forced move to dump Gibson indicated that the CIA plans to accelerate the takeover process. This acceleration is a direct result of the U.S. Labor Party's national campaign to expose and destroy

Baraka's organization, to drive this fascist apparatus out of Newark.

"Gibson has proven worthless to the capitalists. He has been incapable of implementing the real union-busting and austerity programs which employers need to run a bankrupt city like Newark in a depression, and he has refused to cooperate fully with the CIA's choice for the next rulers of Newark, Baraka and Imperiale. The CIA has ordered that Gibson be dumped so that he and his few friends don't get in the way of Baraka's strike-breaking and union-busting, or most importantly, in the way of the CIA-managed race riot that Baraka and Imperiale have been told to foment in order to bring the fascist movement to power in this city.

"Gibson has been aggravated by Baraka's charge that he is a 'puppet of Prudential,' and by the jeers of Baraka henchman, Councilman Dennis Westbrook (also known as Mjunba) that he was incapable of breaking the Newark sanitationmen's union. In response, the Mayor allowed a phony Baraka demonstration on Aug. 15, to turn

into a confrontation between members and sympathizers of Baraka's Committee for Unified Newark (CFUN) and over sixty white riot cops. The demonstration ostensibly demanded the 'accountability' of Newark's sanitationmen, accountability to Baraka. It was actually designed to provide a cover for Jim Nance, head of Baraka front group, the Federation of Afro-American Police Officers, by provoking the white cops into arresting and roughing him up in the presence of witnesses and the press. As is well-known in Newark, Nance was one of Baraka's early fascist recruits and once held the position of 'security' head goon in Baraka's organization, a perfect candidate for director of the future Baraka controlled black police force, split from a white force controlled by Imperiale.

"Baraka, through his mouthpiece Westbrook, is using these contrived 'atrocities' to call for the resignation of Gibson and Gibson's sidekick, Police Director Edward Kerr. The black fascist is now making demands that the police and service employees of the South

and Central Wards of Newark be made accountable to the 'community' -- accountable to him. Baraka used the same demand to destroy the Newark Teachers Union (NTU).

"The Labor Committees have known for months that the CIA has been working for more than five years to build the apparatus capable of turning Newark into the first urban American fascist stronghold.

Labor Committee members are exposing the domestic political organizing activities of the CIA and its frontmen in a national anti-Baraka educational and propaganda campaign. At this moment the deadly fraud of 'accountability' -- Baraka's favorite union-busting tactic -- is being exposed on the floor of the national convention of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) in Washington D.C. by NCLC, NU-WRO and RYM organizers. The NCLC will continue to expose every actual or threatened capitulation to such fascist tactics among the unionized, the unorganized, and the unemployed, and, with each exposure, build forces to remove these CIA front operations from American cities branch and root.

WASHINGTON POST
16 Sept. 1973

Garrison Planned To Link General To JFK Slaying

By Iris Kelso
Special to The Washington Post

NEW ORLEANS—New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, as late as March 1971, was preparing to accuse another person of conspiring to assassinate President John Kennedy.

Garrison's intended defendant this time was the late Air Force Gen. Charles Cabell, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency and brother of Earl Cabell Earl Cabell, who later became a congressman, was mayor of Dallas at the time of the assassination.

The Cabell story is brought out in tape recordings introduced in Garrison's pinball bribery trial in

federal court here.

The account of how Garrison developed his theory that Cabell masterminded the Kennedy assassination is said by some to suggest the way Garrison developed his case against New Orleans businessman Clay Shaw, whom he did charge.

According to the tape Garrison talked with Pershing Gervais, his former chief investigator and closest friend, about the Cabell theory on March 9, 1971.

Garrison had gotten Gen. Cabell's name from "Who's Who in the South and Southwest." He was prepared to charge Gen. Cabell if he could establish that Cabell had been in New Orle-

ans any time around the date of the assassination, Nov. 22, 1963.

Gervais, at the time of the conversation, had gone to Garrison's home to deliver \$1,000 the federal government says was a pinball bribery payment. Gervais, who then was working with the government, wore a voice transmitter under his coat.

Garrison's imagination was triggered when he learned Gen. Cabell was former Mayor Cabell's brother. Garrison's theory was that the CIA was behind the assassination and that the Dallas city government and police department cooperated in it. He thought the assassination was masterminded out of New Orleans. He wanted Gervais to check the records at a motel in New Orleans to learn if Gen. Cabell had been there around November 1963.

In the tape, Garrison's voice could be heard saying, "If I can put him in the Fontainebleau Motel, then I've got enough to grab him by the balls."

"OK," Gervais commented, Garrison: "Now the average guy, Joe Smith, don't want to hear any more

when he finds out that the Number Two man in the CIA is the brother of the mayor of Dallas."

Later Garrison said, "Wait till the country finds out that--I been yelling CIA, wait till they find out that the Number Two man in the CIA is the man in charge of the Bay of Pigs and the brother of the mayor of Dallas."

Gen. Cabell was deputy director of the CIA until his resignation effective Jan. 31, 1962. His brother, former Rep. Cabell, says the general was "the engineer" of the Bay of Pigs operation.

Garrison faced the possibility that Gen. Cabell just might not have existed at the Fontainebleau around the assassination date. In that case, he said, he would bring up the General's name at some time when he had a national audience in a television show or in a speech.

There is no evidence in the tapes that Gervais ever checked the motel records. Cabell's name was never mentioned again.

There was a major drawback to Garrison's plan, anyway. He had no defendant. Gen. Cabell had died in 1971—several months before

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Thursday, Sept. 13, 1973

Asian Guerrillas Offer Opium Deal

By Jack Anderson

The colorful Shan guerrillas have offered to sell the United States most of the Southeast Asian opium crop and to wage war on any other opium convoys that may try to operate in the area. In exchange, they want \$12 million in hard cash and a U.S. promise to help them win autonomy from Burma.

This astonishing proposal was made in writing by two top Shan leaders who sent an emissary down from the hills to meet clandestinely in Bangkok with Rep. Lester Wolff (D-N.Y.). As chairman of a House narcotics subcommittee, Wolff is the House's leading expert on Burma-Thailand-Laos opium production. He was in Bangkok last month on a survey with five other congressmen.

The signed Shan offer to destroy up to 400 tons of high-grade Asian opium, combined with the U.S.-sponsored crack-down on Turkish opium, theoretically could wipe out 75 per cent of the supply of heroin on America's streets. And \$12 million admittedly would be cheaper than trying to stop the smuggling operation the hard way.

As Wolff recounts his dramatic encounter in Bangkok, the Shan emissary, an Englishman, arranged by letter and telephone to meet with him in a hotel lobby away from his congressional colleagues. A follow-up meeting was held in a nook off a bustling Bangkok street.

The Englishman handed him

the two-page proposal signed by Gen. Law Hsin Han and Boon Tai, the two rebel leaders, who also sent as evidence of good faith a handwritten list of all recent opium shipments by mule, backpack and trucks with in the vast Shan state area.

Skeptical at first but eager to explore the offer, Wolff invited American diplomatic, narcotics and CIA officials in Thailand to a meeting where he laid out the strange Shan proposal.

At this private session, the authorities confirmed that the Englishman was an authentic Shan contact and that some of the handwritten reports of opium convoys agreed precisely with their own secret information. Our own sources report that both the State Department and CIA had also been approached by the Shan insurgents but that the negotiations had been aborted by Washington.

Wolff left it to the American officials in Bangkok to pursue the offer but asked for a quick progress report, fearing the unorthodox Shan gambit might become snarled in red tape and bureaucratic timidity. When Wolff reached Hong Kong four days later, he was called by his Shan contact, who reported nothing whatsoever was being done about the Shan offer.

At our request, Wolff has now agreed to show us the proposal in hopes this might stir at least preliminary talks on the feasibility of buying up the Shan opium crop. After all, the United States has subsidized Turkish opium farmers with \$35 million a year so they would

stop growing the lethal stuff. The United States also secretly paid \$1 million to Chinese traffickers and others in Thailand for contraband opium, which was burned. (A secret CIA report claims, however, that the U.S. authorities were deceived and really burned cheap fodder covered with opium.)

Wolff's document, typed beneath the crossed swords letterhead of the Shan State Army, is titled "Proposals to Terminate the Opium Trade in Shan State." It begins:

"The Shan State Army and its allies will invite . . . the United States Narcotics Bureau, or any similar body, to visit the opium areas of Shan State and to transmit information about opium convoys on their own wireless.

"The S.S.A. and its allies will ensure that all opium controlled by their armies is burnt under international supervision. The opium will be sold at a price to be negotiated later, but the basis . . . should be the Thai border price." At present, this would amount to roughly \$12 million for 400 tons of opium.

In return for these "temporary measures," the Shan armies want a "permanent solution" based on political self-determination for the Shans and agricultural assistance from the United States to "replace opium with other crops." If this is finally accomplished, promise the Shan leaders, they will "allow helicopters under international supervision to search out and destroy any opium fields that still remain."

In Wolff's view, the advantage of destroying 400 tons of opium far outweighs the ruffling of official Burmese feathers, which direct dealings with the Shans would cause.

Our own CIA sources confirm that the Shan State Army is a tremendous factor in the Southeast Asian drug traffic. One secret report by the CIA's Basic and Geographic Intelligence Office asserts: "The Shan State Army, the largest of several forces that have been fighting for Shan independence from Burma . . . is also heavily involved in the opium business."

Another CIA document tells of caravans of "up to 600 horses and donkeys and 300 to 400 men . . . carrying in excess of 16 tons" moving out of the Shan State. Classified CIA and Justice Department documents say 400 tons of the 700 to 750 tons of opium produced in Southeast Asia come from Burma, much of it from regions controlled or near the Shan State armies.

Wolff, while reluctant to leave Congress during the wind-up of the 1973 session, is willing to serve as an emissary to the Shan generals if it will help get negotiations going. Although he is unwilling to vouch for the Shan generals' ability to deliver on their proposals, he feels they at least warrant serious talk. "So far," he told us, "the U.S. government seems far more eager to wipe out insurgents than to wipe out the heroin trade."

©1973, United Feature Syndicate

Gervais.

Gervais, who probably knew Garrison better than any other person, was notoriously indifferent to Garrison's assassination theories.

In another tape Gervais told a pinball operator, "Clay Shaw had no more to do with that bull— than you did. Garrison just thought he was going to make himself a big man out of that pile of . . ."

Earl Cabell, living in Dallas since his retirement from Congress, had heard that it was him, rather than his brother Charles, who

Garrison hoped to link to the assassination.

At any rate, Cabell was not disturbed. Of Garrison, he said, "That guy is nuttier than a fruitcake."

The story of Garrison's interest in Gen. Cabell could be important in New Orleans. Although Clay Shaw was acquitted of the assassination conspiracy charge, many voters still think Garrison "had something."

In the long run the Cabell story could be more significant than the government's charge that Garrison was guilty of taking payoffs from pinball operators.

INQUIRER, Philadelphia
3 September 1973

FBI and CIA 'Damaged' by Watergate Investigation, Majority Feels

Part of the serious fallout from the Watergate investigation, in the judgment of the American people, is that the reputations of both the FBI and the CIA have been "damaged."

By 52-36 percent the public feels the FBI was used to its detriment in a coverup of the Watergate affair, while a 46-33 percent plurality feels the same way about the CIA.

In the hearings, testimony was given that L. Patrick Gray 3d, former acting head of the FBI, burned papers that later might have been evidence, allegedly on instruction from Presidential aide John Ehrlichman.

In the case of the CIA, several men who were caught in the Watergate break-in were former CIA employees, and E. Howard Hunt, a Watergate operative, had borrowed, disguised and a camera from the CIA, for which he had worked for a number of years.

High-ranking CIA officials have suggested under oath that they felt the White House tried to involve the CIA in the

coverup.

On Aug. 18-19, the Harris Survey conducted in-person interviews among a cross-section of 1,536 households nationwide, asking about those alleged White House efforts to use the CIA and FBI. Fifty-six percent felt there had been an attempt to get the agencies to cover up the Watergate affair. Twenty percent felt that that was not the case.

Former CIA director Richard Helms not only related in his testimony that he resisted inferences that the CIA take

some responsibility for Watergate and the payments made to the defendants, but he denied vehemently that the CIA had any direct or indirect involvement in the burglarizing of Democratic headquarters or the subsequent coverup.

Nonetheless, in the public's mind, the notion persists quite strongly that somehow the CIA was involved in the Watergate.

Forty-five percent felt that the CIA was involved in the Watergate affair and other illegal domestic spying activities, while 24 percent that it was not.

This public suspicion, that somehow the CIA was involved in Watergate and other illegal domestic spying, is a serious charge, because such lack of public confidence could prove harmful to future CIA activities. Even more serious, however, is the fact that under the law authorizing its existence, the CIA is spe-

cifically prohibited from engaging in domestic investigatory operations of any kind.

Helms did admit under questioning that the CIA undertook to draw "a psychiatric profile" of Daniel Ellsberg, the defendant in the Pentagon Papers case, the only time in its history it had done so. However, the CIA denied vigorously that it had

any knowledge and any connection with the break-in to Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. No proof has been offered that the CIA had any involvement in that affair.

Public doubts about both the CIA and FBI persist and likely will for some time, even though the Senate committee's inquiry into their possible roles has been concluded.

Based on those doubts, the public believed, 52 percent to 36 percent, that the FBI has been damaged, and 46 to 33 percent that the CIA has been damaged.

Across the board, among every major subsegment of the American public, even including people who voted for President Nixon last November, at least a plurality feels the reputations of both the CIA and the FBI have been damaged. Both have always prided themselves in being above partisan and political considerations.

TIME

24 Sept. 1973

The Multiple Agent

In the cramped, seedy office that the Hearst Newspapers maintain for their London correspondent, Seymour Freidin sits among some of the mementos of a long and prolific career. There is a citation from the Overseas Press Club for distinguished foreign reporting. There is an autographed picture of his friend, Senator Henry Jackson. To his credit are four books, dozens of magazine articles, countless newspaper stories and columns going back to World War II. None of these, however, earned Freidin the attention he has received since Jack Anderson recently named him as an agent paid by the Republicans to spy on Democratic presidential candidates in 1968 and 1972.

Freidin disagrees with the label, but acknowledges the activity. Actually, he was the original "Chapman's friend," the code name that Nixon Campaign Aide Murray Chotiner gave to two paid informants who traveled with the Humphrey and McGovern press parties. The material they delivered was pretty tame. Freidin and the woman who succeeded him as the second Chapman's friend, Lucianne Cummings Goldberg, reported the candidate's latest speeches, activities and statements to Chotiner. Freidin added some analysis of his own. John Mitchell called the material "junk," and it appears that nothing really confidential or damaging was sent.

Goldberg's name surfaced first. She is a freelancer on the fringes of Washington journalism, and her participation

in the caper was dismissed as a bad joke. But Freidin, 56, though never in the top stratum of his trade, is clearly in a different league from Goldberg. He marched into Prague with Patton and later served as foreign editor of the New York *Herald Tribune*. He is also a Democrat. Why did he become involved in so tawdry an episode?

Double Agent. The money was one factor. Freidin says that he was paid \$30,000 plus \$10,000 for expenses last year and a lesser amount in 1968. Actually, Freidin says, he was a double agent or maybe even a triple one. He told the Humphrey people in 1968 and the McGovern staff last year that he was working on a campaign book. While feeding information to the Republicans, he was really trying to gather material for an "inside" book about internal friction in the G.O.P. camp. He sees no distinction between what he did and the ploy used by Joe McGinniss in 1968. McGinniss worked as a Republican campaign staffer while secretly doing research for *The Selling of the President 1968*, a tough and witty attack on Richard Nixon and some of his aides. "If I had brought it off," Freidin says ruefully, "everyone would be calling me a big hero."

The distinction between McGinniss and Freidin, of course, is that McGinniss was not taking money from one party to spy on the other. It was not the first time that Freidin had accepted pay while trading information. Freidin, like some other correspondents overseas, became friendly with CIA agents in trouble spots around the world. While cov-

ering the Soviet takeovers in Eastern Europe in the 1940s, Freidin was often debriefed by CIA men and got leads from them in return. Occasionally, he says, he accepted CIA money—"so little that it was laughable." To Freidin, a staunch cold warrior like many of his colleagues there, the relationship was all part of the fight against Communism. He dealt with the CIA, he claims, "because it was the right thing. I never told them anything that I wouldn't print."

In 1966 the *Herald Tribune* folded, and soon the cold war began to fade as a big, continuing story. Freidin found himself adrift, his expertise devalued, the demand for his byline sinking. It is a common situation for aging journalists who have committed themselves to one subject or cause. "I wanted to do a book on the States," he recalls, "but my problem was how I could get an angle. I went to the 1968 conventions, and at the Republican Convention I met Murray Chotiner."

Chapman's friend was soon born. Ironically, Freidin got no book at all out of the 1968 campaign. In 1972, he says, he knew "something fishy was going on" among the Republicans, but he was unaware of the Watergate secrets. After that story broke, he realized that any "inside" book he might do would be useless. So he quit before the election and signed on with Hearst. Now, with his new notoriety, he claims to have a number of offers to write his inside book; he feels in demand again. This week he will be back in New York. If Hearst editors share that

WASHINGTON POST
30 August 1973

Kelley Acts to Improve FBI Efficiency

By Susanna McBee
Washington Post Staff Writer

Clarence M. Kelley, the new director of the FBI, disclosed yesterday the steps he is taking to improve the agency's efficiency, investigative techniques and relations with the public.

In an interview with The Washington Post, Kelley said, "I want improvement. I don't know if we need major changes to get it, but I want to find out from an objective point of view how we do things."

Accordingly, he said, he has asked two law enforcement experts "to look over our operations and see whether we need to streamline them."

They are William L. Reed, 37, executive director of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement in Tallahassee, and John C. Coleman, 50, training director at the Regional Center for Criminal Justice in Kansas City, Mo., where Kelley was police chief for 12 years before taking over the FBI on July 9.

The director also said he was hiring his former press officer in Kansas City, William D. Ellingsworth, 33, to work in the FBI's press services office here.

Reed and Coleman, who will be executive assistants to Kelley, are due to begin their review next Tuesday. Ellingsworth, who will be an administrative assistant, is expected to start Oct. 1.

None of the three is a former FBI agent, a fact that might cause resentment among some oldtimers. As one source said, "The bureau is an inbred organization. Some agents get very upset when people are brought in from the outside."

However, Kelley, himself an FBI agent for 21 years, has apparently moved quickly to consolidate internal support for the innovations he hopes to make.

He noted at the start of the interview that he has "a different way of managing" the bureau from that of J. Edgar Hoover, who died last year. During Hoover's 48-year tenure, the bureau's policies and procedures barely changed.

"Where Mr. Hoover had his way of management, I have mine," Kelley said. "Mine is participatory management. I rely quite heavily on the staff for recommendations."

The new director said he is launching a management training program for the special agents in charge of the FBI's 50 offices throughout the country.

The program, which he hopes to start in October or November, will be conducted in six sessions, each with

about 10 agents, lasting three or four days in different parts of the country.

It will include sessions on media relations, handling mail from the public, better communications between headquarters and field offices, use of computers for assignment of cases, analysis of office production, and developing files on how criminals operate.

Kelley also disclosed that he is bringing special agents in charge of branch offices to Washington—three at a time—each week for conferences with him.

"I'm garnering from them a list of things they feel are problems," he said. "One of the greatest problems is communications. For instance, an agent down south may be asked by a reporter up north about something that's going on here, and the agent won't know what's happening here. Or some field office may develop a good technique in training police or laboratory aides, and other offices may not know about it."

Kelley stressed that his policy will be one of an open door with the press. He said he wants "a policy of giving the local people (special agents in charge of local offices) wide latitude in dealing with the media."

During the management training sessions, discussions on media relations may include press representatives who could "relate what is desirable to them," Kelley said. "We should give the agents an outline of what they can and cannot talk about. For instance, they can't talk about investigations now under way."

The FBI chief also revealed that he is going to "reconstitute" the old Crime Research Division, which was split up by L. Patrick Gray III, who served as acting FBI director for nearly a year after Hoover died.

The division handled press and congressional relations as well as speech writing, correspondence with the public and court approval for "The FBI" television show.

Kelley is known to feel that those functions should be coordinated. He said he hopes to recreate the divi-

sion under a new name and designate someone to head it by Sept. 15.

In describing his new appointees for press relations and the management study, the director stressed their professional background.

Ellingsworth was a reporter and photographer for the Kansas City Star for seven years before becoming media liaison officer for the Kansas City police department in June, 1969.

Reed, who has a law degree, has headed Florida's 100-member equivalent of the FBI since November, 1967. Coleman, who has a master's degree in sociology, was a Los Angeles police officer and an administrative aide there to former Police Chief Thomas Reddin. Coleman retired from the force in 1967, after 20 years of service. As training director at the Kansas City center since 1970, he supervised training of state and local police officers.

Asked about FBI morale, Kelley replied, "Frankly, I have not encountered any real morale problem within the organization. I do encounter reports that citizens feel there is a morale problem, and that affects how the public reacts to the FBI."

"I want to restore full confidence in the bureau. I think the confidence is there, but it's in a state of suspension," he said. The 29,000 employees, including 8,600 special agents, still have "great spirit and dedication."

Later, Deputy Attorney General-designate William D. Ruckelshaus agreed with Kelley's assessment of bureau morale. Ruckelshaus, who served as acting director of the FBI after Gray resigned, said he thinks the agents "have accepted" Kelley's.

The morale problem, he said, stemmed from the fact that "there was demotion at the top. Having a permanent officer will solve most of it," he added.

GENERAL

Tuesday, Sept. 18, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

Multinationals Criticized Before U.N. Panel

By Anthony Astrachan

Washington Post Foreign Service

UNITED NATIONS—A number of witnesses, among them Ralph Nader, made broadside attacks on multinational corporations before a U.N. study group last week.

But the radical of American consumer advocates was not radical enough in his proposals for controlling the giant firms, in the view of two men from opposite poles—a Dutch spokesman for international capitalism and a Chilean who thinks multinationals are hurting the underdeveloped world.

The paradox was typical of the difficulties that characterize any attempt to study, let alone regulate, multinational corporations—companies which now produce at least \$330 billion a year in countries other than their home states.

Nader was one of 14 witnesses before a U.N. panel of "eminent persons" that is making a year-long study of the impact of the multinationals in the hope that it will produce new ideas on how to make these giant companies fit into a system that was not designed for them because it was based on nation-states.

Nader accused the multinationals of disrupting the world monetary system by shifting funds among their subsidiaries in different countries, exploiting the labor and "perverting the politics" of developing nations, shifting industrial pollution from their home countries to other states and running "snakepit" mining operations in Asia, Africa and America.

His list of abuses was dramatic, but his proposed solutions were not. Many of them were anticipated in the 195-page U.N. report on which the current study is based. That prompted Sicco Mansholt of the Netherlands, a former head of the European Economic Community's Executive Commission, to tell Nader that his ideas were not strong enough.

Nader gave highest priority to collecting information about the multinationals. Their power, he said, depends heavily on their ability to conceal or disguise their resources and their actions.

He said that prying out vital information could have an international effect equivalent to the way American consumers forced automakers to recall cars. He urged the United Nations to send questionnaires to all states and to the more than 200 multinationals that have annual sales of more than \$1 billion.

Nader suggested 13 questions, among them who owns what land, mineral and other resources in each country, the amount of taxes paid in each country, wage and benefit levels by country and environmental pollution data. He also urged that the United Nations investigate and publicize abuses by the multinationals alleged by "nations or peoples."

Nader gave second priority to individual and collective action by countries to impose conditions on the entry of foreign capital. Such conditions can and do work, according to two witnesses who preceded Nader.

Jose Campillo Saenz, a Mexican official, described his country's new regulations on foreign investment, including a limit of 49 percent or less by foreign companies in Mexican corporations and rules for the transfer of technology.

Ernst Keller, the Swiss president of ADELA, an investment company headquartered in Peru but owned by 240 shareholders in 23 countries, said that his company accepts a minority holding, creates new enterprises rather than buying existing ones, sells out to local interests after recovering its initial investment and tries to develop indigenous savings, personnel and management.

Some of the U.N. panel members expressed regret that Nader had not been present the first day of the hearings to engage in a face-to-face debate with the five executives of American corporations who testified then.

In fact, the executives tended to support most of the ideas on regulation that Nader later endorsed, although they differed with him on enforcement procedures and denied that multinationals commit the kind of sins he charged them with.

Thomas A. Murphy, vice chairman of General Motors,

and Irving S. Shapiro, vice chairman of Du Pont, for instance, both supported an equivalent to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that would "harmonize" national policies on investment, taxes, pollution control and the like.

The executives insisted, however, that their companies already contributed to economic and technological development and the health and welfare of the countries where they operate.

Oswaldo Sunkel, a distinguished Chilean social scientist, disagreed. "I get scared, really scared," he said, "when I hear such individuals speak of social responsibility. Who has appointed a small group of individuals to decide the fate of so many?"

Sunkel charged that the basic U.N. report "as unable to see the forest for the trees." The forest which he thought deserved more attention was the way multinationals concentrate so much power that they not only change economies but transform social structures and cultures as well. He called the aggregate of multinationals the "dynamic kernel" of a new "transnational capitalistic system."

Sunkel quoted the U.N. report charge that multinationals follow policies which do not suit the interest of either home or host countries and are in effect transnational. He went much further than the report, however, and said these policies are designed to insure the survival and growth of a transnational segment of the world economy.

This segment, he said, is oligopolistic—tending toward concentration in the hands of a few companies.

The few men who determine the policies of this transnational segment may carry national passports, Sunkel added, but they have transnational functions and transnational cultures and ideologies. These were among the forces he saw transforming societies and cultures around the world.

Sunkel claimed that the multinationals keep themselves growing by innovat-

ing products and processes regardless of real consumer need and by tapping potential markets in as many host countries as possible. Both home and host countries encourage this, he said, with research and export subsidies, tax concessions and the like to insure their own economic growth.

He questioned the validity of that growth, however, saying that the multinational corporation "is the most efficient instrument so far developed by capitalism to siphon off resources from where they are most urgently needed, but where there are no commercially profitable possibilities, to where they are least necessary, but where the most commercially profitable possibilities exist."

In the process, he said, "we get new products and processes, but not the capacity to develop new products and processes."

Sunkel said Thursday that the government of the late President Salvador Allende of Chile "may have had many failings and committed many errors, but nobody can deny that it attempted to redress this economic and social structure by fundamentally democratic means."

Allende was unable to get the international help that Sunkel thought his effort deserved, and his experiment ended in "a catastrophic collapse of its economic and political systems," he added.

He drew the conclusion that "it is not possible to try to restructure relations of dependence between underdeveloped countries and the transnational capitalist system in a peaceful way."

The U.N. group is charged with finding just such peaceful ways to restructure a system that now seems weighted against the underdeveloped states. Its members did not all share Sunkel's pessimism. But his testimony was moving because the U.N. study had its origins in charges by Allende that the International Telephone and Telegraph Company had intervened in Chilean politics.

After three days of public hearings and five days of closed meetings here, the group will hold public meet-

WASHINGTON POST

7 SEP 1973

Senate Funds Radio Europe

Associated Press

The Senate yesterday passed a bill to authorize continued federal financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

The 76 to 10 vote sent the bill to the House.

In approving a \$50.2 million authorization for this year, the Senate turned down, 56 to 29, an amendment by Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) to reduce the federal contribution to the two radio networks in future

years to 50 per cent of their operating expenses.

Fulbright called the networks, long financed secretly through the Central Intelligence Agency, "simply a remnant of the Cold War." He failed, 69 to 17, on an earlier motion to send the bill back to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to consider combining the operations of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty with the government-operated Voice of America.

Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.) said the networks, broadcasting news of international events and internal affairs to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, have long since abandoned cold war tactics.

He said they promote pressure for change within the communist countries and contribute to international détente through exchange of information.

Fulbright placed in the Congressional Record a list of corporate and individual contributors of \$500 or more to the two networks over the years since they began operating in the early 1950s.

Percy said nongovernment contributions totaled \$1.4 million in 1971 and \$1.1 million last year.

Sen. Jacob K. Javits, (R-N.Y.) said corporations, foundations and individuals should be encouraged to contribute more, but to force the networks to get half of their financing from nongovernment sources would cripple their operations.

The bill would establish a new Board for International Broadcasting to seek outside contributions for the two networks and oversee their operations.

of Churches, thereby demonstrating in equal measure reluctance to embarrass their east European brethren and determination to keep the issue of human rights in the communist world on the agenda. At the request of a Scottish churchman the council's secretary-general, Mr Philip Potter, gave a personal assurance that the issue would be pursued further. There is to be a special WCC meeting on human rights in Austria next year, and the council's officers swear that there will be no shirking of the communist issue there.

Well, one swallow does not make a summer. Nor, unfortunately, does one, albeit sincere, attempt at political evenhandedness restore to the World Council the credibility which it started to lose a few years ago through its ever deeper and, in the view of its critics, ever more reckless intervention in social and political issues at the expense of its more traditional religious concerns. One of those critics, the representative of the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople, Archbishop Athenagoras, warned the council that if social and political issues were to become its sole concern it risked becoming merely "the insignificant voice of a secularised movement".

For the present this is the voice of a minority, whose views tend to be dismissed as those of stick-in-the-mud backwoodsmen. But moderation may fight its way back. The decision on Monday to give a small grant of \$100,000 a year for five years to help Portuguese deserters in Europe and Africa—but the money has yet to be raised—was certainly a political decision. It is likely to cause controversy in the churches in Europe and the United States, even though great pains were taken to represent this help for deserters as merely a continuation of the WCC's traditional refugee relief policy. But the fact remains that, to the disappointment of some of its leading activists, the council's document on violence and non-violence shrank back from endorsing a "just revolution".

This was a relief to a visiting delegation of English-speaking churches from South Africa which had come to plead for a more constructive approach. The idea of setting up a development agency under the council's auspices, into which the churches could put funds they do not want to invest in companies dealing with South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola or Mozambique, is another indication of a more constructive trend, although it will meet fearful practical difficulties in its execution. There is a sound of pennies dropping in Geneva.

ings in Geneva in October and a further session in New York in March. Its 18 members do not represent their nations but serve as individuals. The chairman is L. K. Jha, former Indian ambassador in Washington.

THE ECONOMIST SEPTEMBER 1, 1973

The churches

The blind eye starts to open

FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

Geneva

The World Council of Churches, which has for years maintained a tight-lipped silence about political and religious persecution in the communist countries, took a first, hesitant, half-step towards condemning it this week.

The council's 120-strong central committee, meeting at its headquarters in Geneva, was debating a document on violence and social justice which had been prepared by a study group and was about to be circulated to the council's 267 Protestant and Orthodox member-churches throughout the world for "study, reflection and action." This document referred to a number of "violent and oppressive" situations in southern Africa, the United States, Latin America, Israel and Northern Ireland, but breathed not a word about the communist world or the former colonial countries of Asia and Africa. This made a number of senior western churchmen deeply unhappy. How can we talk about injustice in southern Africa if we go on, year after year, ignoring injustice in Russia? So argued a Norwegian bishop, amid much nodding of heads.

But at a special meeting on Sunday speaker after speaker from Russia and the other east European countries got up to protest against what they called cold-war propaganda; in their countries, they explained, there was no injustice, no oppression and, no, not even a ruling group to oppress anybody. In a voice choking with emotion, the Rumanian Orthodox patriarch kept repeating how good the state was to the church. After that there was quite a bit of behind-the-scenes lobbying, allegedly accompanied by hints that churches from the communist countries might have to pull out of the council if it publicly criticised their governments. In the end an extremely mild dig at post-revolutionary governments which impose "unduly restrictive measures on their citizenry" was dropped, together with a mention of conflicts in Asia and Africa, from an official gloss which was to accompany the document.

Nevertheless, the east Europeans did not have it all their own way. At the plenary session on Wednesday some speakers tried to reinstate the omitted paragraph. The attempt failed, but a substantial minority abstained, including some senior figures in the World Council

NEW YORK TIMES
22 September 1973

SENATE CONFIRMS KISSINGER, 78 TO 7

Nation's First Foreign-Born
Secretary of State Will
Take the Oath Today

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 21 — Henry A. Kissinger, who emigrated with his family to the United States 35 years ago to escape Nazi persecution, was confirmed by the Senate today as the next Secretary of State. The vote was 78 to 7.

Tomorrow morning at the White House, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger will administer the oath of office to Mr. Kissinger, the first naturalized citizen and the first Jew to hold the senior Cabinet position.

Sen. Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York, said in the two-hour Senate debate that preceded the vote that Mr. Kissinger's nomination was "a miracle of American history."

"He has proved not only to America but to the whole world that this still is an open society," Sen. Charles McC. Mathias Jr., Republican of Maryland, said, praising the 50-year-old, former Harvard professor who joined the Nixon Administration in 1969 as the President's adviser for national security. He will retain that post along with his new assignment.

One of those voting against Mr. Kissinger's confirmation was Sen. Jesse A. Helms, Republican of North Carolina, a conservative who said he had "considerable doubt about Mr. Kissinger's policies, particularly his role in improving relations with Russia and China. The Senator strongly criticized the United States' wheat deal with the Soviet Union.

"I greatly fear that his other much-lauded agreements will also end up with the Soviet taking us for a ride," he said. "The issue is one of competence and I have concluded that Dr. Kissinger has failed the test."

The other six Senators who voted against the confirmation were liberals whose opposition to certain Administration policies is well known. They were James Abourezk, Democrat of South Dakota; Floyd K. Haskell, Democrat of Colorado; Harold E. Hughes, Democrat of Iowa; George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota; Gaylord Nelson, Democrat of Wisconsin, and Lowell P. Weicker Jr., Republican of Connecticut.

Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas and chairman of the Foreign Re-

lations Committee, which cleared the nomination, opened the debate. He recommended Mr. Kissinger's confirmation and at the same time decried the rising number of American voices opposed to improved relations with the Soviet Union.

"I am very fearful we are moving backward to a revival of the cold war," Senator Fulbright said. "There are increasing indications that détente appears to be breaking down."

He referred specifically to the efforts led by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, to block the Administration's plan to extend normal trade preferences to the Russians until the Kremlin allowed unrestricted emigration of Jews and others.

Mr. Fulbright said that "we are now approving a new Secretary of State, but if we are predisposed against the policies he stands for, we will end up with a revival of the same cold war of the nineteen-fifties."

The problems of how to deal with the Soviet Union figured prominently in Mr. Kissinger's three days of open hearings with the Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Kissinger stressed that while he personally found some Soviet policies repugnant, he felt it was in the best interests of both the American and Russian peoples to continue to seek ways of relaxing international tensions, without linking such moves to changes in either country's domestic system.

Some Have Reservations

Some Senators, like Edmund S. Muskie, Democrat of Maine, voted for Mr. Kissinger but cited reservations about his policies. Mr. Muskie was critical of the Administration's Vietnam and India policies and about the wiretapping in which he said Mr. Kissinger had been "cleared of any taint of Water-gate-related misdeeds."

Tapping of the phones of four newsmen and 13 officials from 1969 to 1971 was the most controversial issue raised during the two weeks the Foreign Relations Committee spent in considering the Kissinger nomination.

His role apparently was limited to supplying the Federal Bureau of Investigation with names of officials who had access to secret national-security information that had appeared in the press. These individuals were then put under F.B.I. surveillance.

The committee found that although the practices involved in the wiretapping were open to criticism, Mr. Kissinger's role in the wiretapping was no reason to bar his confirmation.

Both Mr. Welcker and Mr. Nelson, however, cited the wiretapping in their speeches today as a major reason for their vote against the confirmation.

Senator Abourezk said: "We know enough about Dr. Kissinger to know that he is capa-

ble of deceiving the Congress and the public."

Senator Hughes said that despite Mr. Kissinger's "luminous intellectual powers," he believed that the nominee was "guided by a philosophy that is inimical to the long-range cause of world peace and inconsistent with the moral purpose of our nation."

Senator McGovern, the only member of the 17-man Foreign Relations Committee to oppose the confirmation, said that he was voting against the Administration's over-all foreign policy.

The new Secretary of State plans to go to New York Sunday night and to address the United Nations General Assembly Monday morning. He will remain in New York until Wednesday night to meet with foreign officials attending the session.

He will not be able to confer with State Department officials until Thursday, when he plans to outline his ideas for increasing the efficiency and raising the morale of the department's 6,000 employees here and the 6,000 abroad.

BALTIMORE SUN

10 September 1973

3 Turkish parties to call for removal of opium ban

Ankara, Turkey (AP)—Turkey's ban on opium production is becoming an issue in the campaign for the October 14 general election. All three major parties intend to mention the possibility of lifting it in their platforms, sources said yesterday.

Suleyman Demirel, former premier, and chairman of the conservative Justice party, which has a good chance of returning to power in October, has implied that his party will point out at least the need for a review of Turkey's opium policy.

The Republican People's party, the second largest political organization, has already announced it will consider resumption of poppy cultivation providing there are "sufficient controls to eliminate intentional concealment."

The centrist Reliance party also is expected to come out against the ban.

Turkey banned opium cultivation in June, 1971, under heavy pressure from the United States, which claimed that 80 per cent of the heroin reach-

ing U.S. addicts originated in Turkey's poppy fields. The politically unpopular decision came from the Army-backed government of Nihat Erim, a former premier, after Turkey's military commanders ousted Mr. Demirel's government March 12, 1971.

Mr. Erim said at the time that Turkey banned the crop "to soothe" the United States, but gave no guarantee not to rescind it if the economic loss to the farmers could not be compensated. Succeeding governments have assured continuation of the ban but the issue has remained controversial.

Mr. Kissinger has pledged to fill all major personal vacancies within two months, and some announcements are expected to be made soon. As an interim measure, he has recalled Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador to Cyprus, to serve as his press spokesman for about a month. Mr. McCloskey had served as spokesman for both Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Mr. Kissinger's predecessor, William P. Rogers.

In private conversations, Mr. Kissinger has stressed his desire to fill most key jobs with regular foreign-service officers and not to bring many of his National Security Council staff members over to Foggy Bottom with him.

He will maintain an office at the White House, where he will wear his hat of national security adviser to the President and chairman of various interagency committees.

A crucial matter, Mr. Kissinger has said, is to bring the State Department more actively into the policy-making field and to promote the best men in the department to positions of importance.

WASHINGTON POST
19 September 1973

Soviet Charge

MOSCOW—Literaturnaya Gazeta, a magazine of the Soviet Writers' Union, called for an "end to provocative activities" of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, according to the Soviet news agency Tass.

Soviet jamming of broadcasts from the British Broadcasting Corp., the Voice of America and the West German radio were halted recently in a move interpreted in the West as a gesture toward détente.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 September 1973

SHULTZ FINDS U. S. 'BURNED' ON GRAIN

By LINDA CHARLTON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 7—Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz became the first high Administration official today to acknowledge that the United States was "burned" in last year's Soviet wheat deal. He said that it would not happen again.

Mr. Shultz's comments came in the course of a news conference at the White House. He was asked, with reference to an allegation that "it seems now that the price of a loaf of bread in Moscow is cheaper than it is in the Safeway here," whether there had been "any miscalculation on the import of this [Soviet] deal on American agriculture."

In the course of his lengthy reply, Mr. Shultz conceded:

"I think it is a fair statement that they [the Soviet Union] were very sharp in their buying practices, and I think that we should follow the adage [that] if we are burned the first time, why, maybe they did it, but if we get burned twice, that is our fault and we shouldn't have that happen."

The Soviet Union, at that time desperate for grain because of domestic crop failures, purchased 440 million bushels of United States grain last summer for more than \$1-billion. The Nixon Administration previously granted the Soviet Union \$750-million in credits,

making possible the grain sale. Export subsidies amounting to \$300-million were also paid by the Nixon Administration to allow the grain companies to sell for prices lower than those prevailing on the domestic market.

This sale, which included about one-quarter of the total United States wheat crop, resulted in domestic shortages of feed grains and wheat.

Earlier in the day, Senator Walter D. Huddleston said he had information indicating that some of the wheat purchased here by the Soviet Union was being resold in Italy at far higher prices. The Kentucky Democrat, who also made a statement on the floor of the Senate this afternoon, said he based his allegations on an article in the Rome newspaper *El Tempo*.

Carroll G. Brunthaver, the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, said in a telephone interview that a check by the department had shown that the cargo in question had been shipped in Galveston, Tex., last month and purchased by a Swiss grain dealer.

The Soviet Union, Mr. Brun-

NEW YORK TIMES
9 September 1973

Third World's Trumps

By C. L. Sulzberger

The so-called Third World is edging gradually into its own and it is hard to imagine that its lack of cohesion or leadership inexperience can indefinitely obscure this new political fact. Such is the main implication of the past week's meeting in Algiers of some sixty chiefs of state or government from countries in underprivileged Asia, Africa and South America.

The tricontinental group is non-aligned in a military or ideological sense although its penchant is generally toward varying forms of socialism. Usually it is referred to as "developing," a word with innuendos of backwardness or poverty that is imprecise when applied to Yugoslavia or to Kuwait and Libya.

When the organization of this international club out of colonialism's ashes was first pressed by Tito, Nehru and Nasser, it seemed too vague and inchoate a dream to promise significant reality. But Marshal Tito, only survivor of the initial prime movers, can rightly regard the Algiers conference with optimism, despite bickering, because of changes on the international horizon.

During the three years since the group last met at Lusaka, Zambia, the superpower blocs assembled around Washington and Moscow have forsworn war and moved perceptibly toward détente. Thus, without growing militarily stronger, the Third World is relatively less menaced by possible threats.

With the fading of major armed conflict as a prospect, the potential importance of the U.N. grows. And, regardless of its internal quarrels, the Third World represents a decisive majority in U.N. membership. If it can ever make up its collective mind on particular issues, its voice will be weighty.

Moreover, as the arms ascendancy of the superpowers and the great powers assumes reduced political significance, Third World lands find they are able to act more boldly without fear of neo-colonialist pressures. Thus we have recently seen expropriations, nationalizations and extrusion of foreign bases with little effective protest by countries whose interests were disadvantaged.

Finally, the nonbloc of underdeveloped nations has learned that the technologically advanced and privileged sector of the international community contains deep-seated weaknesses that can be exploited if the Third World ever manages to coordinate its latent assets.

Industrialized America, West Europe

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

and Japan are all in the initial throes of an energy crisis. They need masses of fuel to sustain their scheduled growth during the years before new sources of power can be harnessed. The main contemporary sources of this are in such lands as Saudi Arabia and Iran (not represented at Algiers), Kuwait, Libya and Algeria, rich in petroleum and natural gas.

Furthermore, the industrialized nations are being racked by a long-enduring monetary crisis not likely to be cured by this month's World Bank meeting in Nairobi. The crisis has been magnified by huge amounts of Arab oil funds banging about from bank to bank in an understandable effort to profit from instability.

The Soviet bloc is relatively unaffected by both these crises due to its rigidly controlled production, its lesser reliance on external fuels, and its tight, artificial currency system. China, which relies minimally on foreign trade, is untouched.

The lesson to be drawn is that the transideological grouping at Algiers possesses key trumps to be played in the coming decade's power game. Already Arab statesmen forecast deliberate slowdowns in fuel production and curtailment in sales to customers who, like the U.S.A., openly favor Israel in the Palestine dispute.

There isn't any doubt that, if the Algiers Club manages to coordinate its actions with nonmembers, such as Saudi Arabia, there will be diplomatic repercussions abroad — above all in Washington. President Nixon's careful language at his latest press conference confirmed this.

American policy must recognize the changing pattern of the global kaleidoscope. The attempt to arrange a pentagonal diplomatic balance—the U.S.A., West Europe, Russia, Japan, China—perforce gives added impetus to creation of another force of immense importance, the Third World, pushed together by its exclusion.

One obvious deduction to be drawn is that the United States must revise the philosophy of its foreign aid program. Henceforth it should take into account the tremendous wealth possessed by the nations which met at Algiers and should encourage them to assist themselves and their fellows more generously.

From now on Washington should try to channel help to the underprivileged only in the form of education and technology. The surplus money that once was ours is rapidly becoming theirs.

haver said, was "in no way involved," and he criticized Senator Huddleston's statement as "loaded" and "just another example of hearsay."

A spokesman for Senator Huddleston, who sent letters to both the General Accounting Office and the Department of Agriculture asking for an investigation, said his office

would investigate the matter further.

Mr. Shultz, during the course of his 38-minute news conference, was also asked about export controls. He said:

"We have been watching this situation very carefully and we think we have a very good probability of not having to impose additional export controls in the food prices."

WASHINGTON POST
26 August 1973

Cold War Thaw Revives U.S. Card-Carrying Communists

By David M. Goldberg
Associated Press

After 25 years, there once more are card-carrying Communists in the United States.

After years of meeting in secret for fear of exposure; of being called before congressional committees; of suspecting that each new party recruit works for the FBI, American communism is, as the official line puts it, "showing the face of the party."

The membership cards, being issued for the first time since 1948, are the proof that the Communists no longer think they would be best off if nobody knew who they were.

The reason for the Communist coming out appears to be the fact that the thaw in international relations has convinced most Americans that the Communist Conspiracy—so much taken for granted a decade or two ago—is no longer on the verge of overthrowing the United States. In the words of that period, few people now appear to be looking for Reds under their beds.

"You don't see the anti-Communists out with placards the way you did 10 or 15 years ago," says H. L. (Bill) Richardson, a California state senator, author, radio commentator and one-time member of the John Birch Society.

"Maybe they're working within the Republican Party, or have quit to join the American Independent Party. Or maybe they've just thrown up their hands and said 'I'm going to enjoy myself before they come marching down the street.'"

Like the cards, "The younger people wanted them. They're proud to be Communists," says Gus Hall, the party's general secretary.

The signs of the thaw are often more symbolic than anything else, but the symbols are the tangible evidence of a public mood.

For example:

• Joe L. Matthews, national commander of the always staunchly anti-Communist American Legion, visited the Soviet Union and Poland last winter. When he returned, he wrote an article in the legion's magazine that was frankly glowing in its praise of veterans' facilities in the two countries. The legion has merged its

Americanism division with the division on children and youth, and the Americanism staff has been sharply reduced from a decade ago.

• The Subversive Activities Control Board had been phased out and the House Un-American Activities Committee has been turned into the House Internal Security Committee. The reconstituted committee hasn't held a hearing on communism in more than two years.

• The Internal Security Division of the Justice Department has been merged into a smaller department. "I don't think communism has been treated as a threat recently," says former Assistant Attorney General A. William Olson, the last director of the division.

• The Communists themselves see a noticeable difference in the way they're greeted when they travel and make speeches, although Gus Hall's presidential campaign—he got about 25,000 votes in the 13 states where he was on the ballot—hardly demonstrates massive support.

• In California, where anti-Communist sentiment is still stronger than in most places, the state senate committee on un-American activities was downgraded two years ago to a subcommittee on civil disorders. The impetus for the move came from James Mills, the senate president pro tempore, after he found his name in the committee's files for having attended a meeting called by the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union.

But even in Southern California, where the John Birch Society has American Opinion Libraries scattered every few miles, there seems to be a lack of interest among the populace in what the Birch society simply calls "The Conspiracy."

"I don't know how you measure sentiment, but I'm certainly not being asked to speak about communism the way I was 10 years ago," says Richardson.

Just about everyone who talks about the change in attitude sees its tangible origins in the events of the past decade: the war in Vietnam, the decision to normalize relations with mainland China, and the accords with the Soviet Union.

But many people who have lived through the '40s

and '50s, when every candidate for public office was bound to pay at least lip service to his opposition to communism, sense that the reasons are more subtle.

And the consensus is that the clearest of those reasons is a new generation that has grown up unencumbered by the attitudes of their parents; that the attitudes of the parents themselves have been changed by events, and that more people know more and fear less about communism.

Dennis Carpenter comes from Newport Beach, Calif., one of the wealthiest communities in staunchly conservative Orange County. He served in the FBI from 1954 to 1958, and then got into politics. He used to be chairman of the California Republican Central Committee and is now chairman of the California senate's new civil disorders subcommittee.

Carpenter feels strongly that communism is still a threat. But he feels just as strongly that hatred of communism must be eliminated as a political and social reflex.

"It's not time to say, 'That problem is over,'" Carpenter says. "But to be honest with yourself in this country, you can't hate someone who's different politically from yourself as long as he's not trying to overthrow the government. That's what this country is all about."

"We fought the Cold War for so long that it's very difficult to sustain it. It's hard to hate continually for a long time."

By most political standards, Clark Clifford's background would be considered more liberal than Carpenters. But Clifford matured politically during a period of intense anti-communism and he advised three Presidents on how to contain it. Now, at the age of 69, he has some doubts about the past.

"I am a product of the Cold War," he says, reaching with his long fingers over the desk in his comfortable Washington law office to toy with paperweights given him by Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.

"When Vietnam came along, there was never any

difficulty for me to accept the concept that we had better do something. I saw how in the '30s nothing had been done to stop Hitler and I related the same way to Vietnam. I thought we had Munich all over again."

By 1967, Clifford was losing his faith. In 1968, he was appointed Secretary of Defense and was, by most accounts, a key figure in turning around the buildup of troops in Vietnam.

Now he says: "I think it was a misjudgment of communism. World War II was a bad example. What we thought at the time was a massive plan on the part of the Soviet Union and China to take over the world just wasn't there."

Finally, from the left, comes the testimony of Leonard Boudin, whose law practice was partially dedicated during the 1950s to defending accused Communists before congressional committees and during the 1960s to defending more diverse radicals. His latest well-known client was Daniel Ellsberg.

Boudin sees the war as the turning point in the change of attitude. But like Clifford, he thinks the change in generations played a major role.

"The focal point was opposition to the war," he says. "But it also resulted from youth unencumbered by the fears of older people."

There is also broad agreement that additional information about communism has helped change the public attitude about it. That is, the left, the center and most of the right agree that the more people know about the subject the less they fear it.

Alger Hiss has been one symbol of the fear of communism. A former State Department officer, he was convicted of perjury after being accused of espionage for the Soviet Union and spent 44 months in prison. Now 68, he's been out of jail for 20 years and sells printing supplies in New York City.

"People were scared of Communists because they had never met one. I had to go to jail to meet a Communist," says Hiss, who maintains his innocence and is still appealing his case.

Dennis Carpenter, who comes from one of the nation's most conservative counties, agrees with the premise.

"You know," he says, "a

lot of people from my area have gone to Russia. They see what it's like over there, and they come back liking our system that much better. But they also see the people over there, and they see them as humans. I think leaving things to people is often a lot better than leaving them to governments."

Fred Kuzmaul, the American Legion's Americanism chairman, gives the same angle a reverse twist.

"Let's face it," he says. "The country can only benefit from the Brezhnev visit. The more the Russians can see that's in this country, the better off we are."

One indicator of the change is the 1971 hearing into communism by the House Internal Security Committee.

During the three decades of its existence, HUAC hearings often were nationally watched dramas. They featured flamboyant committee chairmen on center stage with apostate ex-Communists as witnesses for what had all the earmarks of a prosecution. The foils were a parade of prominent and not-so-prominent people accused of Communist affiliation. As often as not, they

took the Fifth Amendment, an action interpreted by committee members and staff as an admission of guilt.

But the 1971 hearings were sedate and held in relative privacy. The key witness was Charles Fitzpatrick, a New York schoolteacher who joined the party for the FBI and spent more than 12 years as a Communist.

"Fitzpatrick? Let me see. I don't even think I attended those hearings," says Rep. Claude Pepper (D-Fla.). Pepper spent 12 years in the U.S. Senate until he was defeated in 1950 by an opponent who, among other things, used Pepper's pro-New Deal outlook to link him with communism in a campaign brochure called, "The Red Record of Claude Pepper."

Now Pepper is on the committee with three other liberal Democrats. He remembers how the focus changed.

"A few years ago," he recalls, "Speaker McCormack called me and said, 'Claude, I'm going to put you on that committee.'"

"I said, 'No, not me, I don't like anything they do.'"

But he said, 'The House will not abolish it and I want to see that it's no longer a witch-hunting committee. I want everything done legally and correctly.'"

The Fitzpatrick testimony was done legally and correctly. So legally and correctly, in fact, that a good part of his testimony was given over to identifying as Communists people who had made no attempts to cover their party membership.

Even the John Birch Society, the country's most militant and most publicized anti-Communist organization, has broadened its focus beyond exposing Communists.

Charles R. (Chuck) Armour, the society's West Coast governor, says anti-communism is "alive and well and kicking . . . and growing."

But Armour, who runs a staff of 56 full-time employees from a yellow brick building in the fashionable Los Angeles suburb of San Marino, says anti-communism might not be the right term for what the society does.

"The John Birch Society," he says, "has expanded from

being just anti-Communist to looking at a conspiracy in the world to control man and his environment through world government."

What's the source of the conspiracy, a visitor asks Armour, a former insurance broker who joined the society in 1961.

"The evidence today is there in overtures from the Soviet Union and the Red Chinese government in Peking and the effort to put an amalgamated government in the world," he replies.

Does that mean the United States government?

"Draw your own conclusions," he replies. "It means the so-called capitalists, the media and people in high places."

The area around Armour's office still looks like it's concerned.

But conservatives like Bill Richardson and Dennis Carpenter, who still think there is a threat, see little public interest in it. And a recent poll showed that, while the country is still very much against communism, the feeling isn't deep enough to make communism the day-to-day concern it once was.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
18 September 1973

'A country in need of praise'

The Saturday Review and World magazines have joined forces in a new biweekly whose first issue offers a valuable reminder: America is "a country in need of praise." This phrase is the title of an article drawn from a forthcoming book, "Coping," by Daniel P. Moynihan, Ambassador to India and former assistant to the President for urban affairs. Without mentioning Watergate, Mr. Moynihan writes:

"Relentless emphasis on social failure and corruption is no way to summon social energies that are needed to set things right. . . . To recognize and acknowledge success, however modest, is fundamental to the practice of government. It is a first principle of leadership in a democracy, where loyalty must be directed more to institutions than to individuals."

As one example of success, Mr. Moynihan cites the virtual disappearance of the dual school system in the South during a surge of desegregation in 1970 that placed Southern schools ahead of Northern schools in this respect. "The administration in office, which had worked to bring about the end of the dual school system, did not especially want to take 'credit' for it, while its opposition did not in the least want to give it 'credit.' . . . Almost immediately thereafter the issue of school busing arose in Northern cities. If only it had done so in the context of a widely acknowledged success in the South, might not public attitudes have been different?"

Whatever one's answer to that question, such successes should be

acknowledged. One may disagree with Mr. Moynihan's view of solving some urban problems through a kind of "benign neglect" (though he doesn't resurrect that albatross phrase here). But his emphasis on admitting success as well as failure is particularly important now as the nation's confidence in itself is challenged on various fronts.

This is not to advocate slipping into the old complacency but to realize that things are really not so bad that it's not worth trying to improve them. As Mr. Moynihan concludes, "American society would do better to pay somewhat more attention to its successes, for it needs the reserves of morale that this kind of awareness brings."

WALL STREET JOURNAL
11 September 1973

Image Problems?

If Your Copy Machine Doesn't Work, Maybe It Has Been Sabotaged

Office-Copier Makers Deny It, but Dirty Tricks Are Reported to Be a Problem

Fighting for a Market Share

By JOHN EMSHILLER

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

SAN FRANCISCO—The scene was a California meeting of branch sales managers of SCM Corp., presided over by a regional sales chief. The discussion turned to how competitors such as Xerox Corp. and Sperry Rand Corp. were making inroads into SCM's office-copier business.

The SCM managers decided that one solution to competitive problems was sabotage. They discussed tampering with competitive machines in hopes of creating service problems. On a Sperry Rand copier, for example, they were told, "We could turn the roll of paper around . . . which would cause it to jam," one participant recalls. Xerox machines required another tactic. If a salesman could "drop something in the toner tray, you could pretty well score the drum on it," the participant says.

That was the testimony of Robert Wethington, a former SCM branch manager, at a recent trial in San Francisco Superior Court. He said he attended such meetings in San Francisco and Los Angeles while working for SCM in the late 1960s.

SCM flatly denies that sabotage of competitors' products was ever discussed, much less advocated, at company meetings. But two court decisions have gone against the company and certain of its salesmen accused of sabotage. In the more recent case here, a judge reduced a jury award against SCM from \$1 million to \$150,000, causing the plaintiff to demand a new trial.

Mysterious Malfunctions

Despite corporate denials, it's clear from talks with salesmen for SCM and other copier manufacturers, and with independent copier dealers, that dirty tricks have been a real if seldom-discussed problem in the \$2.2-billion-a-year office-copier industry, even though—as some assert—they may now be on the decline. "I've known sales people and servicemen who have told me they committed sabotage," says Doug Moody, an independent copier dealer in Bay Area. "I've seen them tamper with the equipment of one or more former companies, then leave or sell it themselves; most manufacturers also maintain their own sales forces for direct sale or lease to customers." Mr. Moody says he believes these tales of sabotage because "more than once I'd install a machine and come back a few hours later to find it malfunctioning. I'd look inside and find a wire disconnected and, after talking to the customer, find out one of my competitors had been around in the interim."

Mr. Wethington, who now has his own copier business, told the San Francisco court he personally tampered with competitors' products more than once. The aim was to "cause service," he said, adding "if the machine has a

lot of service calls, then you are in a very good position to come back with your equipment."

Outright sabotage isn't always necessary, says a salesman for a smaller manufacturer of copiers. For example, he explains, "some customers who use his company's machine buy their paper from competitors. When the machine breaks down, he 'takes a couple of extra hours' to repair it. 'Then,' he says, 'I'll give the customer a bill for \$100. When he sees it he usually blows his stack.' The salesman explains that it's the "off-brand" paper that's causing the problem, and he offers to cancel the bill if the customer will switch his paper orders to the salesman. "It works a lot of the time," the salesman says.

Anyone with some derring-do and expertise, salesmen say, runs little risk of discovery in sabotaging a competitor. A former SCM employee tells how he often and successfully has done it: "I get permission to go back to the purchasing department of a large company that uses a competitor's machines," he says. On the way through the offices, he says, he will simply stop at a few machines, "pop off their backs, and mess them up." No one ever bothers him. "If you act like you're supposed to be working on the machine," he says, "there are few people who are going to ask you what you are doing."

Looking the Other Way

Just how widespread such practices are, and how high in the corporate hierarchy knowledge of them may go, is uncertain. Major copier makers deny that sabotage has been a problem. A spokesman for Xerox Corp., the biggest, says Xerox never has heard of competitors' tampering with Xerox machines. And, he says, "we have very clear guidelines forbidding anyone in the company from verbally criticizing, much less tampering with, a competitor's equipment."

A former SCM employee says that corporate officers never were at any of the sabotage meetings he attended. But he says he is certain at least a few high officials knew what was happening. "I know a couple of vice presidents of the company personally," he says. "And they knew sabotage was discussed and that salesmen were doing it. They just chose to turn and look the other way."

Sources at other companies say that higher officials may not have ordered salesmen to commit sabotage but they at least suggested it. One man says that when he worked for Apeco Corp., an Evanston, Ill.-based copier manufacturer, regional sales managers visiting branch offices would "talk about it in a joking way,

saying, for instance, that SCM had screwed up one of our machines and intimating we might do the same to them when we got a chance."

If some copier salesmen may be tempted to sabotage, it's because their business is fiercely competitive. Though Xerox, with some 60% of domestic sales, dominates the market, dozens of other firms, large and small, are all fighting for a share. "In this business the end justifies the means," the former SCM salesman says. "Either you get your sales quota or you get your pink slip."

Hook on a Rug

SCM's troubles in the San Francisco case trace back to 1968, when Copico, a local dealer, installed a coin-operated Olivetti machine in the San Francisco Public Library on a trial basis. Almost from the start things went wrong. Bent and gummy coins jammed the machine; a mysterious puncture in its two-and-a-half-gallon tank spread ink all over a library rug. Library employees testified they began to notice that trouble started after visits by two SCM salesmen who had been servicing an SCM machine in the library. Then one day the two men were caught leaning over the Olivetti

vetti machine with their hands in it.

They claimed they were only studying the lens mounting. But the library called Copico, and Copico called the police.

It was Copico whose \$1 million jury award was reduced by a judge; Copico rejected the lowered award, and a new trial has been scheduled as a result. Evidence at the original trial suggested that higher officials of SCM had instructed salesmen to sabotage the competition. Allen Kline, a former SCM salesman, testified he attended a 1965 meeting in Atlanta where regional sales managers gave instructions on tampering. (The company denies such instructions were given.) After the trial, Mr. Kline would say only that "SCM is a big company, and I'm only an individual. I don't want to rub salt into their wounds."

Earlier, in a 1968 antitrust suit in federal court in Baltimore, a judge found SCM salesmen guilty of "tampering (with) and misrepresenting" paper and supplies sold by Advanced Business Systems & Supply Co., a Baltimore-based dealer.

SCM appealed the verdict to the U.S. Court of Appeals, which modified some of the findings but didn't change the findings of fact concerning tampering. An SCM spokesman says the company tried to appeal to the Supreme Court but was turned down.

The trial court said that SCM salesmen would run off a satisfactory copy using SCM paper on an SCM machine. Next they would try competitive paper (in this case manufactured by Nashua Corp. of Nashua, N.H.) in the machine. But they would set its lens shutter so that no paper could have made satisfactory copies and, the court found, then blame the Nashua paper for the poor copies to persuade the customer to buy SCM paper.

A big part of their profit in electrostatic machines that use chemically treated paper, industry sources say, comes from contracts for the paper and other supplies. "You can almost give the machine away," a former salesman says, "if you can get the customer to buy your paper and supplies."

After the Baltimore case, the Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint charging SCM with, among other things, "maladjusting or tampering with owned and/or leased SCM electrostatic copying machines when non-SCM copying supplies are used." Shortly thereafter, the company entered into a consent agreement with the FTC in which it promised to refrain from such practices without admitting having used them in the past.

SCM says the Baltimore and San Francisco cases "have been distorted and blown out of proportion." Even if the facts are correct, an

SCM spokesman says, "It is mystifying how unauthorized and uncondoned acts of individual salesmen can be attributed to the company."

Xerox, the industry leader, generally appears to have avoided sabotage tactics. Until recently, Xerox was the only major company whose machines used conventional bond paper, which Xerox customers can obtain directly from paper companies. Competition has been much more intense in the market for chemically treated paper that most other machines used.

Dirty Tricks Warning?

Though Xerox insists it has a strict policy even against knocking the competition, at least one dealer thinks some Xerox employees may have tampered with some of his machines. "I've had a coin-operated Olivetti machine in this Safeway for years," says the dealer, Fernando Velez, president of S&F Copy Co. Inc. "Then recently Xerox puts one in next to mine, and mine starts to go haywire." In another Safeway store where Xerox installed a copier, he says, "somebody actually got into my machine and screwed up the electronic circuitry. And to do that you have to know the business."

"None of our people have ever heard of Velez, and as far as we know he has never made a complaint to us," a Xerox spokesman responds. "If we were ever convinced that an employee of ours was involved in anything like that he would be fired on the spot."

No formal tampering complaints have been made against Xerox. But the Federal Trade Commission has complained that the company maintains its position in the copier industry in other ways. In December, the FTC filed an antitrust suit that charged Xerox with monopolizing the copier business by requiring customers to lease instead of letting them buy Xerox machines and by using discriminatory pricing practices, among other things. Xerox has called the complaint "ill-founded and without merit."

There are some in the industry who believe sabotage has declined in the past two or three years, partly because of SCM's troubles and partly because the trend to machines using plain paper has dulled the cut-throat competition to supply chemically treated paper. Bigger, more sophisticated and more expensive, the plain-paper machines also require a greater investment to produce and market so that "you can't afford to get caught pulling these kinds of stunts," says Mr. Moody, the dealer in Hayward. But, he adds, "I worry sometimes the same things could happen in the bond-paper market as happened in the electrostatic one. I just hope we have become more sophisticated than that."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 September 1973

Opium fogs U.S.-Turk relations

Life terms, politics
raise a dilemma

By Sam Cohen
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

Istanbul, Turkey

The United States is caught in a harsh dilemma here over drug trafficking.

On one hand the U.S. has urged Turkey to clamp down on opium production and trafficking.

On the other, American officials are concerned at the severity of punishment handed out to individual U.S. citizens convicted of drug offenses here. They are embarrassed by the long prison sentences; especially when American intervention on behalf of convicted persons would appear inconsistent with the goal of clamping down on the drug market.

The situation is complicated by the current campaign for next month's Turkish elections. All the major parties contesting the election have promised to at least reconsider the two-year-old ban on opium production — a ban prompted by American pressure and compensated for by American dollars.

Cultivation favored

The opposition Republican Peoples Party has announced readiness to

resume poppy cultivation with effective control on illicit trading. The majority Justice Party has also pledged to reconsider the ban. Smaller parties have promised to lift it.

Various politicians are taking advantage of the election campaign to criticize the ban, which they see as product of American intervention. They maintain that Turkish farmers have suffered from the ban and say American aid for compensation and crop substitution has been inadequate, making some of Turkey's estimated 100,000 poppy farmers even poorer.

American diplomats here are worried about this criticism and the real possibility that the next Parliament may pass a law allowing farmers to cultivate poppies again.

Faces punishment

Meanwhile, another American has become a victim of Turkey's harsh punishment for drug offenders. An Istanbul criminal court has just sentenced 26-year-old William James Hayes of Long Island, N.Y., to 30 years imprisonment for attempting to smuggle two kilograms of hashish out of Turkey. A university dropout, Hayes was arrested August, 1970, at Istanbul airport, tried, and sentenced to four years jail for possessing drugs.

With good conduct reducing his term, Hayes would have been freed last July from Istanbul's Sagmacilar prison if the Ankara appeals court had not insisted twice that he should be punished for smuggling. This under Turkish law is a grave crime without discrimination of drug quantity or quality.

Recently the appeals court gave its final verdict for Hayes: life imprisonment. Under Turkish laws, a local

criminal court must respect an appeals court's final verdict.

No alternative

So, although the Istanbul court judge who previously tried Hayes was convinced he tried to take the drug home for his own use and not for commercial purposes, the judge emphasized in Monday's hearing that his court could do nothing but abide with the Ankara appeal court's ruling. The judge was able to turn life imprisonment into 30 years jail for Hayes's good conduct.

Diplomatic activity between Washington and Ankara has sought ways to ensure Hayes's early release. But this presents serious problems.

The Turks are sensitive about any intervention in their system of justice; and it is hard for American authorities, who have insisted on Turkey's crackdown on the drug trade, to ask for leniency.

However, intensive lobbying in New York and Washington has led to several high-level representations. More are expected now that the 30-year sentence is final.

Hayes's main hope, like other Americans and foreigners jailed for drug offenses here, is the possibility of a general amnesty on Turkey's 50th anniversary next October. This would be the task of the new Parliament to be elected Oct. 14, and will take several weeks or months until passed.

All major parties seem prepared to approve an amnesty bill, although differences already exist among them regarding its extent. Hayes's sentence, for instance, may be reduced 10 or 15 years under an amnesty. His remaining years also may be reduced one-third for good conduct, but he would still have several years to spend in jail.

WASHINGTON POST
17 September 1973

Full Funding for Radio Free Europe

The Senate voted 76 to 10 to authorize the full \$50 million requested by the administration for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which broadcast useful and otherwise unobtainable information to East Europe and the Soviet Union respectively. But the Senate Appropriations Committee then knocked out \$10 million. Given the stations' tottering financial condition, this will probably destroy them, unless the funds are restored in an amendment due to be made on the Senate floor today. The movement to cut the money, and thereby to virtually assure the stations will go off the air, was led by Sen. John Pastore (D-R.I.), the very gentleman instrumental in putting yesterday's Redskins game on the air. What a pity his devotion to public access

to the airwaves is limited to broadcasts on these shores.

Opponents of the two radio stations used to argue that they were "cold war relics" which undermined East-West detente. Henry Kissinger nailed this one last week in his testimony that the two stations have "not interfered with detente." President Nixon has repeatedly urged their continuation and full funding. Senators might further consider that today in Geneva there opens the brass-tacks phase of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. Its most important agenda item calls for a freer East-West flow of people and ideas. For the Senate to cut and condemn two principal channels of communication, on the opening day of a conference devoted to expanding such communication, would be destructive as well as absurd.

Eastern Europe

NEW YORK TIMES
16 September 1973

SOVIET DENOUNCES WESTERN SUPPORT OF ITS DISSIDENTS

Calls Them 'Tiny Bunch of
Intellectuals' and Affirms
its Information Curbs

By THEODORE SHABAD

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Sept. 15—The Soviet Union today denounced Western expressions of support for a "tiny bunch of intellectuals" and warned that "no one is allowed to violate the principles of our democracy."

In the first official response to protests over Moscow's drive against dissidents, the Communist party daily Pravda also ruled out any unrestricted flow of information that would "legalize anti-Communist propaganda" within the Soviet Union.

The detailed Soviet rebuttal reflected continuing opposition to Western attempts to link easier human contacts with the political and economic relations sought by the Kremlin. The issue will be debated at the second phase of the European security parity opening Tuesday in Geneva.

Response to 2d Charge

The Soviet statement also appeared to respond to concern among some Soviet liberal intellectuals that international relaxation of tension was being hindered by the harassment of the physicist Andrei D. Sakharov and other advocates of greater public disclosure and broader human rights in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Sakharov meanwhile, seemingly undeterred by a two-week campaign of personal denunciation, addressed an open letter to the United States Congress, urging members to stand firm on the controversial Jackson amendment.

The amendment, to the Administration's comprehensive trade bill, is named for one of its sponsors, Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington. A similar amendment has been submitted in the House of Representatives.

Already endorsed by a ma-

jority of members in both houses, the amendments would link freedom of emigration for Soviet citizens to any extension of trade benefits by the United States.

The linkage has been opposed by the Nixon Administration as an obstacle to its Soviet policy, as well as by members of the American business community intent on expanding trade with the Soviet Union.

Alluding to this opposition, Mr. Sakharov expressed the hope that Congress "will find the strength to rise above temporary partisan considerations of commercialism and prestige."

The issue is scheduled to come to a vote this coming week in the House Ways and Means Committee, which has been discussing the trade bill.

Mr. Sakharov described as deliberate obfuscation the reported attempts of some opponents of the amendment to suggest that its passage would give rise to outbursts of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and hinder the emigration of Jews.

"It is as if the emigration issue affected only Jews," Mr. Sakharov said, adding that there were thousands of non-Jews who wanted to exercise their right, under the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to choose the country where they want to live. Soviet citizens do not have the inherent right to emigrate, and the expression of such a desire is often greeted as a virtual act of treason.

A group of Moscow Jews, who have been frustrated in their attempts to emigrate, charged today that officials of the Nixon Administration had urged them to cease their public campaign and had assured them that diplomacy would be more effective in resolving their problems.

Diplomacy Is Rejected

Alluding to apparent efforts by Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State-designate, to intercede quietly on behalf of some Jews, the latest statement said:

"We have little faith in the effectiveness of lists being carried by advocates of 'quiet diplomacy' across the ocean to Moscow, and then back again together with assurances but without any concrete results."

"We are convinced that only the methods of open public struggle can help resolve the problem, which touches above all on the lofty principles of the rights of man."

The statement also accused Steven Lazarus, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for East-West Trade, of having put pressure on Moscow Jews during a visit to Moscow in February to desist from public protest lest they endanger the Administration's trade bill.

"Careful not to compromise 25

himself by a direct meeting with us," the statement said, "he let us know through an intermediary what, in his view, our behavior should be."

According to the Moscow Jews, Mr. Lazarus urged them to appeal to Jewish organizations in the United States to drop their support for the Jackson amendment. Adoption of the amendment, Mr. Lazarus is reported to have said, would mean the end of Soviet-American trade expansion and would therefore expose Soviet Jews to revenge by the Kremlin.

The statement was signed by 12 scientists and engineers who have been barred from emigrating on vaguely defined grounds of national security. They included Veniamin G. Levich, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, Aleksandr Y. Lerner, computer specialist, and Mark Y. Azbel and Aleksandr Y. Voronel, physicists. Mr. Azbel and Mr. Voronel were among six scientists who staged

a two-week hunger strike in June.

C.I.A. Is Accused

Today's Pravda article attributed Western expressions of sympathy for dissident intellectuals to a well-organized campaign planned by "experienced people from the Central Intelligence Agency and by specialists in the art of shaping public opinion."

Mike Mansfield, the Senate majority leader, was widely quoted in the article in support of the Soviet point of view as having said that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and radio stations beaming broadcasts into the Soviet Union represented remnants of the cold war that should be eliminated.

The newspaper also praised David Rockefeller, chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, for having warned that it would be a mistake to use the prospects of expanded trade as leverage against the Soviet Union.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 September 1973

Warning to Moscow

More than any other group of men and women, scientists live with the terrifying knowledge of humanity's precarious balance on the edge of self-destruction. An awareness of awesome risks, together with their own responsibility in creating them, leads scientists at times to reach across national boundaries to appeal to the conscience of men of power. It was in such a moment of humane solidarity that the National Academy of Sciences reached out to its Soviet counterpart in a warning that the arrest or further harassment of Andrei D. Sakharov, the eminent Soviet physicist, might jeopardize the future of American-Soviet scientific cooperation.

Academician Sakharov, father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb but also a prime mover for the nuclear test ban, has come to be a symbol of lonely courage in the battle against the new upsurge of repression in Moscow. He has courageously told his countrymen: "intellectual freedom is essential to human society — freedom to obtain and distribute information, freedom for open-minded and unfearing debate, and freedom from pressure by officialdom and prejudice."

Just such pressure is now being brought to bear on Academician Sakharov with such organized force that even the members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with a few honorable abstentions, have surrendered to the Kremlin and attacked their colleague.

This new line of persecution, along with the stepped-up Soviet campaign of terror against all dissent and recent incidents of organized anti-Semitism, is being pressed at the very time when American and Soviet officialdom extol the mutual benefits of the new spirit of détente and cooperation. The Soviet people, who stand to derive great personal benefits from trade with the United States, must conclude that the American Government is giving tacit approval to what can only be considered as neo-Stalinism. A succession of Cabinet-level American delegations to Moscow, coinciding with the new terror inevitably reinforces this impression.

American scientists have now made it clear that they cannot in good conscience cooperate with those who stifle dissent and suppress intellectual freedom. Would that the United States Government, as represented by President Nixon and Secretary-designate Kissinger, had a comparable sense of moral purpose.

WASHINGTON POST
12 September 1973

The Requirements of Detente

The very difficult question of what is to be the substance of Soviet-American "detente" is passing from a debating phase to a political phase. A significant number of Americans now appear to believe it is neither desirable, possible nor safe to improve relations with the Soviet Union unless the Kremlin liberalizes some of its domestic policies. So the National Academy of Sciences has just conditioned its support of further scientific exchanges on an end to Kremlin harassment of physicist-libertarian Andrei Sakharov. House Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills (D-Ark.) says he will resist expanded East-West trade "if the price is to be paid in the martyrdom" of Sakharov, Nobel laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn and other noted dissenters. Congressional consent for expanded trade has already been linked to Soviet consent for freer emigration, especially emigration of Jews.

As the excitement of summitry wore off, people were bound to start examining the stuff of detente, the more so as the inflationary impact of last year's Soviet grain purchases came to be felt. Distracted perhaps by Watergate, Mr. Nixon has given no evidence that he has coped with the issue himself, as he should have. For it is a plain fact that, though he made his first-term breakthroughs largely alone and in secret, their consolidation requires public support. He needs the support of scientists to expand exchange, and of Congress to broaden trade. Meanwhile, the situation on the Soviet side has not been static. The Soviet government, eager to reap the benefits of detente without cost to its domestic grip, has intensified its crackdown on dissenters; they in turn have reached out for foreign support. The sharper the foreign protests, the more determined some in the Kremlin become to ignore them. Those Soviet leaders who had doubts about detente all along are no doubt arguing now that the current American "interference" in Soviet affairs proves their original point.

The attitudes of American critics require closer scanning. Some Americans who now speak for Soviet human rights may well do so because they never "trusted" the Russians. Others may be making political hay. Still others, particularly American Jews, see an opportunity and feel an obligation to help their co-religionists. Scientists and intellectuals have an interest in their Soviet counterparts. Whether or not one sympathizes with any of these attitudes, the fact remains that there is a substantial and growing constituency which expects political and economic progress to be accompanied by progress in opening up Soviet society. It is a fundamental American tenet to equate trustworthiness and openness. It is deeply disturbing that the Kremlin is

not subject to the same checks on the arbitrary use of power that operate on democratic governments, however imperfectly. It is offensive to find the Soviet state denying human values and it cannot avoid raising doubts about how reliable a partner it will be in joint political and economic enterprises. A form of "interference" in Soviet affairs is a natural consequence of this concern. But our own self-interest is involved as well. And that is what makes the problem so difficult for us.

Secretary of State-designate Henry Kissinger last Friday pronounced himself personally "disappointed" and "dismayed" by the recent reports of oppression from Russia. "Yet," he went on, "we have as a country to ask ourselves the question of whether it should be the principal goal of American foreign policy to transform the domestic structure of societies with which we deal or whether the principal exercise of our foreign policy should be toward affecting the foreign policy of those societies." This way of posing the issue is entirely consistent with Dr. Kissinger's view that foreign policy is essentially global strategy and that domestic considerations and pressures should not be allowed to impinge on it. Moreover, he is surely well positioned to understand the never-absent risk that the Kremlin majority currently supporting a detente policy could crumble.

The appropriate approach to the issue he poses, however, is not merely to caution those concerned with human rights. That is not only questionable politics but questionable diplomacy. The appropriate approach is to go on to caution the Soviet leadership that it is simply not possible to mold the necessary public support for a detente policy in the United States while the Kremlin continues acting as it does with respect to human rights. The real problem, we suspect, is not so much that the Soviet Union practices domestic policies repugnant to many Americans. The problem is that at a time of East-West promise when many Americans had expected a softening effect on Soviet internal policies, the Kremlin seems to be going *backwards*. It is this sense of disappointment, of betrayal, which energizes many critics of Soviet performance on human rights. The remedy, then, is not a "transformation of the Soviet domestic structure" but some reasonable amount of evidence of positive changes—some movement in the right direction, rather than the other way around. Such evidence would almost certainly loosen the knot now tightening around certain aspects of Soviet-American detente. President Nixon has no more compelling piece of international business than to set the Soviet leadership straight on what, as a practical political matter as well as a question of principle, detente requires if it is to achieve a necessary measure of support in this country.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 September 1973

First, Human Détente

By Henry M. Jackson

WASHINGTON—Since the Moscow summit of May 1972, it has become fashionable to contrast the "crudity" and "bluntness" of earlier Soviet regimes with the "subtlety" and "sophistication" of Mr. Brezhnev and his associates. But there is nothing subtle about the latest wave of show trials, staged confessions and harassment in the Soviet Union. It is evident that the supposed "relaxation of tensions" in international affairs is not yet accompanied by a corresponding relaxation of Soviet internal controls.

In 1937, Thomas Mann, then in exile in Switzerland, was informed by the University of Bonn that "the faculty finds itself obliged to strike your name off its roll of honorary doctors."

In his written reply, Mann asked the Nazi Government he had fled:

"Why isolation, world hostility, lawlessness, intellectual interdict, cultural darkness, and every other evil? Why not rather Germany's voluntary return to the European system, her reconciliation with Europe, with all the inward accompaniments of freedom, justice, well-being and human decency, and a jubilant welcome from the rest of the world? Why not? Only because a regime which in word and deed denies the rights of man, which wants above all else to remain in power, would stultify itself and be abolished if, since it cannot make war, it actually made peace."

In 1969, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote to the Secretariat of the Soviet Writers' Union after being informed that it had expelled him:

"Your clumsy articles fall apart; your vacant minds stir feebly—but you have no arguments. What would you do without 'enemies'? You could not live without 'enemies'; hatred, a hatred no better than racial hatred, has become your sterile atmosphere. But in this way a sense of our single, common humanity is lost and its doom is accelerated. Should the Antarctic ice melt tomorrow, we would all become a sea of drowning humanity, and

into whose heads would you then be drilling your concepts of 'class struggle'?"

The message of these two great writers is the same: A regime that denies the rights of man can never be reconciled to membership in the community of civilized nations.

The question today is whether recent East-West developments have in fact increased the chances the Soviet Union will decide to become a member of the community of civilized nations. I am bound to say that I share the apprehensions of those who remain doubtful. But this much is certain: How we design and implement the emerging policy of détente, the weight we assign to human rights in the development of relations with the Communist nations, and the depth of our own commitment to individual liberty will prove decisive.

This is the point that Andrei Sakharov communicated to us during his brave and outspoken press interview last month. "Détente," Sakharov said, "has to take place with simultaneous liquidation of isolation." Détente without democratization, would be "very dangerous . . . that would be cultivation and encouragement of closed countries, where everything that happens goes unseen by foreign eyes behind a mask that hides its real face. No one should dream of having such a neighbor, and especially if this neighbor is armed to the teeth."

Thus, without an increasing measure of individual liberty in the Communist world there can be no genuine détente, there can be no real movement toward a more peaceful world. If we permit form to substitute for substance, if we are content only with "atmospherics," we will fail to keep the peace.

Of all the human rights contained in the universal declaration of the United Nations, none is more fundamental than that in Article 13—the right to free emigration. And as we assess the developing détente, a basic measure of progress will be its impact on the free movement of people. The importance of free emigration stems

from the fact that whatever other liberties may be denied—speech, press, religion, employment—any and all of these can be restored by emigration to free countries of the West. Of human rights, free emigration is first among equals. Moreover, emigration has a special international character that necessarily places it in the context of international relations—for the state that wishes to receive emigrants has at least as much of a stake in free emigration as the state from which they come.

Significantly, the economy of the Soviet Union is in desperate straits, and we have been asked to extend to Russia the benefits of our markets on a most-favored-nation basis, of our capital at preferential rates, and of our superlative technology. There are those who argue that we must make these trade concessions in the interest of promoting détente but that we ought not to attach conditions that would, at the same time, promote human rights in the Soviet Union. This is the argument of the Kremlin. It is also, I am pleased to say, an argument that we in the Congress have clearly rejected. The overwhelming support for my East-West Trade and Freedom of Emigration amendment—77 cosponsors in the Senate and over 280 in the House—to make these benefits conditional on free emigration is, in my view, not only the best hope for the survival and freedom of many brave people, it is a sound and proper way to approach the potential détente.

Those who insist that the pace and development of détente should reflect progress in the area of human rights are often accused of opposition to détente itself. Nothing could be further from the truth. The argument is not between the proponents and detractors of détente, but between those who recognize that a genuine era of international accommodation must be based on progress toward individual liberty and those who choose to pretend otherwise.

Henry M. Jackson, Democratic Senator from Washington, is a member of the Armed Services Committee.

WASHINGTON POST
11 September 1973

Scientists' Protest on Sakharov Hit

United Press International
Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, clearly rebuking the National Academy of Sciences, yesterday urged U.S. scientists to support joint projects with their Soviet counterparts instead of "firing brickbats through the daily

press."

Weinberger spoke at a news conference after his return from a 16-day tour of health facilities in the Soviet Union and Poland.

On Sunday, Dr. Philip Handler, president of the National Academy, warned the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences that American scientists might refuse to take part in joint research and scientific exchanges if Soviet authorities continued harassing physicist Andrei D. Sakharov.

Weinberger declared that Soviet-American scientific co-

operation was of "enormous value to mankind in general" and should transcend what he described as an internal Soviet affair.

"I can certainly appreciate that there are some practices going on [in the Soviet Union] which are certainly not subject to, nor do they have, my approval," Weinberger said.

"None of these things constitute endorsement of the internal affairs of any government," he said. "But it is better to have dialogue than simply standing off firing brickbats through the daily press."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 September 1973

Soviet dissidents/U.S. politics

The Solzhenitsyn-Sakharov affair in the Soviet Union is fast escalating into a major international incident.

The two Soviet dissidents, one a Nobel-winning novelist and the other a major nuclear physicist, have become symbols of the fight to exercise the rights of free thought and expression within the Soviet system. Their personal situation is grim. They are under savage, concerted official attack. Novelist Solzhenitsyn has raised the possibility of his disappearance or murder. Scientist Sakharov speaks about mind-changing drugs forced upon dissidents placed in asylums in the Soviet crackdown.

Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov are pressing their cause with great heat, calculating that the more aware the outside world is of their plight the more difficult it will be for the Soviet authorities to do them in. This week, for instance, Solzhenitsyn proposed that Sakharov be awarded the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize — even though the deadline for nominations was Feb. 1. Also, the two men have been summoning Western newsmen in defiance of Soviet authorities and making their case.

The men are eloquent, earnest, and incisive thinkers. Solzhenitsyn's statement to the Nobel committee reasoned that, with detente, the world threat was not so much aggression between nations as repressive violence within national borders. He was thus carrying further the recent startling warning of Sakharov that the West must be aware of making it easier for Moscow to trample down on civil liberties by lessening the Soviet Union's economic and military worries.

The West has been hearing this message.

The National Academy of Sciences last weekend warned that American scientific cooperation with the Soviet Union was being threatened by harassment of Dr. Sakharov.

Members of the World Psychiatric Association are threatening to boycott a conference scheduled to be held in the Soviet Union next month. They are considering pressing for inspection of mental hospitals to which political dissidents are sent.

Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany last week indicated concern for the embattled dissidents. Sweden's Foreign Minister Kristér Wickman and Austria's Chan-

cellor Bruno Kreisky likewise have declared support for Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn.

Repression of the dissidents is affecting Communist organizations outside the Soviet Union. Reports from Paris indicate dismay and embarrassment among French Communists.

The Solzhenitsyn-Sakharov affair is nettlesome to Washington. The escalating impact of the issue is swiftly reaching into American political life.

Last weekend Rep. Wilbur Mills, the most essential man in Congress to the White House on trade and economic matters, said he would oppose freeing up trade with the Soviets "if the price is to be paid in the martyrdom" of dissidents.

WASHINGTON POST
15 September 1973

Tom Braden

Kissinger and Sakharov

Henry Kissinger thought long and hard about what to say to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about Russian physicist Andrei D. Sakharov. What he said may have made sense from our stand point, but from the stand point of Sakharov, Alexander Solzhenitsyn and others among Russia's dissident intellectuals, Kissinger's words must have read like a death sentence.

In brave public announcements from Moscow, the dissidents had been pleading for a different kind of statement, one which insisted on respect for human rights as a prerequisite for detente. Instead, Kissinger gave them a pat on the head. Was he right or wrong?

Consider the dilemma which Kissinger sees. Consider also that if he sees it correctly, it is not only his dilemma but yours and mine. Here it is:

The way to take a strong line on the Russian intellectuals is to suggest that U. S. trade and economic aid will be withheld unless the Russians cease persecuting these men. If the United States takes this line, the Russians might retaliate. The way they might retaliate is to take a similarly strong line on the disarmament talks.

In Kissinger's view, this is a clear and present danger. The Soviet Union wants economic aid. Only the United States can grant it. The United States wants a freeze on the arms race. Only the Soviet Union can grant it. If that's a fair trade, should Sakharov and the others stand in the way?

Kissinger tried to sidestep the dilemma: "I am dismayed by the conditions Sakharov reports. Yet we have as a country to ask ourselves a question: Whether it should be the principal goal of American foreign policy to transform the domestic structure of societies with which we deal . . . ?

It's a good question. But it amounts 28

The Mills statement is a remarkable sign of how deeply the dissidents issue could penetrate American politics. Mr. Mills, from Arkansas, is no starry-eyed Eastern Establishment liberal. He has been no great spokesman for civil rights. He hasn't built his political career on foreign affairs. He is a domestically oriented politician, and an astute one.

Representative Mills no doubt sees a political danger in passing trade legislation, expanding trade with the Soviet Union, if such a move can be attacked as aiding internal Soviet repression. This new development, this political liability for American officials in the Sakharov-Solzhenitsyn case, should be read by the Soviet Union for its possible impact on American trade and detente policy.

Already the liberal elements in the American press are calling Washington's attitude on the dissidents "ostrichlike." With Representative Mills indicating middle America's growing concern, silence on the subject in the White House will be ever harder to maintain.

to telling Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn and the others that, as far as we are concerned, the Soviet Union has a license to hang them.

Kissinger's statement must have come with particular irony for Sakharov. His book, "Progress, Co-existence and Intellectual Freedom" was published in this country with the following blurb on the dust jacket: "A deeply moving testimony to the freedom of the human spirit.—Prof. Henry Kissinger." There is an enormous gap between those words and the words of Secretary of State-designate Henry Kissinger before the Foreign Relations Committee: "I cannot recommend that an entire foreign policy be made dependent on that particular aspect (human rights) of the domestic structure of the Soviet Union."

Is this the gap between the mind of an academician who doesn't know the facts and a responsible official who does? It's hard to make a judgment. A lot of people in Washington who ought to know think the Russian economy is in such terrible shape that the United States can demand almost anything it wants. Kissinger doesn't agree. And Kissinger ought to know, even more than they.

At the very least, Kissinger ought to be subjected to a little heat on this subject. "We have in the past," he told the Foreign Relations Committee, "successfully pointed out to the Soviet leaders the unfortunate impact that some of their policies have on our opinion."

This was an obvious reference to his own successful plea for the lifting of immigration restrictions on Soviet Jews. Perhaps he intends to make a similar personal plea for the Russian intellectuals. His feet should be held to the fire.

Western Hemisphere

NEW YORK TIMES
12 September 1973

U.S. UNSURPRISED BY COUP IN CHILE

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11—United States officials were not surprised by the Chilean armed forces' revolt today, but they declined to comment for the record, to avoid even a hint of commitment to the overthrow of President Salvador Allende Gossens or involvement in it.

According to information from the United States Embassy in Santiago, none of the 2,800 American citizens in Chile appeared to have been harmed in the rising, a State Department official reported. The embassy lies directly opposite the presidential palace, where Dr. Allende held out for a time this morning, and the official said the embassy building had been nicked by small-arms fire.

Of the American residents of Chile about 2,300 live in and around Santiago, and half of those are United States Government employees and their dependents. The rest are mainly businessmen, students and missionaries.

The United States Government—which had a record of interfering in Chilean politics, principally with money, before Dr. Allende came to power in 1970—has maintained the position of a disinterested bystander since then, except for protests against his expropriation policy.

U.S. Investment Plummeted

The expropriations, principally of United States-owned copper mines and International Telephone and Telegraph installations, have reduced United States investments from \$750-million just before Dr. Allende came to power to under \$70-million today.

Reports of the coup caused copper futures to rise by 3 cents to 78.40 cents on the New York Mercantile Exchange, but an American official warned against the idea that a new regime might restore nationalized property.

"They haven't got any money anyway," he explained, "and all

parties support nationalization. So any Anaconda shareholder who thinks he is going to get his money back is going to be disappointed."

The central element in Washington's attempt to be even-handed toward the Chilean developments is military aid and cooperation.

Four United States Navy vessels had been headed for Chile today from Peru as part of joint hemisphere naval maneuvers; they were redirected toward Chilean ports as soon as news of the revolt came, the State Department said.

U.S. Aid Has Continued

The United States, which provided \$1.7-billion in economic and military aid to Chile from 1946 through 1970, continues to give assistance, in both fields.

In fiscal 1973 United States credits for Chilean military purchases and training totaled \$12.4-million, while economic aid, including school lunches, amounted to about \$3-million.

Six months ago the economic and military credits were justified by Washington as "an important means of demonstrating our continuing interest in the well-being of the Chilean population and of maintaining long-standing and friendly relations between the U.S. armed forces and their Chilean counterparts."

It is noted here that the Allende Government welcomed the military aid and rejected offers of Soviet arms.

"We have no vital interest in Chile," a Washington analyst observed. Privately, however, the Nixon Administration is distressed that Chile, with a long record of democratic constitutional practice, proved unable to resolve the current crisis by parliamentary means.

Military interference has been absent from Chilean politics since 1932. Officials here expect the military leaders to try to restore at least some parliamentary rule soon. "There is no Nasser, no colonel in the Chilean armed forces," another analyst remarked.

In conversations three weeks ago United States diplomatic and intelligence analyst predicted that a military coup would occur soon because of increasing nervousness in the armed services over the expansion of groups of armed factory workers in bases around Santiago. In the proclamation by the military junta that seized power today, the factory groups were cited as a reason for the revolt.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 September 1973

U.S. HOPES CHILE KEEPS DEMOCRACY

Studies Recognition of New Regime—Denies Any Role in the Military Coup

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12—The State Department expressed a hope today for a resumption of democratic government in Chile after the coup d'etat yesterday by the armed forces in Santiago.

The United States is studying the question of recognizing the new military regime, a State Department spokesman said, adding that the Nixon Administration was in no hurry.

At a noon news briefing, Mr. Hare said that the United States approach toward diplomatic recognition had been changing in recent times, with Washington now maintaining relations even though a government might be in turmoil, as is the case with Chile.

Both Mr. Hare and Gerald L. Warren, a White House spokesman, said it was "inappropriate" for the United States Government to comment on a situation viewed here as an "internal" Chilean affair.

Otherwise, Administration officials spent most of the day denying charges that the United States was involved in the overthrow of Chile's President, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, who killed himself yesterday, according to the Chilean junta.

Denials in Washington

The charges were made in the capitals of several Communist countries and were also voiced in this country and in Latin America by liberal and leftist supporters of Dr. Allende's socialist administration.

Denials that the United States Central Intelligence Agency was involved in the coup came from Mr. Warren and Mr. Hare.

Asked whether the United States wished a resumption of a democratic government in Chile, Mr. Hare responded "Yes."

Mr. Hare and a spokesman for the Defense Department also rejected suggestions that four United States Navy ships had been ordered to halt a trip to Chile—and, with that, any implication of prior knowledge of the coup.

The Pentagon spokesman said that the American vessels—three destroyers and a submarine—left Rio Bay, Peru, on

schedule between 6 A. M. and 9 A. M. yesterday to continue a tour around Latin America.

The ships, he said, were headed for Valparaiso, 1,500 miles to the south, to join Chilean Navy vessels in an antisubmarine exercise that was announced a month ago.

After news of the Santiago uprising was broadcast a little later in the morning the American ships were ordered to stay away from Chile, the spokesman stressed.

Denial on Ambassador

The State Department also denied assertions voiced by numerous Americans with Chilean connections that the United States Ambassador, Nathaniel Davis, had been involved in the coup. The assertions were based on a belief that Mr. Davis had made a sudden trip to Washington and the returned to Santiago in time to be there during the rising.

The State Department said that Mr. Davis arrived here Friday, having been asked Aug. 29 by the Secretary of State-designate, Henry A. Kissinger, to return for consultations along with other United States envoys. Mr. Davis saw Mr. Kissinger Saturday and flew back to Santiago that afternoon.

A matter of concern to Allende sympathizers in the Hemisphere appeared to be the fate of thousands of political exiles from Brazil, Argentina and other Latin-America countries who had been granted asylum by Chile's leftist coalition Government.

Reports from Santiago indicated that these exiles were being rounded up by the military junta and threatened with imprisonment or worse.

Message From Kennedy

On hearing these reports, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, sent a message to Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in Geneva, appealing for his intervention on behalf of "10,000 political refugees" to insure their safety.

Representative John J. Moakley, also a Massachusetts Democrat, introduced a bill in the House of Representatives today that would authorize a select committee to investigate "with sweeping subpoena powers" whether there was United States involvement in the coup.

Several hundred protesters demonstrated against the Nixon Administration in front of the White House this afternoon. Their leaflets laid blame for the coup on President Nixon, on Mr. Kissinger, and on United States companies that had big investments in Chile before Dr. Allende came to power three years ago.

The leaflets said: "Allende died to save democracy. The U.S. killed both."

NEW YORK TIMES
14 September 1973

U.S. Expected Chile Coup But Decided Not to Act

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 13—Administration officials said today that President Nixon had received numerous reports in the last year of an impending military coup in Chile, and had decided against taking any action that would either encourage or discourage the overthrow of the Government of President Salvador Allende Gossens.

The White House and the State Department both sought to counter a view widely held in Latin America that the United States knew in advance of the plans for Tuesday's coup which resulted in Mr. Allende's death. They also denied again that the United States was involved.

"The Administration had been receiving rumors of unrest in the Chilean military for more than one year," Gerald L. Warren, the White House spokesman, said. "Sometimes they mentioned specific dates and sometimes they did not."

Instructions to Embassy

Mr. Warren said that "aside from these rumors, the President had no advance knowledge of any specific plan for a coup."

"Our embassy had instructions in the event that any elements in Chile came to them with any plans for an uprising not to have anything to do with it," Mr. Warren said. "And these instructions were followed carefully."

The Administration, which made no comment yesterday about the coup, seemed nettled by a spate of articles that appeared in the United States and overseas today. The articles suggested some kind of American involvement in the overthrow of Dr. Allende, who was second in Latin America only to Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba in criticism of the United States.

Of particular concern to the Administration was the receipt by the embassy in Santiago had of a report that the coup would take place on the day it did. The White House and State Department said that this report, one of several in the same vein, did not reach the desks of responsible officials until after the coup was actually being under way a few hours.

At the United Nations, John A. Scalk, the United States delegate, held a news conference to say that "anyone who alleges that the United States or any of its agencies participated in this coup directly or indirectly does not speak the truth."

"And as a member of the Cabinet, with access to sensitive intelligence information, I know what I am talking about," he said.

Paul J. Hare, the State Department spokesman, said that Washington had been informed that a coup would take place on Sept. 8. When no coup occurred, Washington was informed by the embassy of a report of a coup on Sept. 18. Finally, around midnight on Sept. 10, the embassy "did" receive reports that Sept. 11 was to be the date and this, as you know, turned out to be correct," Mr. Hare said.

"It was the best-advertised coup in history," a senior official said.

"There was absolutely no way of knowing beforehand," Mr. Hare said, "that on any of these dates, including the Sept. 11 date, a coup attempt would be made."

Mr. Hare said that no effort was made to contact the Allende Government about the coup rumors or to meet with military men to discourage them from carrying out the coup.

Mr. Hare also repeated denials that an American task force of four ships had been ordered before Sept. 11 to turn around without entering Chilean waters for a scheduled joint exercise.

The task force was told on Sept. 10 of rumors of a coup that day, a State Department official said, but when it did not occur, the ships set out the next day from Peru, only to be turned around at midmorning, after the coup began.

The Ambassador's Trip

Mr. Hare also sought to deny that the coup had any special connection with the two-day visit to Washington last week-end of Nathaniel Davis, the Ambassador to Chile.

He repeated that Mr. Davis had been summoned to Washington at the end of August by Secretary of State-designate Henry A. Kissinger along with other Ambassadors for a discussion of State Department policy and problems.

"The purpose of the visit was not to report on any coup attempt," Mr. Hare said. "He returned to Chile immediately after seeing the Secretary of State-designate because of the tense situation there and the desirability of having an Ambassador in the country during this period."

The embassy in Santiago has been sent a note by the new military junta, asking that diplomatic relations be continued, State Department officials said. They said they expected that

WASHINGTON POST
13 September 1973

U.S. Was Informed Of Junta's Plans Before the Coup

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. government learned of the military coup in Chile the night before it happened, but policy makers in Washington at "the highest level" decided on a hands-off policy after evaluating the information, an administration official revealed yesterday.

This description of events leading to the overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende was given by a State Department official in a closed briefing for senators as the Nixon administration sought to dispel speculation of possible U.S. complicity in the ouster of the Marxist government.

Jack Kubisch, assistant secretary of state and U.S. coordinator for the Alliance for Progress, told members of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there had been "no involvement by the U.S. government, U.S. corporations, agencies or citizens," sources reported.

Sen. Gale W. McGee (D-Wyo.) said committee members had told Kubisch that a statement to that effect should

once Latin-American countries responded favorably to the junta, Washington would too.

Chilean Embassy: No One Quit

The Chilean Embassy here said through a spokesman, Patricio Rodriguez, that "no embassy officers were 'reer diplomats' and therefore barred from making any comments about the government change. He said that nobody in the embassy had resigned over the actions in Santiago."

The Nixon Administration's attitude toward Dr. Allende was always cool and this did not change on his death. After refusing to comment about his reported suicide, or to issue any condolences yesterday, Mr. Hare said: "I do want to express regret over the loss of life in Chile, particularly of the Chief of State, President Allende."

The Administration resisted all efforts to persuade it to comment on the morality of the coup, in which a democratically elected government was overthrown. One official said that "we will have to work with the generals and it makes no sense to issue some moral statement about democracy."

be issued at the highest level to quash any possible suspicions and rumors.

According to the information that Kubisch gave the subcommittee, a Chilean officer had mentioned to an American officer in Chile that a coup was brewing. One source said that the tip came "not more than 14 to 16 hours before—maybe as little as 10."

The information was then passed on to "the highest level" in Washington and a decision was made to keep hands off, the source said, adding that this meant that President Nixon was notified. Apparently, the information was not conveyed to the Chilean regime.

State Department sources said last night that the information received by the embassy officer was in the context of numerous rumors and hints of a coup in recent months. They said that the first action taken by the United States after learning that the coup had begun was to order four naval vessels en route from Peru for exercises to keep out of Chilean ports.

The military takeover immediately posed a potential embarrassment, because American disapproval of the Marxist-led regime is well known, and because charges of U.S. connivance against the regime were raised last spring before a Senate subcommittee investigating the role of U.S. corporations there.

At that time, there was testimony that the International Telephone and Telegraph Co. had offered to help the CIA prevent the election of Allende. Later, company officials testified, the CIA approached ITT about waging a campaign of economic sabotage against Chile.

Questioned yesterday about possible CIA involvement in the coup, White House deputy press secretary Gerald L. Warren denied that the agency had been involved. The State Department also strongly denied U.S. involvement.

Nevertheless, critics of the Nixon administration's policy in South America blamed the United States yesterday for helping create the conditions in which military intervention became an ever-stronger likelihood.

Joseph Collins of the Institute for Policy Studies said, "The tactics were economic chaos." Collins said that Chile

NEW YORK TIMES
15 September 1973

CHILE'S JUNTA SAYS IT KEPT U.S. IN DARK

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 14—Chile's ruling four-man junta has informed Washington that it deliberately kept its plans for a coup on Tuesday to itself to prevent any possibility of United States involvement in the overthrow of President Salvador Allende Gossens, according to a Cabinet-level official of the Nixon Administration.

A representative of the junta made this statement yesterday to Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, the official said.

The official said that the Chilean representative used the word "deliberate" in describing why the coup plotters had not informed American diplomats beforehand.

According to the official, tips that the coup was pending—a dozen such tips culminating in a warning Monday night—were made to United States diplomats in Santiago by lower-level Chilean military officers who were not directly involved in the plans.

Administration Pleased

The Administration, which has denied having had any prior knowledge of the plans for the coup last Tuesday, was clearly pleased by the junta message.

The Nixon Administration had been under heavy fire abroad and at home from Allende sympathizers who charged that he was overthrown with American assistance. The Administration has taken pains to counter the allegations and the report of the junta note is the latest example of that effort.

At the State Department it was noted that the final warning of the coup passed on Monday night to a United States diplomat in Santiago was considered so routine by the embassy that it was sent as an ordinary telegram.

"Had it been urgent," a State Department specialist on Latin America remarked, "it would have been marked *niact*"—the abbreviation for "night action."

The telegram was said to have turned up first in the morning file of Arnold M. Isaacs, the Chile desk officer, at 8 A.M. Tuesday. At that time the coup in Santiago had been under way for almost two hours.

At 8:45 A.M. the State Department's operations room received an urgent cable from the embassy in Santiago saying that the coup had begun and only then, it was said, did the night telegram take on significance for Mr. Isaacs and the other department officers concerned with Chile.

The information sent by the junta representative appears to have been the first direct contact between the new rulers in Chile and the United States Government.

WASHINGTON POST
16 September 1973

Aid Used As Choke On Allende

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

The swift toppling of the Allende government, in a military coup last week has inevitably touched off speculation about American involvement in the upheaval in Chile.

News Analysis

From the White House, from the State Department and even from the Central Intelligence Agency there have been stolid denials of U.S. intervention in the Chilean crisis.

"Involvement," in the popular imagination, suggests Marine landings, cloak-and-dagger operatives, gunboats and paramilitary espionage teams. There has been no evidence, as yet, that any

In another action the junta sent a "circular diplomatic note" to a number of foreign embassies in Santiago, including the United States Embassy, saying that it had taken charge in Chile and considered itself the new Government. The note also stated that the junta was prepared to meet Chile's international obligations and expressed the desire to maintain diplomatic relations.

The one-page note was signed by Adm. Ismael Huerta in his capacity as Foreign Minister.

Regarded as Invitation

A United States Government official described this as "a customary act" by a new Government, and could be regarded as an invitation but not a request to establish relations.

The circular note was disclosed by Paul J. Hare, the State Department spokesman, at his noon press briefing.

The Nixon Administration was described by a high-ranking official as being in no hurry to open formal relations with the Santiago junta.

Washington wants to wait until the situation is more stable in Chile and until Latin American and other foreign governments have formerly taken up relations with the junta.

"The United States Government is so big and so powerful that our actions become that much more significant," the official said. "Therefore we will try to make taking up relations not significant in the timing, to glide in, so to speak—not the first and not the last—so that no one can infer a special meaning."

such operations were carried out under U.S. auspices in Chile.

Nonetheless since its inauguration in 1970, the Marxist government of the late Salvador Allende has been the target of economic policies that have squeezed the fragile Chilean economy to the choking point.

These policies were conceived in an atmosphere of economic strife between the Allende government and a group of large U.S. corporations whose Chilean holdings were nationalized under the terms of Allende's socialist platform.

The instruments for carrying out the sustained program of economic pressure against Allende were the U.S. foreign aid program, the Inter-American Development Bank, the U.S. Export-Import Bank, the World Bank and also private U.S. banking institutions.

Allende himself, in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly last Dec. 4, complained that from the day of his election, "we have felt the effects of a large-scale external pressure against us, which tried to prevent the inauguration of a government freely elected by the people and has tried to bring it down ever since."

The effect, he said, has been "to cut us off from the world, to strangle our economy and paralyze trade in our principal export, copper, and to deprive us of access to sources of international financing."

The U.S. economic hard line against Chile was adopted in mid-1971 when the question of compensation for expropriated American properties was still in doubt.

The expropriation of the major U.S. copper companies was voted unanimously by the Chilean legislature—right, left and center—in July, 1971. It was not until the following October that the decision on terms of compensation was made. During this period of uncertainty the hard economic line was already being applied against the Chilean government.

One of the first actions under the new policy was the denial by the Export-Import Bank of a request for \$21 million in credit to finance purchase of three Boeing passenger jets by the Chilean government airlines, LAN-Chile. The credit position of the airline, according to a U.S. official fa-

"It is unequivocally clear

NEW YORK TIMES
16 September 1973

The Chilean Tragedy

that the United States government and all elements of the United States government were not—repeat not—involved.”

—State Department Briefing, Sept. 12, 1973.

“A more realistic hope among those who want to block Allende is that a swiftly deteriorating economy . . . will touch off a wave of violence, resulting in a military coup.”

ITT Memorandum, Sept. 17, 1970.

miliar with the negotiations, was excellent at the time.

In August, 1971, the Ex-Im Bank notified Chile that it would no longer be eligible for loans and that loan guarantees would be terminated to U.S. commercial banks and exporters doing business with Chile. The bank also cut off disbursements of direct loans that had been previously negotiated by the Frei government, which preceded Allende's.

Meanwhile, in the Inter-American Development Bank, a \$30 million loan application for development of a petrochemical center was stalled after the U.S. director protested plans to send a technical mission to Chile to evaluate the request. The mission never left.

IADB financing for Chile came to a virtual standstill in 1971 and thereafter, with the exception of two loans of \$7 million and \$4.6 million to the Catholic and Austral universities.

Because the United States contributes the lion's share of the Inter-American Bank's development fund kitty, it exercises a virtual veto over loan requests.

The World Bank pattern was much the same. In August, 1971, the World Bank was scheduled to send a project appraisal mission to Chile to evaluate prospects for a fruit-processing facility as part of the agrarian reform program. The mission, according to an authoritative government source, was canceled in response to State Department objections.

Early in 1972 the private banks followed the lead of the international lending organizations. Chile's short-term credit float plummeted from \$220 million in 1971 to \$35 million in 1972.

There were allegations that Chile, under the Allende administration, had become too grave a credit risk for development lending.

Nonetheless, in 1971 the United States granted a \$5 million line of credit to the Chilean military for purchase of C-130 four-engine transports and in December,

1972, extended an additional \$10 million in credit for military activities in 1973.

Chile, one of the heaviest beneficiaries of U.S. aid programs in the world during the 1960s, was reduced to \$15 million in loans from the Agency for International Development in 1970 and has been granted nothing since. The cut-off in AID credit further darkened the prospects for the Allende government to pay off obligations incurred under prior governments.

Credit standards have been variably applied to Latin American countries seeking U.S. and international financing. Bolivia was granted \$30 million in AID financing after the coup of conservative Hugo Banzer in August, 1971, even though the economy was a shambles.

Brazil qualified for a \$50 million development loan program within six weeks after a military junta ousted the Goulart government in 1964—also at a time when the country's economy was in severe disarray.

U.S. government credibility, in professing its non-involvement in the Chilean change of government, may tend to be undermined by the disclosures of the ITT case. In Senate testimony last March and in prior press revelations, representatives of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. and the Central Intelligence Agency acknowledged that they sought to promote economic chaos in Chile, first to block Allende's election and then to bring about his downfall.

ITT at the time was in the midst of negotiating expropriation terms for its Chilean telephone company (Chiliteco). While the Chiliteco case was being negotiated, ITT officials were counseling Nixon administration officials to take a hard line of economic reprisal against Chile, particularly through international lending organizations and commercial banks.

Whatever might have been the administration's motives, its turning of the economic tourniquet against the Allende government figured importantly in its downfall. There was no need for direct American involvement in the military coup.

Two theories were bound to surface in the aftermath of the military take-over in Chile and the suspicion-laden death of President Allende. One was that the United States was responsible for the coup; the other was that the tragic fall of Dr. Allende proves it is impossible anywhere to build a socialist system by democratic means and machinery. To accept either theory is to overlook the principal cause of Chile's disaster and its meaning for the future.

In light of the disclosure last year of schemes by the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation to block Dr. Allende's election in 1970 or to bring down his Government, Washington's denials of involvement in last week's coup inevitably have encountered worldwide skepticism, enhanced by recollections of the boorish behavior of this Administration toward the Allende regime and its successful effort to block sources of credit for Chile with international lending agencies.

However, nothing so far uncovered indicates that the Nixon Administration seriously considered the bizarre C.I.A. and I.T.T. proposals; and there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever of American complicity in the coup. In short, on the known record, Washington had only the most peripheral responsibility in the downfall of Dr. Allende. To pretend otherwise is simply to obscure the basic reasons for the Chilean tragedy.

Dr. Allende's experiment failed because his Popular Unity coalition, dominated by Socialists and Communists, persisted with an effort to fasten on Chile a drastic socialist system fiercely opposed by well over half the population. He won in 1970 with only 36.3 per cent of the vote—a mere 39,000 votes more than the total for the conservative runner-up. In congressional elections early this year, Popular Unity won only 44 per cent.

Yet, in defiance of a Congress dominated by the opposition, often in disregard of the courts, and in the face of economic chaos and raging inflation, the regime continued to “requisition” enterprises, large and small. These actions polarized Chile as never before, provoking all-out opposition not merely from the rich or a fascist fringe but from the middleclass that makes up half the population and that saw itself facing destruction.

If Dr. Allende had moved more deliberately; if he had paused for consolidation after nationalizing Chile's basic industries and had delineated reasonable boundaries for his socialist program, he probably would have completed his term with considerable measure of success. A more moderate approach would have split the opposing Christian Democratic party, many of whose members favored his initial policies. But Dr. Allende was never able to rein in the more extreme elements of his unruly coalition.

The Allende Government did substantially improve the lot of Chileans on the lowest rungs of the economic ladder. It gave many workers and peasants a greater sense of national participation than ever before. These are gains the military rulers promised in their first communiqué to preserve—a pledge they will find it dangerous to neglect. They are gains that could, however, have been achieved at far less over-all cost and without the disastrous polarization of Chilean society.

The traditionally non-political armed forces intervened not primarily because of Dr. Allende's socialism but out of fear that a polarized Chile was lunging toward civil war. What cannot be clear for some time is whether the violent destruction of an elected Government, albeit a minority one, will make that ultimate catastrophe less likely or even more probable.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1973

Cuba, in U.N., Says Nixon Instigated Chilean Coup

By KATHLEEN TELTCH
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Sept. 17 — Cuba today accused President Nixon of having instigated the coup in Chile last week in which the Marxist Government of President Salvador Allende Gossens was overthrown.

The accusations were made at a meeting of the Security Council at which a newly named representative of the Chilean junta, in turn, displayed photographs and documents that he said showed Cuba's blatant interference in Chile's affairs.

The charges and countercharges were made at a tumultuous Council meeting interrupted at one point by anti-Castro demonstrators in the gallery, who jumped to their feet scattering leaflets and shouting "What about Cuba?"

Cuba had requested an urgent meeting of the Council, in a letter protesting that the Chilean military forces that carried out the coup had shot up the Cuban Embassy and shelled a Cuban merchant vessel.

Angry U.S. Response

The Cuban delegate, Raúl Alarcón Quesada, lashed out at the military junta, accusing it of murdering Allende supporters and torturing political pris-

oners. He then turned to the United States.

"It is not difficult to know where the main responsibility lies," the Cuban delegate said. "The trail of blood, spilled in Chile leads directly to the dark dens of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon."

"If the fascist military junta has bloody hands, Nixon and his collaborators are guilty of instigating and masterminding the events in Chile."

The new Chilean delegate, Raúl Bazán, told the council that the Cuban Embassy in Santiago had been turned into an arsenal and that the embassy staff of 100 was busy training guerrillas in sabotage. He said that Havana's aim was the complete radicalization of the Allende Government.

The sweeping accusations by Cuba drew an angry response from John A. Scali, the United States representative, who said the Cuban delegate had "descended to a new low, even for those who wallow in such words as normal talk."

"In this hemisphere, we know well how often Cuba attacks others for what it is doing itself, such as subversion and bloody violence," Mr. Scali said in a written statement distributed outside the hall as the debate continued.

Both in his statement and later in the Council, Mr. Scali protested that Mr. Alarcón had

violated a pledge that he would stick to the specific issues on which he had asked for a Council meeting. That pledge, Mr. Scali said, had been conveyed through the Council President, Lazar Mojsov of Yugoslavia.

Castro Accuses U.S.

By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, Sept. 17—Premier Fidel Castro said today that the military take-over of Chile was a fascist coup spurred by the United States.

The Cuban leader, arriving after a trip to Hanoi, denounced the United States and said the new Chilean junta would meet stern resistance. "I think the people of Chile will not accept this oppression by military dictatorship easily and will continue to resist," he told newsmen at the airport.

Speaking Spanish, and using an interpreter, Mr. Castro, in reply to a question about the possible United States role in the coup d'état, remarked: "The United States is father of the creature."

During Mr. Castro's brief stopover he was welcomed by dozens of diplomats and senior Indian officials, including Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

He said that the United States, while it was "blockading" international loans for President Allende, maintained a close relationship with the

Chilean armed forces, which staged the coup.

The overthrow of Dr. Allende has been widely denounced by Indian officials, including Mrs. Gandhi. Although the officials have stopped short of condemning the United States,

Mrs. Gandhi has warned India against the danger of outsiders seeking to subvert the nation.

Her remarks, made Saturday at a meeting of the New Congress party's policy-making All India Congress Committee, referred to "outside influences" responsible for the coup in Chile and for the "murder" of Dr. Allende.

The United States Embassy declined to comment on the speech, but there was general feeling within and outside that the attack was aimed at the United States. What made it puzzling was that the Prime Minister and Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan agreed privately last spring that the United States and India should blunt public outbursts against each other. Mr. Moynihan is in Washington for meetings with President Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger.

American officials are waiting to see if Mrs. Gandhi's remarks foreshadowed a new spate of harsh attacks or if they are an isolated interlude provoked by the downfall of Dr. Allende, a popular figure among Indian leftists.

NEW YORK TIMES

15 September 1973

Tito Hints That U.S. Is to Blame in Chile

By RAYMOND H. ANDERSON
Special to The New York Times

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, Sept. 14 — President Tito charged in an angry speech today that imperialist reaction—an apparent allusion to the United States—had instigated "hiring generals" to overthrow and murder President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile.

Speaking at a rally in the eastern Croatian town of Osijek, the 81-year-old Yugoslav leader said that equal dangers of hostile intrigue confronted Yugoslavia and other small non-aligned countries.

Yugoslavia must be alert, he said, to apprehend agents and spies infiltrating into the country to foment disunity among the six republics of the Yugoslav federation.

Marshal Tito, frequently interrupted by cheers, remarked that he had not intended to make a speech. He evidently felt moved to do so out of emotion over the Chilean developments.

The official press agency, Tanjug, delayed five hours before reporting the speech although it had been broadcast live on radio.

Marshal Tito implied that the violent overthrow of President Allende's leftist coalition had demonstrated the urgency of unity among the nonaligned countries. He reiterated approval of improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but he demanded that nonaligned countries be included in decisions affecting their interests.

"We have lost one of the most faithful members of the nonaligned movement," he continued. "We have lost Chile. As a result of international reaction and imperialism, the legitimate Government has been overthrown and a great man, a great comrade, President Allende, has been murdered by hiring generals."

While Marshal Tito refrained from naming the United States in his denunciation of imperialism, Tanjug explicitly accused the United States last Wednesday of having created economic chaos in Chile by withholding credits, manipulating copper prices and instigating strikes and disorders.

Soviet Accuses 'Imperialism'

MOSCOW, Sept. 14 (Reuters)—Soviet commentators charged today that "international imperialism" had been behind the military coup in Chile, but did not mention the United

States by name.

A commentator in the Communist party newspaper, Pravda, charged "foreign protection" stood behind the "Chilean oligarchy that unleashed bloody terror" in Chile. The Government newspaper, Izvestia, also blamed unidentified "imperialist circles."

Italy's Reaction Strong

By PAUL HOFMANN
Special to The New York Times

ROME, Sept. 14—The impact of the coup in Chile has been strong in Italy largely because some groups here have favored the formation of a coalition including the Communists that

would be similar to the deposed Allende Government.

Such a coalition has been suggested by the large Italian Communist party, the left-wing

Socialists and some left-wing factions in the Christian Democratic party of Premier Mariano Rumor. The Christian Democrats head a center-left coalition that includes Social Democrats, Republicans and Socialists.

The Christian Democratic party, Italy's strongest, is showing uneasiness over the strategy of Chile's Christian Democrats, who opposed President Allende. The two parties have had frequent contacts, and former President Eduardo Frei Montalva, the leader of the Chilean Christian Democrats, attended the national convention of the Italian party last June.

This week, the Italian party condemned the military coup that overthrew President Allende, asserting that it was difficult to understand how Chilean Christian Democrats could expect an early return to constitutional and democratic methods.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 September 1973

Latin America points finger at U.S.

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Buenos Aires

In much of Latin America, the United States is being assigned the villain's role in the military rebellion against Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens.

The Latin American reaction against the United States seems based less on fact than on deep-seated suspicion flavored by history.

And in the emotional aftermath of Dr. Allende's death, Washington has added to the furor through what seems to be a lapse on the part of the State Department.

On Wednesday a State Department official asserted that Washington had known about Tuesday's rebellion 48 hours before it began.

The decision was made not to inform Dr. Allende, a State Department spokesman said, because it might have been construed as intervention in Chile's internal affairs.

Reverberations

All of this stirred reverberations in Latin America, where not only the Marxists, but also the democrats are mourning Doctor Allende.

From Mexico to Argentina, the flags are at half staff, newspapers are full of eulogies to Dr. Allende as a democratic martyr, and protest marches have linked Dr. Allende's passing to the United States.

Latin America detects no mourning for Dr. Allende in Washington. Many share the view of former Argentine dictator Juan Domingo Peron that "there was dancing in the halls of the

State Department" when the tanks rolled against La Moneda, the Chilean White House Tuesday morning.

Newspapers as far apart as Buenos Aires and Caracas view with suspicion the lightning weekend visit of Nathaniel Davis, United States Ambassador to Chile, to Washington.

More than coincidence

And they find it more than coincidental that the United States and Chilean Navies have scheduled joint exercises in the South Pacific this week.

Despite denials of any United States involvement whatsoever, the United States automatically comes under suspicion when a government hostile to it falls in Latin America.

Official U.S. policy is one of low profile. But Latin Americans have a long memory — Guatemala in 1954, Bay of Pigs 1961, and Dominican Republic 1965.

Many Latin Americans find it impossible to believe there was no government involvement in the International Telephone and Telegraph plotting against Dr. Allende in 1970.

Why statement

This suspicion was only reinforced by the State Department's claim that it had advance knowledge of the coup and that it chose not to inform Dr. Allende. Why would the United States make so provocative a statement if it really was as innocent as it claims, Latin American commentators are asking.

One of the sad facts of life in Latin

America is that United States denials of meddling in Latin American affairs have lost their credibility.

And now many Latin Americans are prepared to believe the worst about a possible United States role in Chile.

[The first two governments to recognize the Chilean regime were two of Latin America's right-wing military governments, Reuter reported from Buenos Aires.]

Brazil, Uruguay

[The right-wing military rulers of Brazil and Uruguay officially announced recognition of the Chilean military government Thursday night.]

[In Montevideo, the scene of an army coup early this year, Uruguayan riot police dispersed students demonstrating against the Chilean coup as the Uruguayan Government announced its recognition.]

[In Argentina, meanwhile, the Peronist government decreed three days of official mourning for President Allende in line with Mexico, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. Flags were also at half-mast in Cuba.]

[In Caracas, the Latin American Labor Confederation (CLT) condemned the coup and accused "imperialist powers" of involvement, in a reference to allegations in other centers that the United States was behind it.]

[Peruvian President Juan Velasco Alvarado who heads a left-wing military government sent a message of "deepest sympathies" to President Allende's widow.]

NEW YORK TIMES
12 September 1973

Tragedy in Chile

Any military coup is a tragedy, representing a breakdown of civilian authority and usually the collapse of government by consent. It is especially tragic for Chile, where sturdy democratic machinery had functioned for many years and the armed forces had a strong tradition of keeping to their barracks. In a country as bitterly divided as Chile has been during President Allende's three years in office, it will require tremendous skill and tact by the military chiefs now to avert widespread civil strife.

No Chilean party or faction can escape some responsibility for this disaster, but Dr. Allende himself must bear a heavy share. Even when the dangers of polarization had become unmistakably evident, he persisted in pushing a program of pervasive socialism for which he had no popular mandate. His political coalition—especially his own Socialist party—pursued this goal by

dubious means, including attempts to bypass both Congress and the courts.

Dr. Allende might have prevailed had he been able or willing to consolidate his considerable gains for socialism and to offer genuine cooperation in the Congress to the opposition Christian Democrats, Chile's largest party. Instead, the tactics of his coalition induced the moderate Christian Democrats to join the right wing National party in opposition and obstruction. As the crisis deepened last week, Dr. Allende rejected a compromise overture from former President Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democratic leader.

While there is no evidence that the Nixon Administration seriously considered the maneuvers against Dr. Allende suggested in 1970 by the C.I.A. or the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, it is essential that Washington meticulously keep hands off the present crisis, which only Chileans can resolve. There must be no grounds whatsoever for even a suspicion of outside intervention.

WASHINGTON STAR
19 September 1973

CARL T. ROWAN

Chile Is Our Tragedy as Well

It is conceivable that U.S. military attaches and CIA operatives in Santiago had nothing to do with the military coup in Chile, or the death of Marxist President Salvador Allende. But all the propaganda resources the United States can muster will not convince many Latin Americans.

"I can't prove it, but I firmly believe it," the old Argentine leader Juan Peron said when asked if the United States had overthrown Allende. "I know all about this process. I believe it could not have been otherwise," he added.

That pretty well sums up the suspicions of the overwhelming majority of Latin Americans, whatever their ideology. There has simply been too much testimony in the U.S. Senate, too much media publicity about CIA and ITT schemes to crush Allende, for such suspicions not to exist.

Another reason why U.S.

denials of involvement evoke skepticism in Latin America and even here: The maze of lies and cover-ups revealed in the Watergate hearings has created a climate in which the tendency everywhere is to expect the worst of this government and believe none of its denials.

That is why this first Chilean coup since 1931 could become almost as big a tragedy for the United States as for Chile itself.

Somewhere in the U.S. government there may be gleeful handshaking over the demise of Allende, who was, in fact, a demagogue who brazenly ordered Cinderella and Sleeping Beauty rewritten so as to give children Marxist indoctrination. He was a constant headache for U.S. leaders. Some Americans surely are proud that arms we poured into Chile made it possible for the military to topple him.

But only a fool will overlook the fact that Allende was not the creator of the basic problems the United States faces; he was just a symbol of new awakenings in Latin America with which this country has been loath to deal.

It was not just a litany of the leftists when Allende shouted to the United Nations that Latin America remains poor and underdeveloped because it is exploited by huge U.S. corporations which make phony pretenses of "investing" in Latin American countries.

On a recent trip to Latin America I heard that same charge, spoken with angry passion, from the lips of presidents and foreign ministers who are Christians and capitalists and in no way inclined to communism.

Contempt for the multinational corporations already was at unprecedented levels in many countries, and a lot

of these firms will suffer in the wave of resentment over the Chilean coup.

No matter how innocent and uninvolved U.S. officials may have been, it will be clear to almost everyone that the coup-makers can retain power only with U.S. arms. Every intelligent Latino will look to see how much the junta relies on the loans and grants that the United States denied Allende.

Whatever the short-term advantages of "ridding" Latin America of its first elected Marxist ruler, we cannot ignore the fact that the Chilean coup pumped a lot of new anti-U.S. venom into the hemisphere.

As a long-range matter it is sad to ponder—except for those who believe that there is nothing to worry about because, whenever U.S. interests are seriously threatened, there will always be a few armed friends ready to stage another coup.

WASHINGTON POST
18 September 1973

Chilean Aftermath

The new junta in Chile has arrested thousands of officials and supporters of the deposed Allende government, as well as additional thousands of foreign exiles whom the late President had let into the country. Some among these "foreign extremists," as the generals call them, are faced with the cruel prospect of being returned to the regimes they fled. Soldiers are preventing others from talking asylum in foreign embassies in Santiago. Summary executions have been reported, on an undetermined scale. For a group supposedly reluctant to take power, the junta seems to be acting with a considerable degree of harshness and arbitrariness.

Arriving in Mexico City, President Allende's widow asked the United Nations to take steps to "prevent reprisals." The Secretary General mumbled; the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees issued a statement asking that foreign refugees in Chile not be repatriated against their will. The United States government has been unable to muster even a mask of concern. All too typically, the State Department's Latin chief lunched the day after the coup with representatives of American firms doing business in Chile, but he could find no time at all through the week to receive a delegation alarmed by possible junta violations of human rights.

In Chile, while the junta tries to restore order, it has closed the congress (which was dominated, by the way, by the opposition to Allende), interdicted the political parties, and announced plans to write a new constitution incorporating "necessary changes." These

would evidently restrict the channels of political expression open to the Allende constituency. There is no question but that some of those supporting the late President worked outside the law. But to deny a political voice to a substantial part of the population, in the most politicized country of Latin America, is a virtual recipe for further violence. Chile's lively political tradition makes it an unlikely place to implant for long a military-technocratic government of the sort familiar elsewhere in the hemisphere. If the generals are serious about returning their country to its democratic heritage—and we do not minimize the difficulty of that task—they should so indicate.

Cuba, now being cited by the junta as the fount of many of Chile's woes, complained in the Security Council yesterday that its Santiago embassy and a Cuban merchant ship at sea had been attacked by the Chilean military. The United States has traditionally championed the privileges of diplomatic immunity but on this occasion, apparently as a gesture to the new Chilean leadership, it resisted the calling of the council session. The 28th General Assembly opens today. If Secretary of State-designate Henry Kissinger attends, he will find himself in an atmosphere dominated by the coup in Chile and by a widespread feeling that the United States welcomed the coup, if it did not encourage it. In such an atmosphere it will not be easy to explain that the United States respects the small states of the world and hopes to keep up good relations with them.

LONDON OBSERVER
16 Sept. 1973

Tug of war at embassy

by JO BERESFORD

THE bloodless struggle for the Chilean Embassy in London's Devonshire Street continued this weekend.

The junta's nominee as Ambassador, Rear-Admiral Oscar Buzeta, told me today that the present Ambassador, Senor Alvaro Bunster, has no business at the Embassy any more.

Nobody will obey him. He does not represent any Government of Chile. Every action and attitude that Bunster takes is not recognised by the Government of Chile.

Unless the British Government decides to recognise the regime in Chile, the battle will continue.

On Friday Admiral Buzeta, the Naval Attaché, left his office in Piccadilly to take over the Embassy a few hundred yards westwards in Devonshire Street. He told the staff that he was the new Chargé d'Affaires and that the Ambassador, Sr Alvaro Bunster, had been dismissed from his post.

Sr Bunster has made no attempt to reoccupy his office. But he has asked the Foreign Office to ensure that he is able to carry out his diplomatic functions, and his residence in Eaton Place is now guarded day and night by two policemen.

So far, the Foreign Office has declined to comment on the situation in the embassy, and has asked Sr Bunster to go to the Foreign Office tomorrow morning for discussions.

Admiral Buzeta told THE OBSERVER yesterday, 'I intend to go to the Embassy on Monday morning after briefly visiting my old office. But Sr Bunster can come and use his old office if he wants to.'

Sr Bunster, however, claimed yesterday that the Naval Attaché had prevented him from using telephone or telex services at the Embassy or from communicating with the staff. 'I cannot accomplish my tasks as an Ambassador in the Embassy,' he said. 'There I now have only the rights of a private Chilean citizen.'

Admiral Buzeta, who was Director of the Naval School in Chile during the Queen's State visit in 1968 and was made Commander of the Royal Victorian Order, has been in London only since January. He claims that Bunster is 'making a fuss.'

At the protest rally called in London today, Sr Bunster will be one of the speakers. The meeting starts at 2.15 at Speakers' Corner and will end with a short march to the Chilean Embassy.

Other speakers will include Judith Hart, MP, for the Labour

LONDON OBSERVER
16 Sept. 1973

CHILE: Death of a hope

THE OVERTHROW of the Chilean Government by its own armed forces and the death of President Salvador Allende are tragic events in several dimensions. The world has not seen a more patient and restrained head of Government than Allende. Far from using the power of the State in a Marxist spirit against his political opponents, he obviously preferred negotiation to compulsion.

His political opponents included some within his own party and coalition. Indeed, he might never have been challenged by the military if his supporters had been less fractious. It was his very reasonableness and lack of dramatic oversimplification, added to an element of inefficiency, that made him vulnerable to the many who brought about the gradual attrition of his Government.

If Allende was a man who never advocated force in politics and did not deserve to see his regime perish by the sword, it is also a national tragedy that Chile should have collapsed into civil violence and military rule. Of all the States of Latin America, Chile is the one with the oldest-established parliamentary democracy. As Switzerland has maintained a democratic society while surrounded by neighbours often in the throes of one autocracy or another, so has Chile been among the best-governed and freest societies in its continent.

The remarkable sight of Allende inviting generals to join his Government is less extraordinary when it is realised that the Chilean Army has acquired a reputation for defending the constitution without involvement in party politics. Allende was appealing to that tradition. The military, who have overthrown his Government, have broken it.

But, of course, it is the particular political character of Allende's Government that makes its overthrow a world-wide tragedy. The world today can be divided between Marxist States and the rest. The chief blemish of the Marxist States is their lack of political freedom—of the freedom to disagree publicly and to form political parties other than the Communist Party. It is this monolithic political character that has led to the wistful search for 'socialism with a human face,' as the deposed Czech leader, Dubcek, called it.

Allende showed every sign of wanting to demonstrate that his Marxist party would not try to close down all other parties and voices, if it were voted into office. Certainly, during his brief period as leader of a rather political parties and the mainly hostile weak coalition Government, he allowed all Chilean parties and newspapers more liberty than most Latin American Governments have done when under a comparable strain. But would he have acted more tyrannically had he ever commanded a clear parliamentary majority? It can only be answered that there is no evidence for expecting this—of him, at any rate.

The value to the world of successfully

showing that Marxism can be adapted to political freedom—if it can—would have been great. It would have heartened those Communists who hope they can come to power through the ballot box and who ask to be trusted that they would not thereafter close down the voting process; such are many of the present French and Italian Communist leaders. The Chilean story is bound to make both them and their potential Social Democrat partners question whether they would be treated fairly if they gave up revolutionary ideas for parliamentary ones.

Conversely, Leftists throughout Latin America will inevitably draw the conclusion that Allende's revolutionary opposite numbers, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, had the better idea—while Rightists will be confirmed in their belief that they have a divine right to use the Army to overthrow Leftists of any sort.

Those who practise Marxist politics in Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, and are searching for a way of introducing political freedom into their closed societies, will be deeply discouraged. If they had been able to show that a Marxist Government was compatible with a free parliamentary system, they could then have pressed more confidently for the political freedoms that they know must come, if their societies are ever to become something more than school-rooms for adults.

It is being freely speculated that the real villain in the Allende story is the United States. Certainly, the Nixon Government viewed the arrival of the first Marxist President on the continent of America with less than pleasure. There is plenty of evidence of American commercial companies, fearing nationalisation, doing all they could to hamper the regime and pressing Washington into doing more. How much Washington did is not yet clear. But it seems mistaken to attribute chief blame to the US: Allende himself never did.

What is certainly true is that neither Washington nor any other Western capital took much interest in helping the Allende Government to survive. Perhaps it is asking for a very far-sighted kind of self-interest to suggest that Western Governments should have seen the enormous value to themselves of treating Allende at least as well as any other Chilean Government is treated.

If his success had steered some Communist Parties towards the ballot box and away from the barricades; if it had encouraged the revisionists and discouraged the autocrats in some Communist States of the world; if it had shown that the political repertoire of free societies is able to include Marxists without self-destruction—that, or any part of that, would have meant a gain for the prospects of mankind. That a man and a Government with such potentialities should have been knocked out of the way, shifted as Dubcek was like so much rubble, is a bitter modern tragedy.

Party, Lord Brockway for Liberation (the Movement for Colonial Freedom), and John Gollan, general secretary of the Communist Party.

LONDON OBSERVER
16 Sept. 1973

Chilean coup embarrasses Kissinger

from ANTHONY SAMPSON: Washington, 15 Sept.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT here is continuing to react to the Chilean coup with marked embarrassment.

There is no convincing evidence that the United States Government encouraged the overthrow of President Allende, but there are indications that it helped to create the conditions that made it inevitable, and other Latin-American countries will not be slow to note it.

It seems unlikely that the coup was assisted by 'dirty tricks' from the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA has a long record of involvement in Chile, and was very active in 1964 in assisting the election of President Eduardo Frei (who may be asked to return to power by the ruling junta).

But since then the CIA, while still active, has become more cautious and sophisticated.

Much evidence about its activities in Chile emerged last March in the hearings of the Senate Multinationals Committee in Washington, to discover the connections between the CIA and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, which has large holdings in Chile.

The hearings revealed that the CIA, in response to pressure from ITT, had put forward a plan for inducing economic chaos to prevent Allende coming to power, or to undermine him once in power, and the memos written at the time of his election have an ominous ring in the light of the eventual coup.

In October 1970, for instance, William Broe, of the CIA, told ITT that their economic pressure could increase unrest and thus encourage military intervention.

'Broe advises to keep on the pressure,' said an ITT memorandum recording the conversation. 'This because Allende should not take office with "complete support" and also for the weakening we might accomplish after he does take office—also there is always a chance something might happen later.'

The contacts between the CIA and ITT continued after Allende came to power. In October 1971, when Allende took over the telephone company, ITT put forward to the White House an 18-point plan, including contacting the Chilean military and the CIA, to ensure that 'everything should be done quietly but effectively to see that Allende does not get through the crucial next six months.'

It is not clear whether the plan was acted on, but most of the points were achieved in the following year, including the

cutting off of aid, the restriction of loans, and a drastic reduction of US purchases from Chile.

The United States Treasury swiftly took a hard line towards credit to Chile, and encouraged their European partners, for instance in the World Bank, to do the same (in contrast to the International Monetary Fund, which under French influence was much more friendly to Chile).

Of course, there were plenty of sound banking reasons, too, for ending loans to a country that was going headlong towards galloping inflation. But these did not prevent American loans being maintained and actually increased in one crucial sector in Chile, the military.

It is very likely that Allende's Government would have been faced with economic chaos without any encouragement from the US or Europe. But what is striking from the available evidence is how little the US tried to reach an accommodation with Allende, a factor that may well have pushed him into a more extreme position than he first occupied.

The refusal of the advanced industrial countries to tolerate the Chilean experiment was the theme of a speech on Thursday by a leading left-wing Chilean economist, Professor Sunkel, speaking to the UN Committee on Multinationals, convened as the result of the ITT revelations.

'The Chilean experiment has ended with a catastrophic collapse of its economic and political systems,' the Professor said. 'The conclusion for us here seems to be that it is not possible to try to restructure relations of dependent countries and the transnational capitalist systems in a peaceful way.'

It seems clear that many people in the State Department and the CIA were hoping for a military coup to oust Allende, and there had been talk of it for some months.

But certainly the violence of the coup, and the ferocity of the junta leaders, seems now an embarrassment, and General Pinochet's insistence on 'exterminating Marxism' is not in accord with current thinking here.

Nor is the breaking off of relations between Chile and Cuba necessarily welcome to Dr Kissinger's State Department, which has been considering re-establishing relations with Dr Castro. The Chilean junta may in the end create as many problems for the US in the rest of Latin-America as President Allende did.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 September 1973

Spun Off By the Whirlwind

By C. L. Sulzberger

Even though history's whirlwind proved too great for him, there was something appealing about the late Salvador Allende who tried to lead Chile into Marxist Socialism by parliamentary means.

This attempt was hampered by extreme left revolutionary movements as well as conservative forces of the right and center. Together they produced economic chaos. In the end, the President, who had never mustered a popular majority, was crushed.

Allende participated in two Chilean popular-front governments each of which endured three years. The first (1938-1941) produced a new basis for collaboration between middle class and workers' parties. Allende, its Health Minister, already a Socialist, was immensely proud that he introduced free milk for children. The second (1970-1973), just smashed by a military putsch, resembled its predecessor in that neither was able to carry out its full program.

Comparing these experiments, the President once said to me (Santiago, March 23, 1971): "That [first] popular-front regime was on the left of the capitalistic system. But the Popular Unity Government now wants to transform the capitalistic system entirely."

"At that time the leading role in the popular-front government was taken by the Radical party, representing the small bourgeoisie. Now the leading role is not bourgeois at all. This time the President, myself, is a Socialist and not a radical."

Allende was very much a political animal, a small, stocky, quick-moving man with grey mustache, ruddy face, thick, heavily rimmed spectacles. He

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

was unique in his effort to achieve full revolution on a relatively slow-motion, democratic basis and it is arguable that the latter restrictions, which added left-wing impatience to right-wing rage, made his ultimate downfall inevitable. He boasted:

"In thirty years' political life I never failed to do what I said I would do. It could be possible that the dynamic of events might eventually create a revolutionary party, one party of the revolution" (containing the Socialist, Communist and radical elements which backed him).

"But this is not possible for the imminent future. After all, the Socialists don't want to be changed and the radicals, who in Chile have had a party for 110 years, surely won't commit suicide. Don't forget that Karl Marx foresaw a time when there would be no governments at all. But when? It

WASHINGTON POST
19 September 1973

Chalmers M. Roberts

The U.S. Integrity Gap

hasn't come yet.

"The strategy of Socialism must depend on the realities of any country where it is attempted. To be a Socialist is obviously not the same thing as being a Communist. There are different roads to Socialism."

Allende insisted his credo would never restrict basic freedoms. He said: "My word is formally engaged to respect all the fundamental rights of man. No matter how extensive our economic and social reform will be, we will not only respect human rights but actually increase them. Human rights are not merely political; they are also social and economic."

He promised he would never allow any foreign power to exert influence over Chilean sovereignty or to establish bases that could be used against the United States. But many of his actions were clearly hostile to the U.S. and its interests. He never excluded the chance that violent confrontation might smash his program.

"Sadly, very sadly, I admit this possibility exists," the President told me. "That is the lesson of history. I know it would come from the right because it has already done something that never before occurred in Chilean history—namely, assassinated the army commander. There have already been two attempts on my life."

Nevertheless, he boasted that certain of his accomplishments were indelible. "If I were to die tomorrow," he said, "no one in Chile would ever dare to abolish the system. I instituted of giving every child free milk. No one would ever attempt to end our system of social security. No one would dream of taking away from illiterate citizens the right to vote which they have been legally granted."

Chileans are an orderly people and less subject than most South Americans to armed coups. One may hope the junta that ousted Allende will restrain its obvious prejudices in favor of the right and will seek to incorporate into any new regime some of the beneficial reforms of the old, while tempering economic socialism with social democracy. This would be a suitable monument to the late President whose aims were revolutionary but whose means were intended to be moderate.

The take-over in Chile by a military junta has demonstrated that the U.S. government in general and the Nixon administration in particular is suffering from a credibility gap. Allegations that the coup was engineered, or at least encouraged, by Washington through the Central Intelligence Agency are being made around the world. The administration, while conceding that it did have some advance tips that the take-over was coming, denies that it had any part in the affair and, specifically, that the President had heard the reports in time to do anything about them, even if he had wished to do so.

The CIA starts out with several strikes against it. After all it is well known that the agency did engineer a coup against the leftist government of Guatemala in 1954; that it had a hand in saving the Shah of Iran's throne in 1952; that it tried unsuccessfully to topple Sukarno's government in Indonesia; that it was central to the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs; that it has been involved in intrusions into Communist China; and that it conducted for years a secret war in Laos. President Nixon himself recently referred to the Iranian affair without mentioning the CIA role. He finally conceded, last year, that two Americans long held by China were, in fact, CIA operatives. And so on.

As to Chile, the CIA says its hands are clean. But it is on the public record that John McCone, the former head of the CIA, offered a big chunk of money to the agency on behalf of his new employer, International Telephone and Telegraph, to help prevent Salvador Allende from coming to power. So it is not likely that those who want to believe the CIA is involved in the anti-Allende coup will give the CIA a clean bill of health. As for those who hope, or even believe, that the CIA has learned some lessons or been reined in, it is not very easy to accept, on their face, the current CIA denials. Maybe they are true; but just maybe they are not.

But it isn't just a matter of the CIA; it's President Nixon himself. When you consider his record for dissembling, it makes you wonder about Chile.

During the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon campaign, candidate Kennedy proposed strengthening the anti-Castro forces. But candidate Nixon, who then was the Vice President, knew about the secret Bay of Pigs plan and, to protect the prospects of that invasion, he had to "go to the other extreme" and attack the Kennedy proposal as "dangerously irresponsible," as he himself has written. In short, he lied to cover the operation. More recently, as President, Mr. Nixon secretly authorized the undisclosed bombing of Cambodia while telling the public that the United States was not violating that country's neutrality. As to Laos, he admitted American involvement only when forced to

do so by a Senate investigation. In time we shall probably hear of other similar cases now still hidden.

In short, Mr. Nixon's record of credibility hardly encourages one to accept protestations of innocence in Chile. It reminds me of Thurston the Magician who used to show you how empty his sleeves were; he then proceeded to pull from them an amazing assortment of cards, scarves and other paraphernalia of his trade.

In the case of the Bay of Pigs Mr. Nixon, writing in his "Six Crises," never questioned the propriety or legality of the operation against Castro. "The covert operation had to be protected at all costs," he wrote. There is nothing in the Nixon record to indicate that he has in any way altered that point of view. Indeed, the justification in the Watergate case for trying to head off an FBI investigation of the Mexican money transactions was essentially the same. In short, the end justifies the means whenever the end is a matter affecting "national security."

President Nixon's aversion, to put it mildly, to the Allende regime was well known. His administration kept on supplying military aid while withholding economic help; international organizations were encouraged not to help Allende. The American ambassador had just made a quick trip back to Washington and had returned to Chile prior to the takeover. Put it all together and the only conclusion one can come to, given the record, is no clear conclusion — and a reasonable doubt about any official conclusion offered by the government.

Perhaps not directly related to Chile but part of the Nixon backdrop to his foreign policy methods is his penchant for surprises, for the quick switch, and for secrecy. Dollar devaluation, the change in China policy, the "Nixon shocks" to Japan, the mining of Haiphong harbor—even the switch to Phase I economic controls here at home—all testify to this style of doing business. Who can guess what he may have in mind for Latin America, where Henry Kissinger says he wants to institute new policies?

Integrity is perhaps the most precious asset that a government can have. The sad fact is that in the post-World War II decades successive administrations have eaten away at governmental integrity. One has only to recall President Roosevelt and the secret Yalta agreements, President Eisenhower's handling of the U-2 affair, President Kennedy's initial covert operations in Indochina and the panoply of evasions by President Johnson as documented in the Pentagon Papers. By the time Mr. Nixon got into the White House, government integrity had indeed suffered.

Somewhere along the line Mr. Nixon

NEW YORK TIMES
18 September 1973

Agony of the Americas

By Graham Hovey

How hollow the rhetoric that ushered in the Alliance for Progress in 1961 sounds in the wake of Chile's tragedy.

"This Alliance," declared the statesmen at Punta del Este, "is established on the basic principle that free men working through the institution of representative democracy can best satisfy man's aspirations. . . ."

First on their list of Alliance goals: "To improve and strengthen democratic institutions through application of the principle of self-determination by the people."

And now, twelve years later? Well, now we have a military junta ruling Chile with an iron fist after delivering the coup de grace to South America's most durable democracy.

And over the Andes, in the country where the Alliance was born, the armed forces of Uruguay (nobody knew they existed in 1961) govern by decree through a puppet President after helping to collapse the purest democracy in the Americas.

And across the Rio de la Plata estuary, the "application of the principle of self-determination by the people" seems certain on Sunday to restore the trappings of power—the substance having been returned months ago—to Juan Domingo Perón, the ancient, ersatz Mussolini who led Argentina from prosperity to bankruptcy before the Army booted him out eighteen years ago.

And up north, in the giant country whose elected President in 1958 paved the way for the Alliance for Progress with his inspired Operation Pan America idea, Brazil's army presides over a spectacular, if highly uneven, economic development, barely giving lip service to democracy and stamping hard on dissent. One of those stamped on is that ex-President, Juscelino Kubitschek.

One could go on, *ad nauseam*, but the point is clear: Twelve years after the launching with high hopes of an Alliance aimed first of all at underpinning freedom and democracy, there is much less freedom in the Americas. There is more oppression, more torture and terror, more censorship and rule by fiat.

Why have things gone so terribly wrong? Why have there been more coups since the beginning of the Alliance than in any comparable period in the modern history of the hemisphere? And most pertinently, in light of worldwide accusations of American complicity in the downfall of President Allende in Chile, is the United States primarily to blame for this situation?

The image of this country as ruthless, pervasive practitioner of neo-imperialism simply won't wash. If Washington had indeed turned the Monroe Doctrine into the Brezhnev variety there would be no Castro regime in Cuba and a Marxist Government would never have come to power in Chile (not even Lyndon Johnson's invasion of the Dominican Republic

in 1965 can be compared to the Soviet occupation of Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968).

Of course Washington would not help Dr. Allende clamp on Chile a draconian socialism fiercely opposed by a majority of Chileans. Nor would Washington influence international lending agencies to continue accepting Chile as a good credit risk once it became evident that Dr. Allende could not shore up the economy or curb inflation, and that his firebrands would not let him make good his pledge of fair compensation for expropriated enterprises.

But the ingredients for the Chilean tragedy were homegrown, not imported; here, as elsewhere, United States influence, for better or worse, was marginal. As Covey T. Oliver, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, has written: "We have the power, at one extreme, to remove almost any country from the map... but we could not, even if we wished, translate this into control over the country's routine actions."

The valid charge against the Nixon Administration on Latin America is more one of neglect than of imperialist exploitation. After the extravagant rhetoric and feverish activity of the Alliance for Progress heyday, the low-key approach charted by the President was widely welcomed. It soon became evident, however, that behind the lower profile was no hemisphere policy at all.

Mr. Nixon may have disclosed more of his thinking about the political crisis of the Americas than he intended in welcoming President Emilio G. Médici to Washington in 1971: "We know that as Brazil goes, so will go the rest of the Latin American continent."

Is that it, then? Is dramatic economic development achievable only under military rule in a climate of repression and censorship? Many American businessmen involved in Latin America devoutly believe so. Or, at the other end of the spectrum, is a redistribution of wealth, a better deal for the poorest Latins, possible only under a Marxist dictatorship? After the collapse of the Allende experiment, even many American liberals say so.

But can the American Government accept such theses? Even in disillusionment with the Alliance for Progress and recognizing that American influence will be only marginal, can Washington be comfortable with a nothing policy for a continent largely out of control but clearly lurching toward revolution?

Henry A. Kissinger said that his recent call on President Echeverría in Mexico City—his first diplomatic mission since President Nixon nominated him to be Secretary of State—"underlines the importance we shall attach to relations with Latin America." How fine it would be if he really meant it.

Graham Hovey is a member of the editorial board of *The Times*.

became entranced with General Charles deGaulle's idea of the "mystique" of high office, of holding aloof from the public, of treating the public like school children in a "papa knows best" manner. He is not the first President to act this way; it seems to be a failing of those chief executives in particular who have been quickest to wrap themselves in the "national security" blanket. But as President, Mr. Nixon has carried it to hitherto unknown extremes.

Perhaps the United States had no direct role in the Chilean affair; there certainly was reason enough, in internal Chilean terms, for the take-over, without judging the right or wrong of it. But this administration's credibility is so low, who can believe its denials?

NEW YORK TIMES
18 September 1973

U.N. Urged to Send Panel To Chile to Protect Rights

Special to The New York Times

Four Nobel Prize laureates urged the United Nations yesterday to send observers to Chile to protect Chilean citizens and political refugees "who risk reprisals and deportations."

In a statement issued at a news conference at the Church Center for the United Nations, which is across First Avenue from the United Nations headquarters, the four said that "the United Nations must exert its prestige to save the lives and the civil liberties of all those endangered by the violent overthrow of the legal Government of Chile."

The group consisted of Dr. Fritz Lipmann and Edward L. Tatum of Rockefeller University; Prof. Salvador Luria of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Prof. George Wald of Harvard. Also at the conference were Dr. Laurence Birns, a Latin America specialist at the New School, and Michael Harrington, former head of the American Socialist party.

WASHINGTON POST
13 September 1973

Coup in Chile

Chile's coup is different. Its special tragedy is that it ends Latin America's longest democratic tradition and also its most serious effort to carry out rapid social change within a framework of representative government. Whether the coup will arrest the country's social and economic disintegration, or lead Chile into an intensified class war, cannot yet be known. The leaders of the armed forces, until now on the sidelines of politics, conducted their takeover in the name of "liberating Chile from the Marxist yoke," as they described the elected government of Salvador Allende. At the same time, in an evident bow to the Allende constituency, the military leaders assured the workers that their economic and social benefits "will not suffer fundamental changes." Perhaps the Chilean military can return their country in a reasonable time to its democratic heritage. The experience of others is not encouraging. That is what is so regrettable about the failure of the Allende experiment. It is an outcome likely to harden both Latin Left and Latin right in the view that social change in a democratic context doesn't work.

Mr. Allende's truly unfortunate death—by his own hand, according to the new junta—imparts an additional somber and ominous note. Many in Latin America will no doubt regard him as a martyr whose death, like that of Che Guevara, symbolizes the implacability of American "imperialism." His politics, perhaps also his myth, are bound to move to the center of Latin and inter-American politics, and to becloud objective judgment of him. It is impossible not to note, however, that his 30 earlier years in the political wilderness had ill prepared him to exercise power. He ignored the limitations of his minority support and attempted to govern as though he wielded a majority. He lost control of many of his own supporters. His admirers can argue that he was bequeathed a political and economic legacy that would

have burdened any leader, but that is hardly a persuasive defense; the job was not forced upon him.

On the eve of Allende's election in 1970, Henry Kissinger, calling him "probably a Communist," said that an "Allende takeover" would pose "massive problems for us, and for democratic forces and for pro-U.S. forces in Latin America." The CIA and ITT discussed—apparently without further action—how to keep Mr. Allende from power. When Chilean moderates seemed to be looking for a satisfactory way to resolve the copper-nationalization disputes, the administration delivered a number of symbolic rebuffs to Mr. Allende and then proceeded to use its influence to deny him access to loans from the International Development Banks. The evident results were to stiffen the Chilean position on compensation for the copper firms, to work economic hardship on Chile, and to aggravate political tension there. Meanwhile, the U.S. kept up close links with the Chilean military. Military aid flowed; at the moment of the coup, four U.S. Navy ships were steaming toward Chile for joint maneuvers with Chile's navy. In denying CIA involvement in the coup yesterday, the State Department did not offer regrets either for the takeover or for Mr. Allende's death.

Sobering as it is to have to ask whether American ideological coolness and corporate influence played a role in the undoing of the Allende experiment, it is unavoidable. Indeed, the denouement leaves hanging the whole question of what ought to be the American policy toward the forces of economic nationalism churning much of Latin America. The issue is unquestionably worthy of the recall of Secretary of State-designate Kissinger before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for a closer look at our performance in Chile and its implications for future policy, or a separate congressional investigation, or both.

WASHINGTON POST
16 September 1973

Civil Rights Group Says Chile Junta Arrests, Executes, Allende Backers

Amnesty International, an independent organization concerned with the welfare of political prisoners, charged yesterday that there had been widespread arrests and executions of supporters of the leftist government of Salvador Allende since it was overthrown by a military coup.

The statement coincided with expressions of concern by many governments and other civil rights groups over the fate of Chilean and foreign backers of Allende, who died during the coup Tuesday.

A communique issued by the military junta yesterday said that it had identified 13,000 foreigners who were in Chile illegally, and members of the new government de-

scribed them as guerrillas and extremists.

The document said the 13,000 included 4,178 Bolivians, 3,256 Uruguayans and 987 Cubans. There were also large numbers of Argentines, Brazilians, Colombians and Mexicans, the statement said.

Amnesty International said that it had "well documented evidence" that most of the foreign exiles "were compelled to seek political asylum in Chile because the military regimes in Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and other Latin American countries were systematically arresting and torturing dissidents."

The group's statement repeated reports, some based on clandestine radio broadcasts from Chile monitored in Argentina, that many of Al-

lende's supporters had been executed.

It said the organization had "learned from reliable sources that members of Allende's Popular Unity coalition are being arrested. Many are being executed and many thrown out of helicopters."

Mario Artaza, the Chilean charge d'affaires in Washington, denied all reports of summary executions and other abuses, saying the accusations were part of a "very well orchestrated campaign to discredit the new government."

Asked about the many unconfirmed reports that various ministers in Allende's government had been killed, Artaza said: "The entire Allende Cabinet is being held in the military school in Santiago."